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preside over the exchange of discovery.’ [fn] The trial court also noted that, during this period, Buckner ‘repeatedly appeared ready, and willing, for the various scheduled proceedings.’ Although another judge might have seen these circumstances differently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined to weigh the third factor ‘heavily against [Buckner], but not as heavily as it would have if not mitigated by [his] insistence on his right to discovery.’” Contrary to State’s assertion, this factor not affected by whether the discovery difficulties involved “bad faith” on part of the State: “we see no reason why the discretion of the trial court to consider the difficulties with discovery as mitigation should be limited to difficulties that involve bad faith. Whether a defendant is stymied by innocent failures to produce discoverable materials or by bad faith suppression of evidence, he is stymied nonetheless. Here, the trial court found that the State's repeated discovery failings were ‘extremely concerning[,]’ but it never concluded that the State acted in bad faith. Instead, the trial court merely found that the State's failure to timely provide the discovery materials it had promised, without regard to its intent, served to ‘somewhat mitigate [ ]’ the failure of Buckner to timely assert his right to a speedy trial. That was not unreasonable.” 5. Prejudice – trial court could find that defense was prejudiced by delay. Defendant asserts “that a 2003 investigation of evidence tampering in his case revealed that two police officers and a retired police officer—who were friends of the family of the victim—were invited by the family into [victim] Ashleigh's bedroom before it was secured by the assigned investigating officers, that at least one of these officers tampered with evidence—including by removing potential evidence from the bedroom—and that one of the officers told the family members not to tell anyone that they had entered Ashleigh's bedroom before it had been secured by the proper authorities. [fn] The trial court found that the evidence supported Buckner's claims about tampering with evidence. It also found that the officer who investigated the evidence tampering in 2003 was no longer able to recall important and material details of his investigation, that recordings of witnesses to the tampering had been lost by the State, and that those witnesses either were now deceased or unable to recall important details about who had been in Ashleigh's unsecured bedroom and what they had done there. This evidence supports the finding of the trial court that Buckner was not able ‘to sufficiently explore what pieces of evidence at the crime scene were altered or manipulated.’ As a result, the trial court concluded, Buckner ‘was in the unique position of not just speculating, but knowing, that there was tampering with the evidence at the ... crime scene, but being prevented from identifying and showing what aspects of the scene, and what specific pieces of evidence, have been altered or manipulated.’[fn]” No abuse of discretion in these findings, supported by the record. State v. Hartsfield, 318 Ga.App. 692, 734 S.E.2d 513 (November 20, 2012). For a second time, trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation reversed. Defendant was indicted for aggravated assault four years after his arrest. 2. Reason for delay. State offered no explanation for the pre-indictment delay in this “straightforward … case, arising from what the court termed a ‘barroom brawl.’ The court also noted that there were no other factors that would add layers of complexity.” Held, trial court could properly weigh the unexplained delay “more strongly” against the State that mere negligence. “[T]here is some merit in the court's reasoning that there is a difference between having no explanation for prosecutorial delay and refusing to provide one in the face of facts showing that the investigation was largely complete in June 2005, almost four years before indictment. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 784, 534 S.E.2d 796 (2000) (although not deliberate, State's delay was not ‘relatively benign’).” Trial court erred, however, in basing its ruling on a finding not supported by the record – that the District Attorney’s office had a history of unreasonable delay in bringing charges against POST certified officers like this defendant. 2. Assertion of right. Trial court could find that delay in assertion of right was mitigated during time defendant wasn’t yet indicted, citing Pickett (February 28, 2011) and Gleaton (November 8, 2010) , below. And contrary to State’s argument, court could consider defendant’s pro se letter to the court, “asking that the case be resolved as soon as possible,” as ‘militating in his favor,’ even if not enforceable as a trial demand given that he was then represented by counsel. Finally, the court could find mitigation in the State’s “delayed production of a final witness list until the eve of trial, despite the court's order to complete discovery,” citing Shirley (June 30, 2011), below. 3. Trial court erred in finding actual prejudice. “ Most of Hartsfield's concerns have been held not to be unusual by this Court and, therefore, do not rise to the level of actual prejudice. Mental anguish, inability to find employment, and inability to leave the state are burdens that are ‘always present to some extent’ and they fall short of establishing an unusual showing. See, e.g., Watkins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 686(d), 600 S.E.2d 747 (2004) (mental anguish, economic impact, inability to leave state); Weems v. State, 310 Ga.App. 590, 595(2)(d), 714 S.E.2d 119 (2011) (inability to leave state, employment struggle); State v. Reimers, 310 Ga.App. 887, 891(2)(d), 714 S.E.2d 417 (2011) (loss of employment, economic difficulties, inability to see children). Compare Lambert v. State, 302 Ga.App. 573, 577, 692 S.E.2d 15 (2010) (even though the fact that defendant ‘lost two jobs because he had to travel to court on multiple occasions is evidence of anxiety and concern,’ where defendant ‘chose not to alleviate his anxiety and concern by filing a speedy trial demand’ for five years, he failed to show prejudice) (citations omitted). Given a presumption of prejudice, a showing of actual prejudice is not always necessary; here, however, the trial court based its conclusion on an improper finding of actual prejudice. See Sechler [ v. State, 316