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whether to plea bargain with him and, further, that the trial court lacks the authority to accept a guilty plea to a reduced or mitigated charge without the State’s consent, it follows that, where the State has agreed to a reduced charge in exchange for a specific sentence, the State has the authority to withdraw from that negotiated plea and demand a trial if the trial court rejects that sentence in favor of one to which the State does not consent. Put another way, the trial court’s authority to accept a plea agreement to a lesser charge flows from the State’s consent to that agreement; as such, the State has the authority to withdraw that consent and demand a trial when the trial court announces its intention to reject the negotiated sentence on which the State’s consent is premised.” Disapproving State v. Harper, 279 Ga.App. 620(2), 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006), overruled on other grounds, State v. King, 325 Ga.App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (2013). “We also hold that, where a trial court intends to reject a sentence recommended as part of a plea agreement to a lesser charge, the trial court must, on the record and before sentencing, inform the State of its intention and allow the State to exercise its authority to withdraw its consent to the plea and demand a trial. Cf. State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455, 271 S.E.2d 851 (1980). If the State does not object, it will be presumed to have consented to both the defendant’s plea to the lesser charge and the imposition of the lighter sentence.” Benham dissents. Smith v. State, 239 Ga.App. 776, 521 S.E.2d 911 (September 1, 1999). In defendant’s prosecution for statutory rape and child molestation, trial court erred by rejecting the State’s sentencing recommendation and imposing harsher sentence without giving defendant a chance to withdraw his plea. “USCR 33.10 provides that: ‘If the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement, the trial court shall, on the record, inform the defendant personally that (1) the trial court is not bound by any plea agreement; (2) the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement presently before it; (3) the disposition of the present case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement; and (4) that the defendant may then withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right. If the plea is not then withdrawn, sentence may be pronounced.” Here, before hearing the recommendation, the trial court stated to defendant, “[Y]ou understand that regardless of any joint recommendation between your attorney and the District Attorney or what else [sic] anyone else may have told you[,] that this Court and this Court alone will impose a sentence upon you within the limits set by law which I've explained to you, do you understand that?” “We agree with Smith that this record fails to show compliance with the requirements of USCR 33.10. Contrary to the State's contention, the above quoted statement by the trial court at the first hearing was not sufficient to comply with the requirements of USCR 33.10. We find nothing in the record which clearly informed Smith prior to pronouncement of sentence, that the trial court intended to reject the sentence recommendation made by the State pursuant to the plea agreement, that the disposition of the case may be less favorable to him than that contemplated by the plea agreement, and that, given the trial court's intention, he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right prior to pronouncement of sentence. Fuller v. State, 159 Ga.App. 512, 513, 284 S.E.2d 29 (1981). The informational requirements of USCR 33.10 must be satisfied by explicit statements, not by vague statements or implication. Lawrence v. State, 234 Ga.App. 603, 507 S.E.2d 490 (1998). [Fn: Smith was not required, as the State contends, to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court in order to preserve his right to a direct appeal from the judgment entered on the plea. Agerton v. State, 191 Ga.App. 633, 634, 382 S.E.2d 417 (1989); Fuller, 159 Ga.App. at 513-514, 284 S.E.2d 29. ] ” 6. SENTENCE AFTER TRIAL GREATER THAN STATE’S PRE-TRIAL PLEA OFFER Hawes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 461, 680 S.E.2d 513 (June 18, 2009). Following jury trial after withdrawal of defendant’s guilty plea, trial court didn’t violate defendant’s process rights by entering enhanced sentence. Trial court expressly stated that enhancement was based on differences in facts disclosed at trial from those stated during plea hearing, and not based on exercise of defendant’s rights. “There is no absolute constitutional bar to imposing a more severe sentence upon re- sentencing. See Anthony v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 336, 337(1) (219 S.E.2d 413) (1975); Blake v. State, 272 Ga.App. 402, 403(1) (612 S.E.2d 589) (2005). And this Court has repeatedly held that it is not error for a trial judge to impose a greater sentence upon a defendant after he has heard the evidence at trial than he might have imposed in conjunction with a guilty plea. See West v. State, 241 Ga.App. 877, 878-879 (528 S.E.2d 287) (2000); Johnson v. State, 224 Ga.App. 568, 571(2) (481 S.E.2d 268) (1997). This is true because ‘in the course of the proof at trial the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crimes charged. The defendant's conduct during trial may give the judge insights into his moral character and suitability for rehabilitation.’ Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865) (1989).” Townes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 185, 679 S.E.2d 772 (June 3, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court sentenced defendant to 111 years to serve – the maximum on each count of burglary, aggravated assault, and related offenses – after trial, when it had expressed willingness to sentence to 10 years to serve pre-trial. Higher sentence after trial is not presumptively vindictive. “In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865) (1989), the Court determined that the presumption of vindictiveness was absent when a trial court imposes a greater penalty after