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a minor did not involve sexual activity.” Employs rational basis test, as defendant is not a member of a suspect class. “[I]t is rational to conclude that requiring those who falsely imprison minors who are not the child's parent to register pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12 advances the State's legitimate goal of informing the public for purposes of protecting children from those who would harm them. Indeed, it is not unreasonable or completely arbitrary to believe that a child may be more at risk of harm from someone who would falsely imprison the child who is not the child's parent. Again, the fact that Rainer's offense did not involve sexual activity is of no consequence. The term ‘sexual offender’ is specifically defined in OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(20)(A) as ‘any individual ... [w]ho has been convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or any dangerous sexual offense.’ (Emphasis supplied).” Hunstein, writing for Benham, dissents from this ruling, would find the statute to be over-inclusive. “The majority concludes that it is rational to require non-parental false imprisoners of minors to register as sex offenders in order to ‘protect [ ] children from those who would harm them.’ [Cit.] But the statutory scheme creating the sex offender registry seeks to protect children not from all harm, but from harm by those who have committed certain designated offenses,” noting statistics that most non-parental kidnappings do not involve sexual assault. Accord, Smith (August 26, 2014), above (physical precedent only; registration is regulatory, not punitive). In re: Baucom, 297 Ga.App. 661, 678 S.E.2d 118 (April 30, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s petition for relief from sex offender registration under OCGA § 42-1-12(g)(1). Under the subsection, superior court judges have discretion to waive registration where more than ten years has elapsed from the end of defendant’s sentence, and “the court finds that the sexual offender does not pose a substantial risk of perpetrating any future dangerous sexual offense.” At hearing on his motion, defendant presented a psychiatrist’s report stating that he posed no risk of re- offending; but that report is not included in the record on appeal, nor does the record disclose the underlying facts of the offense. Thus, Court of Appeals can’t conclude that trial court abused its discretion. “ While, in considering a petition under OCGA § 42-1-12(g)(1), a superior court's inquiry is prospective, focusing on the potential risk that the petitioner will commit a dangerous sexual offense in the future, the facts surrounding the petitioner's original offense would be relevant to assessing that risk. When he took the stand, Baucom could have offered some explanation regarding his prior offense, but he chose not to do so.” Rogers v. State, 297 Ga.App. 655, 678 S.E.2d 125(April 30, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for an order declaring that he didn’t to register as a sex offender under OCGA § 42-1-12(e)(1); registration is required for “any criminal offense under Title 16 of the Georgia Code that consists of ‘[c]riminal sexual conduct toward a minor.’ OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(9)(B)(iii). In determining whether the conduct toward the minor was sexual in nature, courts must look to the underlying facts of the conviction in question. See Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834, 835(1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005); Brown v. State, 270 Ga.App. 176, 180(2), 605 S.E.2d 885 (2004). This inquiry may include looking to the underlying facts as set forth in the indictment or accusation. See Wiggins v. State, 272 Ga.App. 414, 422(7), 612 S.E.2d 598 (2005), rev'd in part on other grounds , 280 Ga. 268, 626 S.E.2d 118 (2006).” Registration was properly required here based on the underlying facts: defendant entered Alford pleas to two counts of aggravated assault as lesser offenses to rape and aggravated child molestation. Accord, Price (February 7, 2013), above. Planas v. State, 296 Ga.App. 51, 673 S.E.2d 566 (February 12, 2009). As a part of his sentence for statutory rape, trial court properly ordered defendant to register as a sex offender. “Under Georgia law, a person must register as a sex offender if, among other things, he or she is convicted on or after July 1, 1996 of ‘a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor.’ OCGA § 42-1-12(e)(1). … Statutory rape, codified in Title 16, clearly falls within the broad category of criminal sexual conduct toward a minor. And while it is true that ‘ conduct which is punished as for a misdemeanor or which is prosecuted in juvenile court shall not be considered a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor,’ OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(9)(C), the statutory rape admitted to by Planas does not fit within this exception. Misdemeanor statutory rape is limited to cases where ‘the victim is at least 14 but less than 16 years of age and the person convicted of statutory rape is 18 years of age or younger and is no more than four years older than the victim.’ OCGA § 16-6-3(c). But the victim here was 13 years of age. Moreover, Planas was prosecuted in superior court, not juvenile court.” Watson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 635, 642 S.E.2d 328 (February 20, 2007). 1. 2005 amendment to sex registry statute, OCGA § 42-1-12, applied registry requirement to defendant, who entered an Alford plea as a first offender to aggravated child molestation and sexual battery in 2000. “After the effective date of the 2005 amendment, … ‘even first offenders convicted before July 1, 2004, … were required to register,’” quoting Peters v. Donald , 282 Ga.App. 714, 639 S.E.2d 345 (2006). Accord, Rogers v. State , 297 Ga.App. 655, 678 S.E.2d 125(April 30, 2009) (“regardless of what version was in effect at the time of a defendant's sentencing, courts look to the current version of the statute to determine whether registration is required.”). 2. Registration requirement imposed after plea was entered was not an ex post facto law. “In