☢ test - Í

incredible, so outlandish, that I thought it would help my client if I allowed the statement in.’ … [Counsel] chose not to have the statement redacted because he felt that the jury would see that Kimberly was just trying to place all guilt on her husband. He believed that the statement as a whole ‘would help instead of hurt.’ He thought that there was ‘an excellent chance that the jury would believe that they were her drugs and her drug paraphernalia and not Mr. Adkinson's.’” Banks v. State , 244 Ga.App. 191, 535 S.E.2d 22 (May 17, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to admission of defendant’s custodial statement, as it “corroborated in all respects his trial defense that he was an innocent bystander to co-defendant White's carjacking scheme. At the motion for new trial, defense counsel testified that ‘[t]herefore I thought it would be helpful to have his statement to Major Overbey come in as corroborating and consistent with his statements during the course of the trial.’ Such strategic decision with regard to the admission of evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Hamilton v. State, 238 Ga.App. 320, 322(3), 517 S.E.2d 118 (1999).” Jackson v. State , 243 Ga.App. 289, 531 S.E.2d 747 (March 17, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel “failed to object to comments made by the prosecution at closing arguments regarding Jackson having been ‘on the run.’ An objection may simply have highlighted the point being made by the prosecution, so we cannot say this was not a valid exercise of professional judgment.” Accord, Christopher v. State , 314 Ga.App. 809, 726 S.E.2d 411 (February 17, 2012) (Physical precedent only) (failure to object to minor factual discrepancies in prosecutor’s closing argument not deficient); Crawford v. State , 314 Ga.App. 796, 726 S.E.2d 58 (February 17, 2012) (counsel “did not object to the state's closing argument because the objections would have been so minor and ‘nitpicking’ that they could have alienated the jury and thus done a disservice to the defendant.”). Shelnutt v. State, 242 Ga.App. 723, 531 S.E.2d 122 (March 10, 2000). Defendants’ aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to hearsay or irrelevant matter, which counsel deemed not harmful. “‘Decisions as to whether to interpose certain objections fall within the realm of trial tactics and strategy and usually provide no basis for reversal of a conviction.’ Herndon v. State, 235 Ga.App. 258, 259, 509 S.E.2d 142 (1998).” Gilliam v. State, 240 Ga.App. 158, 522 S.E.2d 766 (September 28, 1999). Seems to hold that defense counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to object to officer’s hearsay testimony about an out-of-court identification of defendant: “‘ One person who insisted on remaining anonymous stated that not only does she – is she familiar with the person in the photograph, she knew his first name and last name. She identified the person as Tony Gilliam. She further testified that this person had a girlfriend by the name of Lucy Mims and lives in the area of Mom and Pop's Grocery Store or Convenience Store which is located on the 2000 block of Broad Street.’ Gilliam is correct that this testimony was objectionable as hearsay. It was not, as the State asserts, admissible to explain [Officer] Piper's conduct. This case was not one of the rare instances where the investigating officer's motives, intent or state of mind was relevant. See Brinson v. State, 268 Ga. 227, 228-229(3), 486 S.E.2d 830 (1997).” No prejudice, however, based on other identifications, properly admitted, and overwhelming evidence of guilt. Rivers v. State, 271 Ga. 115, 516 S.E.2d 525 (May 17, 1999). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “An attorney's failure to object to [objectionable] testimony may be seen as trial strategy, i.e., avoiding an objection that would draw the jury's attention to the statement. See Smith v. State, 234 Ga.App. 586(1)(a)(ii), 506 S.E.2d 406 (1998).” Accord, Allen v. State, 272 Ga. 513, 530 S.E.2d 186 (May 8, 2000); Bowman v. State , 324 Ga.App. 734, 751 S.E.2d 532 (November 15, 2013); Davis v. State , 326 Ga.App. 778, 757 S.E.2d 443 (April 2, 2014).

43. EVIDENCE, FAILURE TO PRESENT See subheadings WITNESSES, FAILURE TO IMPEACH and WITNESSES/ SECURE WITNESSES/PRESENT EVIDENCE/SECURE EVIDENCE/FAILURE TO PRESENT, below 44. EXPERT WITNESS, FAILURE TO HIRE/SEEK FUNDS

King v. State, A15A1878, ___ Ga.App. ___, 784 S.E.2d 875, 2016 WL 1237321 (March 30, 2016). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in “failing to present an expert witness on eyewitness identification. As the Supreme Court recognized in Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (2011), ‘[t]he holding in Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (2000), concerning testimony of an expert in eyewitness identification does not stand for the proposition that defense counsel is required to call an expert witness at trial where one of the primary issues involved is eyewitness identification of the defendant, let alone the proposition that the failure to call such an expert witness amounts to ineffective assistance.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.)