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nature of deportation,’ which has been ‘long recognized [as] a particularly severe penalty, [although] not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction,’ and which is ‘uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [Id.] In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Padilla relied on several factors : the fact that prevailing professional norms support the view that counsel must advise their clients of the risk of deportation, [Cit.]; the fact that deportation is ‘ intimately related to the criminal process’ in that it is ‘ nearly an automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions, [id.]; and the fact that deportation is a ‘ drastic measure’ which is the ‘equivalent of banishment or exile.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [Id.]. The Court further explained that in the case at hand, the terms of the relevant immigration statute were ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ as to the consequences of the defendant pleading guilty, such that it was ‘not a hard case in which to find deficiency.’ Id.” Same factors apply to sex offender registration: Prevailing professional norms: “the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice with accompanying commentary specifically reference registration as a sex offender as a collateral consequence about which defense counsel should advise their clients before they enter a guilty plea. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty 14-3.2(f), cmt. (3 rd ed., 1999). See also National Legal Aid and Defender Assn., Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation § 6.2 (1995) (noting that defense counsel should advise their clients, prior to entry of a plea, of any ‘civil disabilities’ that are a consequence of the contemplated plea). Furthermore, like deportation, registration as a sex offender is ‘ intimately related to the criminal process’ in that it is an ‘automatic result’ following certain criminal convictions. Drastic measure: “[W]hile sex offender registration is not the equivalent of banishment or exile, there is no denying that registrants face extensive restrictions on where they can live, work, and volunteer. See OCGA § 42-1-15. Indeed, certain registrants are subject to electronic monitoring for the remainder of their lives. See OCGA § 42-1-14(e).” And registration requirement here was ‘succinct, clear, and explicit.’ Remanded for consideration of prejudice prong. Distinguished, Clark v. State , 306 Ga.App. 352, 702 S.E.2d 657 (October 5, 2010) (defendant challenged voluntariness of plea, but expressly didn’t claim ineffectiveness of counsel). Hollie v. State, 287 Ga. 389, 696 S.E.2d 642 (June 28, 2010). Affirming 298 Ga.App. 1(3) (679 S.E.2d 47) (2009), 1. “the trial court did not err by making Jim Phillip Hollie's registration as a sex offender a special condition of his probation.” “OCGA § 42-1-12 contains no language expressly prohibiting a superior court from imposing sex offender registration as a probation condition. Nor do we interpret OCGA § 42-8-35(b), which sets forth certain enumerated terms and conditions of probation that may be imposed on persons like Hollie who commit criminal offenses which come within OCGA § 42- 1-12, as being exclusive in its provisions but rather recognize that the trial court has broad discretion to impose appropriate conditions not specifically listed therein.” Accord, Wiggins v. State , 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (November 8, 2010). 2. “[S]ex offender registration as a special condition of probation does not exceed the maximum penalty for Hollie's conviction inasmuch as his obligation to comply with the registration requirements after the completion of his sentence would be governed solely by OCGA § 42-1-12.” Accord, Wiggins v. State , 288 Ga. 169, 702 S.E.2d 865 (November 8, 2010). 3. “Contrary to Hollie's argument, the Court of Appeals correctly recognized that current law does not deem registration as a sexual offender to be punishment. See, e.g., Rainer v. State of Georgia, 286 Ga. 675(1) (690 S.E.2d 827) (2010).” Eilers v. State, 304 Ga.App. 607, 697 S.E.2d 295 (June 25, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender reversed; “OCGA § 42-1-12(e)(3) requires sex offender registration ‘by any individual who ... [h]as previously been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor and may be released from prison or placed on parole, supervised release, or probation on or after July 1, 1996 .’ (Emphasis supplied.). … Eilers was placed on probation on June 27, 1995, and the sex offender registration requirements apply only to offenders placed on probation after July 1, 1996.” Fact that defendant did register in 2005 and 2006 doesn’t change the result. Distinguished, Pardon v. State , 322 Ga.App. 393, 745 S.E.2d 658 (June 25, 2013) (defendant was subject to registration where his probation began after his release from prison in 2006, though sentenced in 1982). Rainer v. State, 286 Ga. 675, 690 S.E.2d 827 (March 15, 2010). Sex offender registration requirement was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant, convicted of false imprisonment of a 17-year old. 1. Not cruel and unusual punishment. “United States Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that sexual offender registry requirements such as those contained in OCGA § 42-1-12 are regulatory, and not punitive, in nature. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93(II) (123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164) (2003) (Alaska's sexual offender registration statute served a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and did not impose ‘retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause’ of the United States Constitution). … In light of this determination that such registry requirements are ‘not punitive, it follows that the [registry requirement under Georgia] law is not a “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment,’” quoting Doe v. Miller, 405 F3d 700, 723(V) n.6 (8 th Cir., 2005). 2. No equal protection violation – not “over-inclusive because it requires him to register as a sexual offender even though the offense that he committed against