☢ test - Í

The trial court heard testimony from Takyi and her attorneys about the actions they took regarding her pending citizenship application and the emotional impact the attorneys understood the situation to have on Takyi.” Jackson v. State, 322 Ga.App. 196, 744 S.E.2d 380 (June 12, 2013). Conviction for possession of a firearm during commission of a crime affirmed; trial court properly found no constitutional speedy trial violation. “In this case, Jackson failed to show that the approximate seven-month delay since his indictment was presumptively prejudicial. Jackson's argument, both in his motion to dismiss before the trial court and on appeal to this Court, is based on the assertion that the four-year delay prior to his indictment was presumptively prejudicial. As noted above, Jackson's constitutional rights to a speedy trial did not attach until his indictment. ‘Where the delay occurs in the investigative stage before either arrest or indictment, due process, not sixth amendment, standards apply.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 205(4), 586 S.E.2d 651 (2003). ‘A due process violation requires a finding 1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the defense, and 2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the prosecution designed to gain a tactical advantage.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id.” No such showing of either prejudice or intentional tactical delay made here. Brock v. State, 293 Ga. 156, 743 S.E.2d 410 (May 20, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly found no constitutional speedy trial violation. Assertion of right. “Brock never filed a speedy trial demand in any form prior to trial, first asserting the claim 17 months after the jury had convicted him of murder. The Supreme Court stated in Barker that ‘barring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates ... that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.’ Barker, 407 U.S. at 536. In this case, the trial court found that trial counsel did not file a speedy trial demand after he was hired in 2009 for strategic reasons: he believed the passage of time would benefit the defense and his client was out on bond. In addition, the trial court found unpersuasive Brock's testimony that he disagreed with his attorney and had expressed a desire for a speedy trial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor heavily against Brock. See Wilkie v. State, 290 Ga. 450, 453 (721 S.E.2d 830) (2012); see also State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 529(2)(c)(3) (705 S.E.2d 636) (2011) (‘an extended delay in asserting the right to a speedy trial should normally be weighed heavily against the defendant.’).” Prejudice. “ Brock argues that he was significantly impaired because one of his alibi witnesses died prior to trial and the passage of time impaired the ability of his other witnesses to recall events. The witness, however, died 18 months after the fire in July 2004, and Brock was able to read the witness's testimony from the May 2003 pretrial hearing into evidence at trial. Moreover, “the dimming of memories and loss of evidence that inevitably accompany the passage of time tend to help rather than hinder the accused” since the government has the burden of proving each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Ruffin [ v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 62 (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)].” State v. Gay, 321 Ga.App. 92, 741 S.E.2d 217 (March 29, 2013). In armed robbery prosecution, trial court erred by granting motion to dismiss indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 1. Trial court erred by counting delay from date of offense rather than date of indictment or arrest. Trial court reasoned “that the State was aware of Gay's whereabouts in April and May 2004 [when the offense occurred]. The trial court further noted that the State indicted a co- perpetrator of the crime, Albert Huckaby, and tried and convicted Huckaby in 2005 and 2006, before Gay was ever indicted.” Gay wasn’t indicted until September, 2008. “As the United States Supreme Court has said, the ‘right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution [and is] triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official accusation....’ Doggett [ v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655(III)(A), 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)]. Delays before arrest or indictment are subject to due process, and not speedy trial, analysis. Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 412(2), 667 S.E.2d 605 (2008); Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 878(2), 426 S.E.2d 852 (1993); Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898(2), 252 S.E.2d 397 (1979). Thus, the Sixth Amendment provides no guarantee of a right to a speedy arrest, although inordinate delay between the time a crime is committed and the time a defendant is arrested or indicted may violate due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Wooten, 262 Ga. at 878(2), 426 S.E.2d 852.” 2. Reason for delay. Because the period before indictment and arrest isn’t considered in determining length of delay, the State’s inaction during this period – even if amounting to bad faith, as the trial court found – shouldn’t have been considered as affecting defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right. 3. Assertion of right. “[A] defendant's assertion of the statutory right to a speedy trial is not equivalent to the assertion of a constitutional speedy trial claim. See Torres v. State, 270 Ga. 79, 80(2), 508 S.E.2d 171 (1998) (although defendant ‘file[d] a speedy trial demand, it was based on state statutory grounds rather than the constitutional ground raised in this appeal and asserted for the first time in his motion for acquittal’). Nevertheless, a trial court may accept the assertion of the statutory right as providing some notice to the State and militating in the defendant's favor for purposes of the Barker analysis. See Redd v. State, 261 Ga. 300, 302, 404 S.E.2d 264 (1991); Robinson v. State, 298 Ga.App. 164, 167–168(1)(b), 679 S.E.2d 383 (2009). Thus a