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S.E.2d 851. … This court has previously recognized valid strategic reasons for deciding not to present such an expert. In Breland v. State, 287 Ga.App. 83, 651 S.E.2d 439 (2007), ‘trial counsel testified she chose not to pursue evidence of an expert in eyewitness identification because she feared that doing so would have prompted the state to do the same, which she believed ultimately would have harmed [the] defense.’ Id. at 88(3), 651 S.E.2d 439. We concluded that ‘[t]rial counsel’s tactical decision that the risks of introducing such expert evidence outweighed its potential benefits did not constitute deficient performance.’ Id. See also Winfield v. State, 278 Ga.App. 618, 620–621(2), 629 S.E.2d 548 (2006) (trial counsel’s strategic decision not to hire expert to testify about unreliability of eyewitness identifications based upon photographic lineups did not amount to ineffective assistance).” See also Bharadia v. State , 282 Ga.App. 556, 639 S.E.2d 545 (November 27, 2006) ( exercise of professional judgment in electing not to obtain expert witness not shown to be ineffective assistance ). Hunt v. State, A15A2064, ___ Ga.App. ___, 783 S.E.2d 456, 2016 WL 1203927 (March 29, 2016). Rape, child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing “to present evidence to challenge the scientific basis of the ‘Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome’ (CAAS).” “Hunt’s trial counsel testified that her decision not to employ an expert to rebut [State expert] Lee’s testimony regarding CAAS was strategic; she testified that calling such an expert could bolster the State’s expert by testifying to much of the same information. Rather, she chose to cross- examine Lee to show that the ‘symptoms of this syndrome were also consistent with a kid who wasn’t molested,’ and to illustrate that an expert can ‘take anything and make it look like it’s consistent with child sexual abuse.’” Howard v. State, 298 Ga. 396, 782 S.E.2d 255 (February 1, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown in failure to have blood tested to see if it matched victim or Howard. “Counsel acknowledged that had the blood been tested and found to be Howard’s such evidence would have strengthened the self- defense theory. Counsel also testified, however, that he made a strategic decision not to have the blood tested since if it was not a match such evidence could have been detrimental to Howard’s self-defense claim. Instead, counsel’s strategy was to argue that law enforcement had improperly failed to follow up on leads that might have exonerated Howard. … As Howard did not have the blood tested post-trial, however, he has not shown that this evidence would have been favorable to his defense and that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the trial would have been different. Thereby, even assuming without deciding that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Howard fails to demonstrate prejudice, one of the required elements of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Mere speculation about what the evidence would have shown had it actually been obtained does not satisfy the requirement of showing prejudice. See Whitus v. State, 287 Ga. 248, 801, 805(2), 700 S.E.2d 377 (2010); see also Valentine v. State, 293 Ga. 533, 537(3), 748 S.E.2d 437 (2013).” Kirkland v. State, 334 Ga.App. 26, 778 S.E.2d 42 (September 28, 2015). Conviction for aggravated child molestation affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to retain an expert to challenge the forensic interview of the victim. “Even if trial counsel had presented an expert to point out aspects of A.D.’s forensic interview that allegedly were flawed, the expert’s testimony would not have undermined the admissible evidence of A.D.’s spontaneous statements describing the sexual abuse that were made to her mother and great-grandmother before the forensic interview was conducted. Nor would the expert’s testimony have undermined the similar transaction evidence presented by the State or the admission of Kirkland’s comment after his arrest that he was unaware he could be arrested for child molestation without any physical evidence. In light of this combined evidence that would not have been undermined by an expert in forensic interviewing, Kirkland cannot show a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to call such an expert, the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Ponder v. State, 332 Ga.App. 576, 774 S.E.2d 152 (June 25, 2015). Rape and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to present expert testimony to rebut State’s DNA expert where counsel in fact retained a Georgia Tech biologist who reviewed the case and came to the same conclusions as the State’s expert. Expert presented at hearing on motion for new trial likewise only made it more, not less, likely that defendant contributed the DNA material in question. Arbegast v. State, 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015). Child molestation convictions affirmed; no prejudice shown in “failing to successfully request funds for an investigator, an expert in child interview techniques, and a medical expert to testify about herpes. As noted above, Arbegast did not make any proffer as to what further investigation would have uncovered. Nor did he make any proffer as to what an expert in child interview techniques or a medical expert would have testified. With ‘neither a proffer of what the testimony of the [investigator and] expert[s] would have been nor a showing that the trial court would have abused [his] discretion in denying a motion for funds to hire such an