☢ test - Í

Thompson v. State , 278 Ga. 394, 603 S.E.2d 233 (2004), the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld OCGA § 42-1-13’s mandate that any convicted child molester who continued to reside within 1,000 feet of any area where children congregated would be guilty of a felony. The Court reasoned that because such a person’s failure to abide by the statute would give rise to ‘a new crime based in part on an offender’s status as a child molester,’ the statute was not retrospective and therefore was not an ex post facto law. (citation omitted.) Id. at 395-396; see also Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (Alaska statute requiring retroactive registration of sex offenders was non-punitive and therefore was not an ex post facto law). The same rationale applies where, as here, Watson would be guilty of a felony entirely distinct from those of which he was convicted in 2000 if he failed to register with the sex offender registry. [Cits.]” Accord, Miller v. State , 291 Ga.App. 478, 662 S.E.2d 261 (May 12, 2008); Frazier v. State , 284 Ga. 638, 668 S.E.2d 646 (October 6, 2008). Grovenstein v. State, 282 Ga.App. 109, 637 S.E.2d 821 (October 25, 2006). Sentence requiring defendant to register as a sex offender remanded for further consideration. Eighteen-year old defendant pled guilty to sexual battery against 14-year old victim, who performed oral sex on him voluntarily, according to her own testimony. Court ordered defendant to register as a sex offender. Court of Appeals remands for consideration in light of 2006 amendment to sex offender registration law, which makes certain offenses misdemeanors where defendant and victim are no more than four years apart in age, and exempts registration for those offenses. “Although a trial court is ‘required to sentence [a defendant] in accordance to the sentencing provisions that existed at the time of his criminal act[,]’ (emphasis omitted.) Lockhart v. State, 227 Ga.App. 481, 483 (489 S.E.2d 594) (1997), ‘[t]he designation of a person as a sex offender is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a regulatory mechanism and status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes.’ Ga. L.2006, Act 571, § 1.” State v. Plunkett, 277 Ga.App. 605, 627 S.E.2d 182 (February 14, 2006). Sex offenders sentenced as first offenders prior to July 1, 2004 are not required to register under OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(3), which by its terms applies “to sentences imposed on or after July 1, 2004.” Although court could make this a condition of sentence, see Evors (September 1, 2005), below. Evors v. State, 275 Ga.App. 345, 620 S.E.2d 596 (September 1, 2005). Registration as a sex offender may be required during the period of probation of a first offender sentence, even prior to the 2004 amendment to OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(3), which makes this explicit. Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834, 619 S.E.2d 346 (July 29, 2005). Trial court properly sentenced defendant to register as a sex offender upon his convictions for “criminal attempt to commit child molestation, criminal attempt to entice a child for indecent purposes, and computer pornography and child exploitation.” Offenses were criminal offenses against a victim who is a minor notwithstanding that they were not completed offenses, and notwithstanding that the “minor victim” was actually a police officer posing as a child on the internet. Wiggins v. State, 272 Ga.App. 414, 612 S.E.2d 598 (March 23, 2005), reversed in part on other grounds, 280 Ga. 268, 626 S.E.2d 118 (January 30, 2006). Trial court properly ordered defendant to register as a sex offender as part of sentencing for cruelty to children. Pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12, “a person who is convicted of, among other things, certain ‘criminal offense[s] against a victim who is a minor’ shall register as prescribed therein. OCGA § 42-1- 12(b)(1)(A)(i). ‘Criminal offense against a victim who is a minor’ with respect to convictions occurring after June 30, 2001, includes ‘any conduct which, by its nature, is a sexual offense against a minor.’ OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(4)(B)(xi). In Wiggins’ case, the cruelty to a child as stated in the indictment was the rape, the threat to arrest and jail the victim, and the force used to make her to touch his penis. The evidence in this case authorized the trial court to determine that Wiggins’ act of cruelty to a child fell within the purview of OCGA § 42-1-12.” Brown v. State, 270 Ga.App. 176, 605 S.E.2d 885 (October 26, 2004). Trial court correctly ordered defendant “to register as a sexual offender pursuant to OCGA § 42-1-12. Under that Code section, a person who is convicted of, among other things, certain ‘criminal offense[s] against a victim who is a minor’ shall register as prescribed therein.” Defendant’s offense of public indecency in the presence of victim, a minor, constituted “criminal sexual conduct toward a minor,” thus requiring registration under the act. Whole court opinion overrules State v. Chrisopoulos, 198 Ga.App. 876, 403 S.E.2d 460 (1991), “[t]o the extent that the cited language in Chrisopoulos suggests that the offense of public indecency is a victimless crime and that, therefore, a perpetrator thereof may not be required to register under OCGA § 42-2-1.” Not clear that every act of public indecency in presence of a minor would require sex offender registration – might be a case- by-case factual determination.