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trial than it would have after a guilty plea. ‘[I]n the course of the proof at trial the judge may gather a fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the crimes charged. The defendant's conduct during trial may give the judge insights into his moral character and suitability for rehabilitation.’ Id. at 801. Further, a guilty plea may justify leniency, a justification absent if the case proceeds to trial. Id. at 802. ‘A criminal defendant should not be allowed to reject a sentence concession that is offered in return for a guilty plea and then bind the State to that rejected original lenient sentence even though he is later convicted after a trial. To hold otherwise would allow a criminal defendant to go to trial and seek an acquittal knowing that, even if unsuccessful, he would receive a sentence which is no less lenient than that which he was originally offered. After trial, the factors that may have indicated leniency as consideration for the guilty plea are no longer present.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Price v. State, 281 Ga.App. 844, 846(2) (637 S.E.2d 468) (2006). The trial court's statements at the sentencing hearing indicate that the sentence was based on evidence that Townes' actions were life-threatening to the targeted victim and anyone else who happened to be nearby, that the jury convicted him of entering the dwelling with intent to commit murder, that his actions against this victim had escalated from his previous misdemeanor crimes, and that he displayed no remorse.” Accord, Richardson v. State , 305 Ga.App. 363, 699 S.E.2d 595 (July 9, 2010); Coghlan v. State , 319 Ga.App. 551, 737 S.E.2d 332 (January 16, 2013); Adams v. State , 327 Ga.App. 299, 758 S.E.2d 831 (May 13, 2014) (“In imposing a harsher sentence following trial, the trial court is “merely following through on the inevitable and permissible threat which is implicit in any plea bargain situation-that rejection of the plea bargain may diminish or destroy the very rationale for the imposition of a lenient sentence,” quoting Allen v. State, 193 Ga.App. 670, 671, 388 S.E.2d 889 (1989).). Moore v. State, 283 Ga.App. 533, 642 S.E.2d 163 (February 9, 2007). No error in imposing greater sentence after trial than that offered by trial court for pre-trial plea. “‘The trial court was merely following through on the inevitable and permissible threat which is implicit in any plea bargain situation – that rejection of the plea bargain may diminish or destroy the very rationale for the imposition of a lenient sentence.... A criminal defendant should not be allowed to reject a sentence concession that is offered in return for a guilty plea and then bind the State to that rejected original lenient sentence even though he is later convicted after a trial. To hold otherwise would allow a criminal defendant to go to trial and seek an acquittal knowing that, even if unsuccessful, he would receive a sentence which is no less lenient than that he was originally offered.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. State, 193 Ga.App. 670, 671-672 (388 S.E.2d 889) (1989). ‘In view of Allen and as [Moore’s] sentence is otherwise permitted by statute, the trial court did not err in its sentencing.’ (Footnote omitted.) Stuart v. State, 267 Ga.App. 463, 465(3) (600 S.E.2d 629) (2004). See OCGA §§ 16-7- 60(c); 17-10-7(a) and (c). See also Benjamin v. State, 269 Ga.App. 232, 233(2) (603 S.E.2d 733) (2004).” Green v. State, 277 Ga.App. 867, 627 S.E.2d 914 (March 3, 2006). Trial court did not err by entering greater sentence after trial than was offered by State prior to trial. “It is true that a judge should not impose a sentence ‘in excess of that which would be justified by any of the rehabilitative, protective, deterrent or other purposes of the criminal law’ merely because the defendant chose to try the case. Super. Ct. R. 33.6(B). But this does not mean that the trial court must sentence a defendant to the sentence that would have been appropriate had the defendant pleaded guilty. See West v. State, 241 Ga.App. 877, 878 (528 S.E.2d 287) (2000). ‘It is not error for the trial judge to impose a greater sentence upon a defendant after he has heard the evidence at trial than he might have imposed in conjunction with a guilty plea.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 878-879. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the trial court imposed consecutive sentences simply because Green declined to plead guilty. Moreover, the sentences imposed fall within the statutory guidelines. [Cits.] Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court’s sentence.” Stuart v. State, 267 Ga.App. 463, 600 S.E.2d 629 (May 18, 2004). “In Allen v. State, [193 Ga.App. 670, 388 S.E.2d 889 (1989)] we ruled that if the ‘trial court did impose a ‘harsher’ sentence than it otherwise may have been inclined to impose had [defendant] accepted the plea bargain, there was no unconstitutional ‘vindictiveness’ in so doing.” Accord, Benjamin v. State , 269 Ga.App. 232, 603 S.E.2d 733 (August 23, 2004); Rana v. State , 304 Ga.App. 750, 697 S.E.2d 867 (July 1, 2010) (after trial, trial court not “bound by the last offer made by the State during plea negotiations”); Bowen v. State , 307 Ga.App. 204, 704 S.E.2d 436 (November 16, 2010). 7. SENTENCE GREATER THAN RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT – NO TRIAL Lewis v. State, 330 Ga.App. 412, 767 S.E.2d 771 (October 23, 2014). Obstruction conviction reversed; where defendant provided testimony for the State against his co-indictees in return for a negotiated plea deal, “the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence upon Lewis which differed from the understood terms of the negotiated plea” without giving the defendant and the State “notice of the specific portions of Lewis' testimony that were material to the State's case against the co-defendants that the trial court may have considered questionable and an opportunity to present additional evidence and argument with regard to such testimony.” Critical factor here: “the record shows