☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 675(2)(d), 730 S.E.2d 142 (2012)]; Reimers, 310 Ga.App. at 892–893(2), 714 S.E.2d 417.” Crosson v. State, 318 Ga.App. 449, 734 S.E.2d 234 (November 13, 2012). In prosecution for computer theft by deception and related offenses, trial court properly found no constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Reason for delay. Trial court properly apportioned part of blame to defendant for “dismissing her appointed counsel, filing numerous pro se motions, including a motion to disqualify the trial judge, and motion to stay the trial pending her appeal.” Trial court further found that filing, then dismissing, a statutory speedy trial demand “would have suggested to the State that [Crosson] was not insistent on moving the case quickly to trial and may have caused it to relax a bit when the better course would have been to move forward.” Trial court did properly place most of the blame on the State for delays caused by need to correct the indictment, but found that this was relatively benign, not intentional. 2. Prejudice. None shown from “the ‘constant detainer’ that ‘remained over [her] head’ even after she was out on bond which created anxiety and concern. … Anxiety and concern of the accused are ‘always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing are not likely to be determinative in defendant's favor.’ Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733(1)(d) (438 S.E.2d 626) (1994).” Accord, Sosniak v. State , 292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 262 (November 19, 2012) (“Sosniak has not shown that the anxiety he may have suffered was greater than that always present to some extent.”); State v. Thompson , 334 Ga.App. 692, 780 S.E.2d 67 (November 18, 2015). State v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 863, 734 S.E.2d 12 (November 5, 2012). In murder prosecution, trial court’s constitutional speedy trial analysis was erroneous and thus remanded. 1. Reason for delay. Delay caused by continuances to look for State’s witnesses was properly weighed against State. “See Tyner v. State, 298 Ga.App. 42, 44(2), 679 S.E.2d 82 (2009) (‘The unavailability of State witnesses weighs against the State.’).” 2. Assertion of right. Trial court erred in holding that announcements of “ready for trial” amounted to assertion of right to speedy trial. “Although Johnson announced that he was ready to go to trial on the original trial date and throughout the delay that followed, he did not assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial until August 2011, more than five years after his arrest, and on the eve of his rescheduled trial. Furthermore, Johnson never filed a statutory demand for speedy trial. Though his earlier indications that he was ready for trial may mitigate the weight to be accorded this factor, that Johnson did not assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial until so late in his prosecution must weigh against him. [ State v. Porter, 288 Ga. at 524, 529(2), 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011)].” 3. Prejudice. Incarceration for 29 months before release on bond wasn’t enough to establish prejudice, “‘as [Johnson] has made no showing that he has been subjected to substandard conditions in the ... jail where he [was] housed.’ Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 54(1)(d), 694 S.E.2d 350 (2010). And while Johnson expressed some anxiety about the need to care for his family in Louisiana, anxiety and concern are ‘always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing is not likely to be determinative in defendant's favor.’ Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733(1)(d), 438 S.E.2d 626 (1994) (citations and punctuation omitted). By finding demonstrable prejudice in the form of oppressive pretrial incarceration and anxiety, the trial court erred in its consideration of the fourth factor. That said, prejudice properly may be presumed in this case from the length of the pretrial delay.” Accord, Sosniak v. State , 292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 262 (November 19, 2012); Jenkins v. State , 294 Ga. 506, 755 S.E.2d 138 (February 24, 2014) (nothing especially oppressive about conditions of defendant’s incarceration, but length alone – six years, nine months -- “raises the presumption of prejudice”). Melton, writing for Benham, dissents, would reverse without remanding, as remand “serves only to delay justice.” Richardson v. State, 318 Ga.App. 155, 733 S.E.2d 444 (October 23, 2012). In prosecution for child molestation and related offenses, trial court erred in its constitutional speedy trial analysis. 1. Length of delay . Trial court erred by not including time for prior appeal in calculation of length of delay. “[I]f the trial court enters a new order denying a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the length of the pretrial delay runs to the entry of the new order rather than the original order, where an appellate court vacated the original order and remanded for the entry of a new order expressly applying the Barker–Doggett framework.” 2. Reason for delay. “Where an appellate court is required to vacate a trial court's original order denying dismissal on speedy trial grounds and remand for entry of a proper order under Barker and Doggett, the government is charged with the delay between the trial court's original order and the new order entered on remand. See [ Goddard v. State , 315 Ga.App. 868, 729 S.E.2d 397 (May 15, 2012).] Consequently, the government should have been held responsible for the 13–month delay between the trial court's original and new orders, and this delay should have been considered by the trial court in analyzing the reasons for the delay in this case.” Accord, Cawley v. State , 330 Ga.App. 22, 766 S.E.2d 581 (November 21, 2014). 3. Assertion of right. Trial court erred by categorically stating that State’s failure to respond to discovery didn’t excuse defendant’s assertion of right to speedy trial. See Shirley (June 30, 2011), below. 4. Prejudice – anxiety and concern. Physical precedent only on this point. “Contrary to the trial court's finding, Richardson's testimony that his law enforcement career has effectively been derailed by the pending charges is at least some evidence of anxiety and concern.”