☢ test - Í

plea and sentence, claiming that the trial court was required to follow the state's recommended sentence or to give the state a chance to withdraw from the negotiated plea. The trial court denied the motion, noting, among other things, that all plea bargains are mere recommendations subject to the trial court's approval and that sentencing is within the complete purview of the court as long as it is within statutory limits. The state directly appealed, claiming it is entitled to appeal from allegedly void sentences. But because the state's claims do not actually amount to allegations that the sentences are void, the state cannot directly appeal. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.” Overruling State v. Harper , 279 Ga.App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006), “[t]o the extent that Harper conflicts with the instant opinion and holds that the state may directly appeal from a sentence on the ground that the trial court allegedly erred in disregarding a recommended sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, without first notifying the state and giving it the opportunity to withdraw.” State v. Harper, 279 Ga.App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (June 5, 2006). State has no right to withdraw plea where trial court announces intent not to follow plea agreement. Overruled to the extent it suggests that entry of sentence over State’s objection is void, State v. King , 325 Ga.App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (November 14, 2013). “To the extent that Harper stands for the proposition that the State lacks the authority to withdraw its consent when the trial court intends to deviate from the terms of a negotiated plea, we hereby disapprove it as failing to give effect to the broad discretion granted to the State to negotiate plea agreements,” State v. Kelley , S15G1197, ___ Ga. ___, 783 S.E.2d 124, 2016 WL 690392 (February 22, 2016). ZZ. SENTENCE REVIEW PANEL McClendon v. State, 318 Ga.App. 676, 734 S.E.2d 505 (November 20, 2012). Ruling on defendant’s “Motion to Hold Judgment Void,” trial court erred in holding that Sentence Review Panel order was void. In 2002, Sentence Review Panel reduced defendant’s twenty-year prison sentence for voluntary manslaughter to “twenty years, serve fifteen.” Defendant was released from prison after fifteen years, “and apparently ordered to report to the State Probation Department.” Charged with violating probation, defendant now contends that there are no valid terms of probation. Trial court erroneously agrees with State that Review Panel’s order was void because 1) defendant’s petition for review was untimely, and 2) Review Panel improperly imposed probation where none had previously existed. 1. Generally. “ In cases where the sentence is not void and the defendant filed an application for review of their sentence under former OCGA § 17–10–6, ‘as long as the sentence is one which is otherwise covered by an application, a Sentence Review Panel decision is totally insulated from a trial court's claim of reinvested subject matter jurisdiction over the question of punishment.’ Benefield v. State, 276 Ga. 100 (575 S.E.2d 453) (2003).” 2. Timely application. While applications for review were generally required within 30 days of sentencing or return of remittitur on appeal, USCR Rule 24 allowed for out-of-time applications under certain conditions. Court of Appeals assumes from the record that the Review Panel “acted under the authority of an accepted process to consider late-filed applications for sentence review.” 3. Imposition of probation. “It is true that the Panel did not have authority to modify a sentence to include probation where the initial sentence did not provide for probation. Davenport v. State, 155 Ga.App. 388 (271 S.E.2d 34)(1980).” Trial court erred, however, in assuming that the Panel’s order was an attempt to impose probation and was therefore void. “[E]ven if the ‘twenty years, serve fifteen’ language could somehow convey an attempt to probate five years of McClendon's twenty- year sentence, his original sentence did not provide for any terms and conditions of probation which could have been adopted by the Panel. Reducing the twenty-year sentence to fifteen years in confinement was clearly within the authority of the Panel, see OCGA § 17–10–6(a), and the trial court erred in finding that the Panel's order was void on that basis.” Belcher v. State, 304 Ga.App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (June 28, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to armed robbery and related offenses; trial court’s reference to possible sentence review didn’t make defendant’s plea involuntary. “A defendant's eligibility or ineligibility to seek sentence review is a collateral consequence of entering a guilty plea ( Reed v. State, 251 Ga.App. 606, 607 (554 S.E.2d 792) (2001)), and a defendant's ‘lack of knowledge of [such] collateral consequences cannot affect the voluntariness of the plea.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 582(1) (513 S.E.2d 212) (1999).” Cert. granted on whether Williams v. Duffy is still good law in light of Padilla v. Kentucky (see ATTORNEYS – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES, above), Alexander v. State, case no. S14G1762, September 22, 2014. Vaughn v. State, 298 Ga.App. 669, 680 S.E.2d 680 (July 1, 2009). Failure to advise the defendant, upon entry of non- negotiated guilty plea in March, 2007, that he had the right to have his sentence reviewed by the Sentence Review Panel, did not entitle defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. “Vaughn had no constitutional right to a sentence review by a three-judge panel. Indeed, after Vaughn's sentence was imposed, the Georgia Supreme Court held that former