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OCGA § 17-10-6 was unconstitutional. The Court found that the General Assembly lacked the constitutional authority to divest the state's trial courts of their established jurisdiction over sentencing by creating a quasi-appellate tribunal to review and alter otherwise lawful sentences imposed by those trial courts. Sentence Review Panel v. Moseley, [284 Ga. 128, 129-131(1), 663 S.E.2d 679 (2008)].” Defendant claimed that he wouldn’t have entered plea if he had known that sentence review wasn’t available, but evidence supported trial court’s finding that this testimony wasn’t credible. Sentence Review Panel v. Moseley, 284 Ga. 128, 663 S.E.2d 679 (July 7, 2008). Majority of Supreme Court declares unconstitutional former OCGA § 17-10-6, authorizing the Sentence Review Panel “to review and to reduce certain sentences imposed by the trial courts of this state.” Carley, writing for majority, finds this violates Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I, which provides that “[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in the following classes of courts: magistrate courts, probate courts, juvenile courts, state courts, superior courts, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court.” (Emphasis supplied.)” “This constitutional provision prohibits the ‘establish[ment of] a separate judicial forum.’ Smith v. Langford , 271 Ga. 221, 224 (518 S.E.2d 884) (1999). Accordingly, the General Assembly cannot divest a Georgia court ‘of its constitutional jurisdiction. Any such legislative act violates the constitution and is of no avail.’ Williams v. State , 138 Ga. 168, 170 (74 S.E. 1083) (1912).” However, Supreme Court also finds that any application of this holding to sentences already reduced by the Sentence Review Panel would amount to Double Jeopardy, and thus the ruling can have only prospective application. Sears and Hunstein concur, but point out that, under the terms of the 2006 legislation terminating the Sentence Review Panel, all remaining applications for review should already have been determined; thus, this decision may be an improper “advisory” opinion. Benham dissents, would find that the General Assembly was empowered to create additional courts under Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. 1, Para. 7. Fraser v. State, 283 Ga.App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129 (February 6, 2007). Failure to inform defendant of right to sentence review unlikely to be reversible error. “Certainly, ‘the better procedure is for the trial court to advise eligible defendants of the right to seek review of [their] sentence by the sentence review board at the time of sentencing.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Bruce v. State, 175 Ga.App. 453, 455(5) (333 S.E.2d 394) (1985). However, a failure to so inform a defendant will rarely, if ever, be harmful error on appeal given the provisions of OCGA § 17-10-6(a),” which allows filing of the sentence review petition after filing of the remittitur following appeal. Not helpful here that defendant himself was a criminal defense attorney who in fact had filed a petition for sentence review in this case. State v. Swartz, 277 Ga.App. 241, 626 S.E.2d 210 (January 17, 2006). 1. Defendant’s sentence of ten years’ incarceration, plus five years’ probation, was within the jurisdiction of the Sentence Review Panel, which extends to “any case, except cases in which the death penalty is imposed or cases involving a serious violent felony as defined in subsection (a) of Code Section 17-10-6.1, in which a sentence of 12 or more years, or several consecutive sentences which total 12 or more years, has been fixed and imposed by a judge, without a jury,” OCGA § 17-10-6(a). Statute is not limited to cases in which twelve years incarceration is imposed, despite caption of statute. “[U]nless there is an ambiguity in the statute, the plain language prevails over the caption in determining legislative intent. See Foster v. Brown, 199 Ga. 444, 450 (34 S.E.2d 530) (1945); see also Lutz v. Foran, 262 Ga. 819, 826 (427 S.E.2d 248) (1993) (Justice Sears, dissenting).” 2. “[T]he State suggests that Swartz’s sentence should not be subject to review because it followed a probation revocation. We note that Swartz initially was sentenced as a First Offender. Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules for the Superior Courts Sentence Review Panel, ‘[i]f a First Offender Act sentence is revoked and a sentence of 12 or more years is imposed, that sentence is reviewable even if the original First Offender Act sentence has already been reviewed by the Panel.’ Thus, we find no merit in the State’s argument. See OCGA § 17-10-6(a); Warren v. State, 204 Ga.App. 191 (418 S.E.2d 783) (1992).” AAA. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION Gregory v. Sexual Offender Registration Review Board, S15A1718, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085357 (March 21, 2016). Following his conviction for obscene internet contact with a child, Gregory was denied due process when he was demanded, but was denied, an evidentiary hearing regarding his categorization as a “sexually dangerous predator” under state sexual offender registration laws, OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq. The statute requires the Board to classify each person convicted “sexual offender,” as defined in OCGA § 42-1-12(a), as a Level 1, Level 2, or “sexually dangerous predator.” Each successive level results in greater registration requirements and restrictions on activities; the most restrictive level, sexually dangerous predator, requires lifetime GPS monitoring by the State, paid for by the offender, along with other restrictions. The offender has a right to administrative appeal, including submission of documentary evidence but no evidentiary hearing; the offender may then appeal to superior court, and again submit documentary evidence, and the superior court may, in its discretion, grant an evidentiary hearing. Here, Gregory exercised all of his appeal rights and sought but was denied evidentiary hearings at both levels of review. 1. “Considering the electronic