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Singleton v. State, 317 Ga.App. 637, 732 S.E.2d 312 (September 19, 2012). In prosecution for aggravated assault and related offenses, denial of plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation remanded. 1. Length of delay. Trial court erred in considering only the 19 month delay between indictment and assertion of right, instead of earlier arrest and later ruling on plea in bar (55 months). “[T]he trial court could well have weighed this factor substantially more heavily against the State if it had proceeded under the correct facts.” 2. Reason for delay. “[W]here, as here, there is no allegation of engineered delay by either the State or the defendant, factors to be considered in assessing blame for delay may include ‘overcrowded dockets, the government's failure to provide for sufficient numbers of judges, prosecutors, or indigent defense counsel, neglect by the prosecution or other government agents, mere convenience of the prosecution, or the desire to avoid the expense of separate trials for two defendants involved in the same crime,’” quoting Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 60(2), 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008). “‘Each of these reasons must be counted against the government in the Barker– Doggett analysis, though less heavily than delay designed to sabotage the accused's case.’ Id.” Accord, Fleming v. State , 324 Ga.App. 481, 749 S.E.2d 54 (October 2, 2013). State v. Curry, 317 Ga.App. 611, 732 S.E.2d 459 (September 13, 2012). In prosecution for aggravated assault and related charges, trial court erred in granting motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 1. Length/reason for delay. “Under its analysis of the length of the delay, the trial court held that the 57–month delay should be weighed heavily against the State because the State waited two years to indict Curry and only did so after discovering that he would be released from custody the following week. The court therefore ‘conflated its consideration of the length of the delay factor with its consideration of the reason for the delay factor under Barker. ’ Goddard v. State, 315 Ga.App. 868, 729 S.E.2d 397 (May 15, 2012). And in doing so, the court only considered 2 years of the 57–month delay. See id. (court neglected to consider entire time of pretrial delay).” 2. Assertion of right. Trial court erred in finding that defendant timely asserted his speedy trial right. “While Curry asserted his right to a speedy trial within days of his indictment and second arrest, the trial court made no ruling with regard to Curry's 24–month pre-indictment silence. The trial court therefore erred in its consideration of this factor.” 3. Evidence. Trial court erred in considering “in-house” memo in clerk’s file “which outlines the underlying facts of the 2006 incident and states further: ‘[Curry] will get out on the 29th of November 2008, he has never been prosecuted on these charges, [the victim] wants to prosecute and will be here ... to testify.’ The State contends that the memorandum was hearsay and therefore should not have been considered by the trial court. We agree. Neither the author nor the parties named in the document testified at the hearing. It was therefore inadmissible non-probative hearsay. Jones v. State, 284 Ga. 320, 321(1) and 323(2) (667 S.E.2d 49) (2008). We note that while the court stated that this document was “in the clerk's file,” it is not part of the record here on appeal.” 4. Prejudice. Trial court erred in granting motion based on first three factors, all weighing against State, finding no need to consider prejudice. “We note that in [ State v. Porter , 288 Ga. 524, 705 S.E.2d 636 (February 7, 2011)], the Supreme Court of Georgia declined to adopt a test urged by the State that unless all other factors weight heavily against the State, the defendant must show actual prejudice. Porter, supra, 288 Ga. at 533(2)(d) n. 4. The court held that such a formulation is ‘inconsistent with the flexible balancing test required by Barker and this Court's precedents.’ Id.” 5. Prejudice. Trial court’s prejudice analysis was flawed. “With regard to the first type of prejudice—oppressive pretrial incarceration, the court found that Curry suffered prejudice because ‘he was incarcerated twice on the charges contained in the indictment—the first time for 27 days and the second time for two months and six days.’ But the Georgia Supreme Court has held that incarceration for only four or five months within a period of nearly six years was not oppressive. See Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 20(2) (663 S.E.2d 142) (2008). The trial court also found that Curry had been terminated from two jobs because of the pending indictment. But the court made no mention of Curry's testimony that within one month of the second termination, he obtained employment as a machine operator and was still employed at the time of the hearing.” Sechler v. State, 316 Ga.App. 675, 730 S.E.2d 142 (July 6, 2012). In DUI prosecution, superior court properly denied defendant’s motion for discharge based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Reason for delay. Trial court properly weighed this factor in favor of State. “As the superior court found, this case is an unusual one procedurally in that it involved the entry of a guilty plea in municipal court, the petition and then grant of habeas relief setting aside that guilty plea, and a transfer of the case from municipal court to superior court at Sechler's request. Additional pretrial delay was caused by Sechler's motion to suppress, his notices of leave of absence, and his request for a continuance. In light of these combined circumstances, we conclude that there was evidence to support the superior court's finding that the pretrial delay was caused by the unusual procedural history of the case and by Sechler's own actions, rather than any negligence or deliberate delay caused by the State. Consequently, we cannot say that the superior court abused its discretion in weighing the second factor in favor of the State and against Sechler.” Prejudice. Trial court properly found no actual prejudice to defendant caused by delay. “Sechler testified at the hearing on his motion that he