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prosecutorial misconduct. The mistrial at issue in Brewington resulted from a hung jury, rather than from any misconduct by the State. Thus, we do not read Brewington as standing for the proposition that, for the purpose of analyzing speedy trial claims the clock is automatically reset whenever a mistrial occurs, no matter the reason for the mistrial.[fn] Rather, we view that case as holding that the time for analyzing a speedy trial claim will be calculated from the date of a mistrial only where the mistrial does not result from any misconduct by the State. Brewington, 288 Ga. at 521(2), 705 S.E.2d 660. See also Jakupovic v. State, 287 Ga. 205, 206(1)(a), 695 S.E.2d 247 (2010) (the delay in bringing the defendant to trial was calculated beginning with the date of the order granting defendant's motion for a new trial, where the grant of that motion was based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, rather than on any error or misconduct by the State).” “[B]ecause the mistrial was not caused by prosecutorial misconduct, we find no error in the trial court's decision to apply Brewington and calculate the relevant time period for Whatley's speedy trial claim beginning with the date on which Whatley filed his plea in bar. And because the delay between the filing of that motion and the trial court's ruling on the same was less than a year, the trial court correctly found that Whatley's speedy trial claim failed at the threshold.” Ward v. State, 325 Ga.App. 890, 756 S.E.2d 21 (March 4, 2014). DUI and related convictions affirmed; no constitutional speedy trial violation despite six-year delay. No prejudice shown despite defendant’s claim that “his key witness, who would have testified that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the incident, is now unavailable.[fn] The trial court found that while trial counsel explained at the hearing that he attempted to locate this witness by ‘talk[ing] to a couple of people,’ ‘Googling’ him, contacting county jails, and going ‘back to the place where [the witness] lived,’ counsel admitted that Ward lost track of the witness while he was incarcerated for four years on other charges. The court concluded that therefore Ward was ‘partially responsible for the loss of the witness,’ and that this factor must weigh ‘against the State, although it is modified by Defendant's actions.’ While counsel argued that Ward attempted to locate the witness at some point, there is no evidence that Ward had ever located or could locate this witness at any time during the six years his case was pending. Ward has simply not shown that this witness's unavailability was due to the State's delay in bringing his case to trial. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 687(d), 600 S.E.2d 747 (2004) (no evidence that defendant lost contact with out-of-state individuals because of delay in bringing case to trial); cf. Salahuddin v. State, 277 Ga. 561, 563(2), 592 S.E.2d 410 (2004) (defendant shared partial responsibility for loss of alibi witness; defendant not precluded from asserting alibi defense). Under these circumstances, the failure to show prejudice should have been weighed against Ward.” Jenkins v. State, 294 Ga. 506, 755 S.E.2d 138 (February 24, 2014). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for malice murder and related charges; trial court properly found no constitutional speedy trial violation. Defendant’s original conviction was overturned on habeas petition, affirmed by Supreme Court in 2006. In 2013, Defendant filed plea in bar. 1. Reason for delay. Trial court properly assigned part of the blame for the delay to State based on “confusion as to whether heabeas counsel would continue to represent [defendant] or whether the State’s indigent defense counsel program would assume responsibility for the case.” Other factors contributed to the delay, and “the trial court plainly recognized the defense’s role in the protracted proceedings, but it properly also acknowledged the contributing difficulty of confusion involving Jenkins’s indigent defense,” citing Phan (February 27, 2012), below. 2. Assertion of right. Despite the confusion as to who would represent defendant, the trial court “properly held [defendant] fully accountable for his failure to demand a speedy trial from the 2006 affirmance of his grant of habeas relief until 2012. During this time, there was no evidence of any conflict of interest of defense counsel or of any government action which would have prevented Jenkins from raising his right to a speedy trial. Thus, this factor must be weighed heavily against Jenkins. See State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 677(2)(c)(3) (706 S.E.2d 561) (2011).” State v. Johnson, 325 Ga.App. 128, 749 S.E.2d 828 (November 7, 2013). Physical precedent only. In DUI prosecution, grant of plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation affirmed. Length of delay. Trial court properly weighed length of delay against the State. “Here, the trial court found that a delay of almost three years in a misdemeanor case was significant. Because this was a simple DUI case, all the investigation appeared to have been completed at the time of Johnson's arrest. According to the clerk's office, eight terms of court had passed since she filed her request for a jury trial, at least half of which occurred after August 2011. The delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial and, as the trial court found, is considered an uncommonly long delay.” 2. Reason for delay. Defendant was incarcerated in the State system on other charges but seeking trial on her DUI charge. Prosecutor, however, declined to have her produced from State system, preferring to wait until her release. Held, trial court properly attributed the delay to the State based on its refusal to produce defendant despite her request. “Here, the trial court found that, since at least April 2011, the delay in bringing Johnson to trial was due to the State's deliberate choice not to request a production order, but to allow Johnson to serve her sentence and then prosecute her thereafter for the DUI. Although the trial court did not