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was retired and that he had elected not to seek employment because the pendency of the case meant that he could be called away from a job to appear at court. He further testified that as a result of the case, he has had trouble sleeping, has lost his appetite, and is ‘just generally very upset.’ But ‘[a]nxiety and concern of the accused are always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing are not likely to be determinative in defendant's favor.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mullinax v. State, 273 Ga. 756, 759(2), 545 S.E.2d 891 (2001). And there is no evidence demonstrating that Sechler's alleged loss of job opportunities and his anxiety were unusual for someone in his circumstance. Moreover, Sechler conceded on cross-examination that he had personally benefitted from the pretrial delay, given that a conviction on the case would constitute a second DUI conviction in five years and would have adverse effects on his driver's license status. See OCGA § 40–5–63(a)(2). Consequently, the superior court was authorized to find that Sechler was not prejudiced as a result of undue anxiety or concern.” Goddard v. State, 315 Ga.App. 868, 729 S.E.2d 397 (May 15, 2012). In defendant’s robbery prosecution, denial of plea in bar based on constitutional double jeopardy remanded. 1. Presumptive prejudice. Delay of nearly 19 years between arrest and denial of plea in bar was sufficient to raise threshold presumption of prejudice. 2. Reason for delay. Case was in bench warrant status for sixteen years due to defendant’s failure to appear for trial. “The record reflects, however, that Goddard failed to appear … because the Newton County clerk of court mailed the notice of trial to the wrong address. … Moreover, the State conceded that it was negligent in failing to properly enter the February 28, 1994, bench warrant into the Georgia Crime Information Center (‘GCIC’) database. Thus, although Goddard was frequently arrested and incarcerated from March 13, 1994, through February 2010, for other, unrelated charges in different counties, it was not until March 25, 2010, that Goddard was finally arrested on the outstanding bench warrant for the Newton County charges. … As an initial matter, we note that ‘[a] defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial[.]’ (Footnote omitted.) Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 527(III). That being said, however, we agree that Goddard played a role in the delay following his call to trial on February 28, 1994. Notably, the record reflects that beyond Goddard's letter to the State in April 1993 regarding his incarceration in Fulton County (on other charges) and use of an alias, Goddard otherwise failed to make any further contact with the State, the trial court, his attorney, or his bondsman concerning his whereabouts or otherwise inquire about his pending charges in Newton County. [fn] Cf. Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 718(2) (715 S.E.2d 113) (2011) (weighing reason for delay factor against defendant where neither he nor his attorney made themselves aware of the actual status of the case between 1998 and 2005, and defendant failed to keep his address up to date with the trial court, such that the trial court was unable to send the notice of a 2001 arraignment to defendant's home address); Mayfield v. State, 264 Ga.App. 551, 556–557(1) (593 S.E.2d 851) (2003) (concluding that pretrial delay was largely due to defendant, where he failed to contact the trial court in any way, even though he had an outstanding arrest warrant against him for failing to appear for trial).” Remanded to reassess the relative fault for the delay, but criticizing trial court’s finding “that although the State's negligence played a role in the delay, such was ‘relatively benign.’” “‘Even benign negligence will begin to weigh more heavily against the State, the longer the delay caused by the same,’” quoting Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 338, 345(2)(b), 680 S.E.2d 182 (2009). 3. Assertion of right. Defendant couldn’t be penalized for not asserting his right to speedy trial during ten years when case was dead docketed , citng Hayes, supra. State v. Brown, 315 Ga.App. 544, 726 S.E.2d 500 (March 20, 2012). In child molestation prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Length of delay. Delay of almost nine years is “extraordinary” and “raises a presumption of prejudice and clearly warrants a more searching inquiry.” 2. Contrary to State’s argument, fact that delay was caused by State’s negligence doesn’t require that it be weighed “lightly” or “benignly” against State. “We do not think, however, that it is quite that simple. When the courts say that deliberate delays should be weighed ‘heavily,’ and that unintentional delays occasioned by mere negligence should be weighed ‘lightly,’ they are speaking in relative, not absolute, terms. How to weigh the reasons for a particular delay is not just a matter of selecting one of two discrete choices, ‘heavily’ or ‘lightly.’ See State v. Carr, 278 Ga. 124, 126 (598 S.E.2d 468) (2004) (‘Delay caused by State negligence, rather than deliberate action to impair a defense, generally is considered “ relatively benign.”’ ) (emphasis supplied and citation omitted); Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. 416, 418(2) (490 S.E.2d 91) (1997) (same). After all, the United States Supreme Court has said that ‘the weight we assign to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows,’ such that ‘our toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness,’ Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657(III)(B), signaling quite clearly that not all negligence is to be weighed equally. In this case, because the court below attributed the delay to the mere negligence of the prosecuting attorneys and the court, it was not entitled to weigh the reasons for the delay against the State as heavily as it might in a case of deliberate delay. It does not follow, however, that the court could not still weigh the reasons for the delay ‘heavily’ against the State, relatively speaking.” Significant here that almost the entire nine-year delay was caused by State; defendant only requested a “three to four weeks” delay. “That the delay is so overwhelmingly attributable to the State is a proper basis, we think, for weighing the reasons for the delay against the State more heavily than in a case in which the