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turned over any evidence of factual innocence of the defendant). “[I]mpeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary (‘knowing,’ ‘intelligent,’ and ‘sufficient[ly] aware’). Of course, the more information the defendant has, the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a plea, waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision will likely be. But the Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) (‘ There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case’ ). And the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances – even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” “[T]his Court has found that the Constitution , in respect to a defendant’s awareness of relevant circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor. See Brady v. United States, [397 U.S. 742, at 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)] (defendant ‘misapprehended the quality of the State’s case’); ibid. (defendant misapprehended ‘the likely penalties’); ibid. (defendant failed to ‘anticipate’ a change in the law regarding relevant ‘punishments’); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (counsel ‘misjudged the admissibility’ of a ‘confession’); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (counsel failed to point out a potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (counsel failed to find a potential constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings). It is difficult to distinguish, in terms of importance, (1) a defendant’s ignorance of grounds for impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible future trial from (2) the varying forms of ignorance at issue in these cases.” Impeachment information is often of little value to defendants pleading guilty, where any evidence of factual evidence is being provided, but revealing impeachment information may impose a significant burden on the government because it “could seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing guilty pleas by disrupting ongoing investigations and exposing prospective witnesses to serious intimidation and harm, thereby forcing the Government to modify its current practice, devote substantially more resources to pre-plea trial preparation, or abandon its heavy reliance on plea bargaining. Due process cannot demand so radical a change in order to achieve so comparatively small a constitutional benefit.” 4. OFFER REJECTED/WITHDRAWN BEFORE ACCEPTANCE Wise v. State, 321 Ga.App. 39, 740 S.E.2d 850 (March 28, 2013). Conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to enforce plea agreement where defendant rejected the state’s offer; the offer was then withdrawn; and defendant then sought to accept it. “Wise maintains he had intended to take the plea offer, but that he was confused about some of the terms and that it was withdrawn while he was getting clarification. … ‘Because [Wise] did not accept the plea, there is no plea agreement to enforce.’ Carson v. State, 264 Ga.App. 763, 764, 592 S.E.2d 161 (2003).” Stewart v. State, 286 Ga. 669, 690 S.E.2d 811 (March 15, 2010). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to enforce plea agreement after defendant had already rejected it. “Once appellant repudiated receiving the benefit of his bargain, namely a lighter sentence on a lesser charge, and then withdrew his guilty plea, there was no longer a plea agreement for the trial court to enforce. Accordingly, appellant's conviction is sustained.” Scott v. State, 302 Ga.App. 111, 690 S.E.2d 242 (January 25, 2010). “[U]ntil accepted, the State may withdraw a plea offer at any time (unless for consideration the State has agreed otherwise). See Sparks v. State, 232 Ga.App. 179, 183(3)(c) (501 S.E.2d 562) (1998).” Accord, Bailey v. State , 313 Ga.App. 824, 723 S.E.2d 55 (January 31, 2012). 5. RECOMMENDATION REJECTED BY COURT State v. Kelley, S15G1197, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 124, 2016 WL 690392 (February 22, 2016). Reversing 331 Ga.App. 758, 771 S.E.2d 441 (2015); trial court properly granted motion to set aside judgment. “[T]he trial court does not have the authority to accept a guilty plea to an uncharged, lesser included offense without the consent of the State , and … where the State makes a timely and specific objection, it has the legal authority to withdraw its consent from a negotiated plea and demand a trial when it learns that the trial court does not intend to follow the sentencing recommendation.” In Kelley’s prosecution for felony murder and related offenses, the parties reached agreement for Kelley to plead to the uncharged reduced offense of voluntary manslaughter; in return for his plea and his truthful testimony against his co-defendants, “the State would nolle prosse the remaining charges and recommend a 20–year sentence.” The trial court, however, decided to impose a sentence of ten years, five to serve, and did so over the State’s objection, but later granted the State’s motion to set aside the judgment and entered sentence in accordance with the parties’ agreement. “[G]iven that the State has the authority and discretion to decide how to charge a defendant and