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presented no evidence to the trial court to support his assertion at the motion for new trial hearing that the failure to seek a speedy trial, or dismissal for the State's failure to accord a speedy trial, was due to a systematic breakdown of the public defender system that could be charged to the State.” Cawley v. State, 330 Ga.App. 22, 766 S.E.2d 581 (November 21, 2014). In DUI prosecution, trial court’s denial of motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation reversed and remanded; trial court erred in assigning fault for delay in prosecution. 1. “[T]he responsibility for any delay associated with the trial judge's retirement … must be assigned to the state. See Howard v. State, 307 Ga.App. 822, 826–827(2)(b) (706 S.E.2d 163) (2011); Brooks v. State, 304 Ga.App. 281, 283(b) (696 S.E.2d 110) (2010).” 2. Delay caused by prior appeal over constitutional speedy trial, also remanded for proper application of Barker-Doggett factors, “should weigh against the state. See Richardson v. State, 318 Ga.App. 155, 160(2)(b) (733 S.E.2d 444) (2012); Goddard v. State, 315 Ga.App. 868, 874(2)(b) (729 S.E.2d 397) (2012).” 3. “[W]here, as here, ‘the trial court significantly misapplies the law or clearly errs in a material factual finding, the trial court's exercise of discretion can be affirmed only if the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court used the correct facts and legal analysis, it would have had no discretion to reach a different result.’ [ State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011)] (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).” Trial court here would have had discretion to reach a different result, so remand required. Also citing State v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 863 (734 S.E.2d 12) (2012). Andrews dissents, finds that trial court’s result would have been compelled if balancing test had been properly applied. Milner v. State, 329 Ga.App. 654, 765 S.E.2d 790 (November 14, 2014). In aggravated assault prosecution, no abuse of discretion in denial of motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial right. 1. Length of delay. Despite delay over 10 years, trial court could weigh State’s negligence in bringing case to trial “not heavily.” “ Milner argues that the delay should be weighed heavily against the State simply because of the length of the delay. This argument fails because the idea of a bright-line rule is anathema to the analysis of speedy trial claims. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90–91(II), 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009); [other cits.].” McFadden concurs specially, noting the presumption of prejudice affecting cases with extraordinary delays such as this one, as discussed in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), obviating “the majority opinion's extensive analysis about the propriety of a bright-line rule.” 2. Clerk’s error leaving the case on the dead docket for five years despite order removing it properly weighed “lightly or benignly” against the State. “ Placement of this case on the administrative dead docket was the result of Milner's failure to appear for his original arraignment rather than by an affirmative request by the State to refrain from prosecution. [Cits.] Furthermore, because Milner's case was ostensibly removed from the dead docket by the trial court's September 11, 2006 order, and because the parties believed the case had been removed from the dead docket as evidenced by the parties' subsequent filings, this time may still be counted against Milner.” 3. Failure to demand trial until “ten years after [Milner's] arrest, and on the eve of trial in 2012” properly weighed heavily against defendant. The record doesn’t support defendant’s claim that his delay was mitigated by the State’s failure to provide discovery; on the contrary the record discloses timely responses to each of defendant’s discovery requests, and no claim by defendant that any of the responses was incomplete or inadequate. Nor is defendant’s inaction mitigated by fault of defendant’s retained counsel. “See Vermont, 556 U.S. at 90–91(II), 129 S.Ct. 1283 (‘Because the attorney is the defendant's agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, delay caused by the defendant's counsel is also charged against the defendant.’) (citation and punctuation omitted); Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691, 694(2)(b), 715 S.E.2d 104 (2011); Howard [ v. State, 307 Ga.App. 822, 826(2)(b), 706 S.E.2d 163 (2011)] (‘the reality [is] that defendants may have incentives to employ delay as a defense tactic’). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor heavily against Milner.” Wofford v. State, 329 Ga.App. 195, 764 S.E.2d 437 (October 3, 2014). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to press constitutional speedy trial claim. Defendant failed to show prejudice from delay in trial based on death of expert witness. “Wofford has made no proffer as to what Francis would have specifically testified about or why that testimony would have been favorable to the defense. See Porter v. State, 288 Ga. 524, 530(2)(c)(4) (705 S.E.2d 636) (2011) (holding that the defendant failed to show prejudice where he did not show that a missing witness would have provided testimony favorable and relevant to his defense).” Heard v. State, 295 Ga. 559, 761 S.E.2d 314 (July 11, 2014). Murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to dismiss based on alleged constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Length of delay. “Contrary to Appellant's argument, the trial court did not err by limiting the speedy trial inquiry to the approximately 28 months when charges were actually pending against him,” thus excluding approximately four years between nolle pros of first indictment and issuance of second indictment. “‘[T]he Speedy Trial Clause has no application after the Government, acting in good faith, formally drops charges.’ United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696