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responsibility for the delay is more evenly divided. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651(II) (considering ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for [the] delay’). Moreover, the delay occasioned by negligence in this case is extraordinary, and as the United States Supreme Court noted in Doggett, ‘our toleration of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness.’ 505 U.S. at 657(III)(B).” Accord, Goddard (May 15, 2012),above. 3. Six year delay in assertion of right could be considered “in due course,” considering lengthy delays by State in indictment and arraignment, and delay in entry of appearance by defense counsel. “To assess whether the accused insisted ‘in due course’ upon his right to a speedy trial ‘requires a close examination of the procedural history of the case with particular attention to the timing, form, and vigor of the accused's demands to be tried immediately.’ Ruffin [ v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 63(2)(b)(iii) (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)].” “[A]fter a lawyer finally appeared, Brown promptly demanded discovery of the State. When it appeared that discovery was not forthcoming, Brown filed a motion to compel discovery, and when the State finally provided discovery, Brown promptly asserted his right to a speedy trial. … [O]ur Court has said that, even after indictment, a delay in demanding a speedy trial sometimes may be mitigated by the fact that the accused was insisting in the meantime that the State comply with its obligations to furnish discovery. See State v. Shirley, 311 Ga.App. 141, 146(3)(c) (714 S.E.2d 636) (2011).” 4. Presumed prejudice . Trial court erroneously found actual prejudice in loss of evidence, a fact not supported by the record. However, “prejudice properly can be presumed in this case, given the extraordinary length of the delay, see Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651(II) (noting that “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time”), and the State offered no evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice. The court below, therefore, properly considered presumptive prejudice when it weighed the Barkett–Doggett factors.” Harris v. State, 314 Ga.App. 565, 724 S.E.2d 864 (March 2, 2012). In aggravated assault prosecution, denial of plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial right remanded for reconsideration. 1. Reason for delay. “That members of the district attorney's office were aware of the case against Harris does not show that their delay in indicting Harris was necessarily more than negligent.” Trial court erred in no attributing delay to State, however: “the trial judge indicated that the delay after the case was transferred to the court shortly after the indictment was ‘my responsibility.’ Nevertheless, the primary burden is on both the prosecutor and the court to bring the case to trial, see Jones v. State, 283 Ga.App. 838, 840(2) (642 S.E.2d 865) (2007), and the state bears the ultimate responsibility for its dockets, see State v. Giddens, 280 Ga.App. 586, 588 (634 S.E.2d 526) (2006). Accordingly, as with the pre-indictment delay, the trial court should have weighed the post-indictment delay against the state, although the reason for that delay was not shown to be more than unintentional and relatively benign. Id.” 2. Assertion of right. Trial court properly weighed delay in assertion of right against defendant “only slightly, noting as mitigating factors the lengthy [46-month] delay between the arrest and the indictment and that, once Harris retained counsel, his attorney filed a demand within two months.” 3. Prejudice – destruction of premises. Trial court properly concluded that defendant showed not prejudice where hotel crime scene was condemned, but still accessible. 4. Prejudice – missing witness. Trial court properly concluded that defendant showed no prejudice from missing witness, because “Harris did not demonstrate what the front desk clerk could have offered on behalf of the defense. Generally, ‘[t]o prove prejudice due to the unavailability of ... witnesses, the defendant must show that the unavailable witnesses could supply material evidence for the defense.’ Wofford v. State, 299 Ga.App. 129, 132(4) (682 S.E.2d 125) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted).” Trial court erred, however, in weighing the lack of evidence showing prejudice “heavily” against defendant, based on the extended delay in trying the case, citing Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601(d) (592 S.E.2d 848) (2004) (five year pre-trial delay; “a defendant's inability to make a particularized showing of a decreased ability to present a defense could not be weighed heavily against him.”). Accord, Hill v. State , 315 Ga.App. 833, 729 S.E.2d 1 (May 10, 2012). State v. Takyi, 314 Ga.App. 444, 724 S.E.2d 459 (February 29, 2012). Physical precedent only. In DUI prosecution, grant of plea in bar based on speedy trial violation remanded for proper application of balancing test. Prosecution here was delayed some 18 months, in large part due to transfer from municipal court to state court upon defendant’s demand for jury trial. 1. Reason for delay. Trial court properly considered that state’s misplacing file “for upwards of a year” upon transfer should be weighed against State; but trial court erred in failing to assign some responsibility to defendant, who was advised in advance by counsel “that moving from one court to another may add six to eighteen months to the process.” 2. Assertion of right. Trial court erred in finding that defendant couldn’t have asserted her constitutional speedy trial right in municipal court, and in considering defendant’s hearsay testimony “from conversations she had with people in Sandy Springs Municipal Court and the Fulton County Solicitor's office that related to her ability to assert her right to a speedy trial — to the effect that the case could not be located, thereby suggesting that she could not file such a demand.” “And although a defendant may assert his constitutional right for a speedy trial in municipal court, see, e.g., State v. Lessing, 302 Ga.App. 196 (690 S.E.2d 501) (2010), there is no evidence that Takyi even attempted to do so.” 3. Prejudice. Trial court erred in considering hearsay testimony from defendant about what the Department of