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(1982).[fn] It is clear that the State acted in good faith in this case when it asked the court to nolle pros the first indictment. Rather than improperly ‘dismiss[ing] and later reinstitut[ing] charges to evade the speedy trial guarantee,’ id. at 10 n. 12, the record shows that the State sought to dismiss the first indictment because it doubted that it had sufficient evidence to convict Appellant, and arrested him again only after obtaining new evidence from the only eyewitness to the murder.” But note, time case was dead docketed would be counted, see Hayes (June 15, 2009), below. 2. Assertion of right. “ The trial court properly weighed the third Barker–Doggett factor, assertion of the speedy trial right in due course, against Appellant. He made no explicit demand for a speedy trial on the first indictment until after the court signed an order nolle prossing the case, and he then waited until five months after the return of the second indictment to file his motion to dismiss; his trial began less than two months after that.” Taylor v. State, 327 Ga.App. 882, 761 S.E.2d 426 (July 7, 2014). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed (but obstruction conviction vacated on other grounds); trial court properly denied plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Reason for delay. Trial court properly weighed reason for delay against defendant; record supported finding that delay was caused by “Taylor's dismissal of at least four court-appointed attorneys before he filed his motion, and Taylor caused even more delay by filing a motion to recuse the trial judge.” State v. Alexander, 295 Ga. 154, 758 S.E.2d 289 (May 5, 2014). Trial court properly granted plea in bar to defendant’s felony murder prosecution, based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Defendant was found guilty of child cruelty and not guilty of malice murder; jury was unable to reach unanimous verdict as to felony murder, so mistrial was declared. State then neglected to schedule retrial for eight years. 1. Assertion of right. Failure to assert right was mitigated by defendant’s lack of representation, incarceration, and limited education. “We have recognized that the absence of counsel for an extended time sometimes may mitigate the failure of the accused to assert his right more promptly. See [ State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 676(2), 706 S.E.2d 561 (2011)] (‘a trial court has the discretion to mitigate the weight given this factor when a defendant fails to assert his right during the period ... [when] he was ... without counsel’). Cf. Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265, 268(1)(c), 695 S.E.2d 201 (2010). Other courts have recognized the incarceration and limited education of the accused as potentially mitigating factors. See, e.g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 379–380, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969) (noting difficulties in preparing defense while incarcerated); Aaron v. State, 497 S2d 603, 604 (Ala.Cr.App., 1986) (‘[a]n accused's right to speedy trial remains undiminished even when he is already serving a prison sentence’) (citations omitted); United States v. Richardson, 291 F.Supp. 441, 447 (S.D.N.Y., 1968) (education level of defendant as mitigating factor); but see White v. State, 969 So.2d 72, 79(II)(1)(D) (Miss.App., 2007) (considering a defendant's education level under the ‘prejudice’ factor, rather than under the ‘assertion of the right’ factor).[fn] Although such circumstances may not always mitigate a failure to more promptly assert the right to a speedy trial, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it found mitigation in this case. It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the failure of Alexander to more promptly assert his right to a speedy trial against him only lightly.” 2. Prejudice. “In this case, the trial court found little, if any, actual proof of prejudice,[fn] but it nevertheless found that the presumptive prejudice was substantial, noting that ‘Alexander would be faced with allegations that are over nine years old,’ and that circumstance alone ‘practically impairs putting on a defense.’ [fn] Accordingly, the trial court weighed this factor against the State. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, ‘consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable, and ... affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.’ Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655(III)(A). Especially considering the length of the delay in this case, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it concluded that Alexander suffered prejudice—even if only presumptive prejudice—as a result of the delay. See, e.g., [ State v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 863, 867(2), 734 S.E.2d 12(d) (2012)]; [ State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 677(2), 706 S.E.2d 561(c)(4) (2011)]; [ State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 531(2), 705 S.E.2d 636(c)(4) (2011)].” Whatley v. State, 326 Ga.App. 81, 755 S.E.2d 885 (March 10, 2014). In prosecution for child molestation and related offenses, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on alleged constitutional speedy trial violation. Trial court declared mistrial when State made reference to medical exam of child victim, not previously disclosed, but found no intentional misconduct on prosecutor’s part, as prosecutor had just become aware of the exam. “[R]elying on the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Brewington v. State, 288 Ga. 520, 705 S.E.2d 660 (2011), the trial court held that ‘when a defendant has actually been tried and the trial ends with a mistrial, “the relevant time frame for purposes of a motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds is from the date of the mistrial ... through the date the motion was denied.”’ (quoting Brewington at 521(2)), 705 S.E.2d 660). The court then found that because only five months had elapsed between the mistrial and the court's ruling on Whatley's motion, there was no presumption of prejudice, Whatley's motion failed at the threshold, and the court need not engage in the second part of the speedy trial analysis. … As an initial matter, we do not believe that the rule set forth in Brewington applies to cases where a mistrial was caused by