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that the parties had a plea discussion with the trial judge in chambers prior to Lewis' plea and that the trial judge ‘went along’ with the State's recommendation at the time of the plea. Although this discussion was not transcribed, it appears from the colloquy at the time of the plea that the State had made a sentence recommendation and that the trial court had agreed to sentence Lewis in conformity therewith, provided that Lewis later testified truthfully at the trial of his co-defendants. Accordingly, we find that Lewis' plea was negotiated and that the trial court had accepted the plea under the terms understood by the parties.” Citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427) (1971) (“when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” “Here, it was the trial judge, not the prosecutor, who allegedly did not adhere to the understood terms of the negotiated plea. However, we find that the rationale set forth in Santobello should still apply in this case. When a trial judge accepts a negotiated plea and the defendant later relies on the terms of plea agreement to his detriment by waiving certain constitutional rights that cannot be recovered, the failure of the trial judge to adhere to the terms of the negotiated plea would likely offend the integrity and reputation of the criminal justice system even more than any unkept promise made by a prosecutor. This is so because judges are neutral, whereas prosecutors are adversarial by nature.” Analogizes to right to be heard on contempt charge; notes that court’s finding of Lewis’s untruthfulness “may call into question the validity of the co-defendants' convictions”; and suggests that “[a] reasonable question arises as to whether the trial court should recuse and allow another judge to make the decision as to the truthfullness of Lewis' testimony and whether he remains entitled to the plea deal.” Cert. granted on this issue, S15G0666, March 30, 2015. Brown v. State, 324 Ga.App. 194, 749 S.E.2d 781 (October 9, 2013). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to armed robbery and related firearms charges . “[T]he trial court erred by rejecting the negotiated plea agreement without first informing [defendant] that it intended to do so.” Plea agreement, signed by both sides, called for concurrent sentences “on all counts,” but trial court entered consecutive sentences. “The court did not inform Brown, prior to pronouncing the sentence, that it intended to reject any part of the plea agreement. Then, after pronouncing the sentence, the court denied Brown's request to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, reversal is required. See Thompson v. Greene, 265 Ga. 782, 784(1), 462 S.E.2d 747 (1995); Lawrence [ v. State, 234 Ga.App. 603, 604-605(1), 507 S.E.2d 490 (1998)].” 8. SENTENCE LESS THAN RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT State v. Kelley, S15G1197, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 124, 2016 WL 690392 (February 22, 2016). Reversing 331 Ga.App. 758, 771 S.E.2d 441 (2015); trial court properly granted motion to set aside judgment. “[T]he trial court does not have the authority to accept a guilty plea to an uncharged, lesser included offense without the consent of the State , and … where the State makes a timely and specific objection, it has the legal authority to withdraw its consent from a negotiated plea and demand a trial when it learns that the trial court does not intend to follow the sentencing recommendation.” In Kelley’s prosecution for felony murder and related offenses, the parties reached agreement for Kelley to plead to the uncharged reduced offense of voluntary manslaughter; in return for his plea and his truthful testimony against his co-defendants, “the State would nolle prosse the remaining charges and recommend a 20–year sentence.” The trial court, however, decided to impose a sentence of ten years, five to serve, and did so over the State’s objection, but later granted the State’s motion to set aside the judgment and entered sentence in accordance with the parties’ agreement. “[G]iven that the State has the authority and discretion to decide how to charge a defendant and whether to plea bargain with him and, further, that the trial court lacks the authority to accept a guilty plea to a reduced or mitigated charge without the State’s consent, it follows that, where the State has agreed to a reduced charge in exchange for a specific sentence, the State has the authority to withdraw from that negotiated plea and demand a trial if the trial court rejects that sentence in favor of one to which the State does not consent. Put another way, the trial court’s authority to accept a plea agreement to a lesser charge flows from the State’s consent to that agreement; as such, the State has the authority to withdraw that consent and demand a trial when the trial court announces its intention to reject the negotiated sentence on which the State’s consent is premised.” Disapproving State v. Harper, 279 Ga.App. 620(2), 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006), overruled on other grounds, State v. King, 325 Ga.App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (2013). “We also hold that, where a trial court intends to reject a sentence recommended as part of a plea agreement to a lesser charge, the trial court must, on the record and before sentencing, inform the State of its intention and allow the State to exercise its authority to withdraw its consent to the plea and demand a trial. Cf. State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455, 271 S.E.2d 851 (1980). If the State does not object, it will be presumed to have consented to both the defendant’s plea to the lesser charge and the imposition of the lighter sentence.” Benham dissents. State v. King, 325 Ga.App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (November 14, 2013). Following defendant’s guilty plea to robbery and aggravated assault, trial court entered sentence less than recommended by State. “The state moved to set aside the guilty