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ascribe any intent to deliberately penalize Johnson to the State, it did note that this delay is ‘some type of official neglect’ at a bare minimum, relying on State v. Shirley, 311 Ga.App. 141, 143(3)(b) (714 S.E.2d 636) (2011).” “Although the assistant solicitor testified that his office had previously initiated requests for production orders, that practice had ceased and is now left to the court. The State argues that the Solicitor General was not responsible for issuing production orders and, therefore, any delay caused by the failure to issue one is not its fault. This argument clearly overlooks the fact that ‘the primary burden is on both the prosecutor and the court to bring the case to trial, and the [S]tate bears the ultimate responsibility for its dockets.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Harris v. State, 314 Ga.App. 565, 567–568(b)(ii) (724 S.E.2d 864) (2012).” 3. Prejudice shown by fact that pending DUI charge had “an impact on her incarceration in that she was not able to participate in certain programs and her inability to do so prolonged her incarceration,” citing Johnson (February 3, 2012), below. Trial court also properly found that defendant suffered “anxiety and concerns while in jail above and beyond those normally suffered by defendants in a pending case,” and impairment of her case due to loss of a sescurity video from the store parking lot where her arrest took place. Anxiety: defendant spoke with a counselor during and after her incarceration regarding her ability to care for her family with a suspended license, which would have been alleviated if her license suspension had run while incarcerated. Cawley v. State, 324 Ga.App. 358, 750 S.E.2d 428 (October 25, 2013). In DUI prosecution, failure to weigh Barker factors in deciding constitutional speedy trial violation requires remand to trial court. “‘It is imperative … that in cases implicating a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial, the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker. Absent such findings, there is no exercise of discretion for this Court to review.” Higgenbottom [ v. State, 288 Ga. 429, 430-431 (704 S.E.2d 786) (2011)]. Accordingly, we have vacated and remanded cases where the trial court failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Barker. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 311 Ga.App. 369 (715 S.E.2d 774) (2011); Jackson v. State, 311 Ga.App. 342 (715 S.E.2d 761) (2011); Goddard v. State, 310 Ga.App. 2, 4–5(2) (712 S.E.2d 528) (2011); Moore v. State, 309 Ga.App. 519, 520 (710 S.E.2d 692) (2011). See also Higgenbottom, 288 Ga. at 431.” “Furthermore, ‘we note that the speedy trial clock is still ticking, and the trial court's analysis on remand should take into account that the length of the pretrial delay continues to run until entry of a ... written order applying the Barker–Doggett framework.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Richardson v. State, 318 Ga.App. 155, 164(2)(e) (733 S.E.2d 444) (2012).” Trial court here entered only summary order containing no findings of fact or conclusions of law. Accord, Leopold v. State , 324 Ga.App. 550, 751 S.E.2d 184 (November 7, 2013) (failure to make findings of fact requires remand); Munna v. State , 331 Ga.App. 410, 771 S.E.2d 106 (March 20, 2015) (failure to make findings of fact requires remand); Thomas v. State , 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). State v. Pickett, 324 Ga.App. 273, 750 S.E.2d 177 (October 17, 2013). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss his prosecution for child molestation based on constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Assertion of right. Failure to demand trial weighed against defendant, but “Pickett's failure to assert his right in due course was mitigated by the fact that he was on bond and did not have an attorney for nearly three years prior to indictment.” 2. Prejudice was adequately shown by defendant’s “anxiety from not having any contact with his children for more than five-and-a-half years because of his bond condition. … The trial court also again presumed prejudice from the length of pretrial delay.” State v. Takyi, 322 Ga.App. 832, 747 S.E.2d 24 (July 12, 2013). In DUI prosecution, no abuse of discretion in granting motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial deprivation. 1. Length of delay. Trial court properly found that “the 46–month delay was uncommonly long, ‘especially for misdemeanor traffic offenses with one witness and no follow up investigation.’ See State v. Bucknor, 292 Ga. 390, 393(3)(a), 738 S.E.2d 65 (2013) (the complexity and seriousness of the charges at issue are relevant in weighing the length of the delay); Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–53.” 2. Calculating delay. On remand from State’s prior appeal, trial court should have included appeal time in calculating length of delay. “Because the trial court entered a second order subsequent to our decision to vacate and remand, the trial court erred in calculating the length of the delay as only the initial 18–month delay.” 3. Reason for delay – prosecutorial resources. “[T]he State admitted that it could not locate Takyi's case, citing budget cuts and limited staffing. However, ‘unreasonable delay in run of the mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State's criminal justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn.’ Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 338, 345(2), 680 S.E.2d 182 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).” 4. Reason for delay – State’s prior appeal. “[T]he trial court properly attributed to the State the additional 28–month delay between its original grant of Takyi's motion to dismiss and its second grant of the same. See Richardson [ v. State, 318 Ga.App. 155, 160, 733 S.E.2d 444 (2012)]. The defendant is not charged with the delay resulting from the State's appeal.” 5. Prejudice. Trial court properly found prejudice to defendant: “the trial court found that Takyi suffered unusual and extreme anxiety and emotional pain due to her uncertain immigration status, such that she was ‘frightened that at any time her unresolved immigration status could force her to leave the U.S.’