☢ test - Í

Strickland is satisfied upon a showing that, but for defense counsel’s error, a mistrial would have been granted; that prong does not further require a showing that acquittal would result from retrial,” citing Stanford v. Stewart , 274 Ga. 468, 470, 554 S.E.2d 480 (2001). Distinguished in Navarro v. State , 279 Ga.App. 311, 630 S.E.2d 893 (May 11, 2006) (theme of prosecutor’s closing – “Navarro’s alleged gang affiliation” – was supported by evidence, and thus not “unfair,” so no ineffective assistance for failure to object thereto.). Harris v. State, 265 Ga.App. 876, 595 S.E.2d 683 (February 27, 2004). “That an objection could be made does not demand its making when the impact would be negligible, and the failure to make such objection does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.” Mealor v. State, 266 Ga.App. 274, 596 S.E.2d 632 (February 10, 2004). Counsel’s failure to object to three witnesses’ testimony, that they believed minor molestation victim was telling truth, was deficient, but “the testimony in this case was not so significant as to have contributed to the jury’s verdict, particularly in light of [teenage victim’s] testimony.” Distinguished from Mann v. State , 252 Ga.App. 70, 555 S.E.2d 527 (2001), where victim’s “testimony was ‘far from compelling’” and victim’s statements were only evidence of defendant’s guilt. Dorsey v. State, 265 Ga.App. 597, 595 S.E.2d 106 (January 30, 2004). “Counsel’s decision to forego objecting to cumulative evidence is a legitimate trial strategy that falls within the range of reasonable professional conduct.” Taylor v. State, 264 Ga.App. 665, 592 S.E.2d 148 (December 1, 2003). Prosecutor was properly allowed to ask similar transaction victim how her life had been affected by defendant’s attack, where defense counsel opened the door by introducing the subject of “why she was reluctant to go through with a trial at the time of the crime and why she was able now to come and testify.” Prosecutor’s question to present victim about how her life had been affected by rape, and her response about nightmares and now dressing “more like a ‘boy’ so that her body would be ‘covered up’” were objectionable, but there is no “reasonable probability” they contributed to the jury’s verdict. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to these questions. Beck v. State, 263 Ga.App. 256, 587 S.E.2d 316 (September 17, 2003). “The making of objections falls within the realm of trial tactics and strategy and usually provides no basis for reversal of a conviction.” Williams v. State, 261 Ga.App. 511, 583 S.E.2d 172 (June 5, 2003). Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to object to prosecutor’s closing argument which included as a major theme references to defendant’s future dangerousness and references to the Columbine shootings and bombings of public buildings. (Defendant was on trial for criminal trespass and obstruction.) Collins v. State, 248 Ga.App. 62, 545 S.E.2d 607 (February 14, 2001). Defendant was found guilty of DUI-less safe. Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorney did not object to testimony from one of the arresting officers that the defendant had failed the field sobriety tests. Held, the defendant has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different if counsel had objected to the officer using the term “failed.” Alternative language that conveyed that the defendant had not performed the tests adequately would have had the same effect. Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 402, 538 S.E.2d 67 (July 28, 2000). Vehicular homicide convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to object to State’s closing argument. Contrary to defendant’s argument, “the prosecutor did not argue that driving without a license, on its own, was sufficient to prove reckless driving. The prosecutor was merely discussing the elements of reckless driving and giving examples of how Davis exhibited reckless disregard for the safety of others. Furthermore, according to trial counsel, Cella briefly thought about objecting but felt that the state's argument was weak and ridiculous and ‘didn't think that the judge would tell him not to make it.’ Given the fact that he had a chance to address the argument in his closing, Cella made a strategic decision not to object.” Adkinson v. State, 245 Ga.App. 178, 537 S.E.2d 474 (July 14, 2000). Simple battery and related drug and other convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel stipulated defendant’s wife’s custodial statement into evidence. Wife and Adkinson were both charged with possession, and each blamed the other. “Adkinson's counsel had read and studied Kimberly's statement, and he wanted to use it against her. Because he did not know whether Kimberly would testify, he seized the opportunity to put Kimberly's statement into evidence. He testified that he believed Kimberly's statement would prove favorable to Adkinson because it was self-contradictory and, in his opinion, ‘so