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BBB. SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING McCranie v. State, 335 Ga.App. 548, 782 S.E.2d 453 (February 2, 2016). Following 2010 guilty pleas to child molestation and statutory rape, trial court erred by failing to sentence defendant to a split sentence for statutory rape as required by then OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b): “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, and notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, any person convicted of a sexual offense shall be sentenced to a split sentence which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense. No portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court and such sentence shall include, in addition to the mandatory imprisonment, an additional probated sentence of at least one year. ” (Emphasis supplied.) “For statutory rape, where the defendant is twenty-one years or older, the minimum sentence is ten years imprisonment and the maximum sentence is twenty years imprisonment. OCGA § 16–6–3(b). Here, the trial court sentenced McCranie to ten years probation. Although the trial court had the discretion to deviate from the mandatory minimum pursuant to former OCGA § 17–10–6.2(c), the record is devoid of any mention at all of former OCGA § 17–10–6.2 or any discussion of the factors that must be considered under the statute. Moreover, the trial court did not enter the required written findings indicating that it was exercising its discretion to deviate from the mandatory minimum. See former OCGA § 17–10–6.2(c)(2). Since the trial court did not sentence McCranie to the mandatory minimum, or otherwise comply with the requirements of OCGA § 17–10–6 .2(c), McCranie’s sentence for statutory rape is void.” Accord, Watkins v. State , 336 Ga.App. 145, 784 S.E.2d 11 (March 10, 2016) (first child molestation convictions required split sentences). Richardson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 344, 779 S.E.2d 406 (November 6, 2015). Sentence for aggravated child molestation affirmed; Provisions of OCGA §17-10-6.2 didn’t apply to offenses committed prior to the statute’s enactment in 2006. Clark v. State, 328 Ga.App. 268, 761 S.E.2d 826 (July 14, 2014). Following guilty plea to child molestation, sentence vacated for failure to include at least one year of probation as required by OCGA § 17–10–6.2(b), which provides: “Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section, and notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, any person convicted of a sexual offense shall be sentenced to a split sentence which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense. No portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court and such sentence shall include, in addition to the mandatory imprisonment, an additional probated sentence of at least one year. ” 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, however, the language “which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment” does not limit the term of imprisonment to the minimum (five year) term. Based on “ Bowen v. State, 307 Ga.App. 204, 205(2), 704 S.E.2d 436 (2010), in which we ruled that OCGA § 17–10–6.2(b) ‘mandates a split sentence for sexual offenders that includes at least the minimum term of imprisonment.’ (Emphasis in original.) Thus, the statute authorizes the trial court to issue a split sentence that includes at least five years of imprisonment and at least one year of probation, for a total of no more than twenty years.” Accord, Spargo v. State , 332 Ga.App. 410, 773 S.E.2d 25 (May 29, 2015) (OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) mandates a split sentence of at least five years incarceration and one year probation on first conviction for child molestation). 2. Physical precedent only on this point. Sentence vacated for failure to exercise discretion by deciding whether to deviate downward from minimum sentence based on “OCGA § 17–10– 6.2(c)(1), when sentencing Clark. See Tindell v. State, 314 Ga.App. 91, 91–92, 722 S.E.2d 921 (2012) (The defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea with a recommended sentence of fifteen years, five to serve, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly, while concluding that it had no discretion under OCGA § 17–10–6.2(c)(1) to sentence him to less than the mandatory minimum sentence for the offense. This Court found that the trial court had erroneously failed to exercise its discretion under that statute, and it vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.); see also Holland v. State, 310 Ga.App. 623, 629–630(5), 714 S.E.2d 126 (2011).” Here, “the trial court appeared to believe that it had no discretion to sentence Clark to anything less than 20 years of imprisonment.” State v. Crossen, 328 Ga.App. 198, 761 S.E.2d 596 (July 11, 2014). Following guilty pleas to various sex offenses, trial court was authorized to impose sentences deviating downward from the mandatory minimum sentence requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b). “The statute provides that a defendant convicted of certain sexual offenses must be sentenced to at least the minimum term of imprisonment applicable to the offense, but allows the trial court to exercise its discretion to deviate from the mandatory minimum under certain circumstances.” Contrary to State’s argument here, and construing this ambiguous penal statute strictly against the State, Court of Appeals finds that the burden of proof is on the State, not the defendant, to show that downward deviation is not authorized. OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c) allows downward deviation “if the statutory factors are absent”: prior convictions for sex offenses or obscenity offenses; use of a deadly