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Homeland Security, her immigration attorney and her DUI attorney said regarding the effect the pending charge had on her immigration status and possible deportation. “The rule that hearsay is objectionable and without probative value is applicable to hearings on speedy trial motions. [ State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 530(4) (705 S.E.2d 636) (2011)]; Jones v. State, 284 Ga. 320, 324(2) (667 S.E.2d 49) (2008). … Thus, the trial court in this case erred by allowing hearsay evidence and relying on hearsay in its findings. See also Howard v. State, 307 Ga.App. 822, 828 (706 S.E.2d 163) (2011) (Defendant's testimony ‘that having this case pending for so long caused him great anxiety and concern ... was hearsay and, therefore, of no probative value.’).” Compare to Takyi II (July 12, 2013), above (sufficient evidence of defendant’s ‘anxiety and emotional pain due to her uncertain immigration status’). Phan v. State, 290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2d 876 (February 27, 2012). Interlocutory appeal in capital murder prosecution; trial court properly found no constitutional speedy trial violation despite seven year delay caused, in part, by unavailability of state funding for indigent defense. 1. Reason for delay. Trial court erred in weighing this factor entirely against the defense. “The trial court was correct in observing that the defense on several occasions sought and was granted continuances in the case, while the State repeatedly maintained that it was ready to proceed. See Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265(1)(b) (695 S.E.2d 201) (2010) (delay resulting from defense continuance request chargeable against defense). However, it is also clear that these continuance requests stemmed directly from the funding issues that manifested first in the partial rejection of the defense's travel request [to seek mitigation evidence in Vietnam]. The prosecution had no need to delay the case, as it possessed the resources necessary to proceed. To lay blame entirely on the defense for seeking continuances under these circumstances would be manifestly unjust. See Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 50(1)(b) (694 S.E.2d 350) (2010) (‘[i]n light of the State funding issues that contributed to counsels' inability to move the case forward ..., the delay in bringing the case to trial ... is properly weighed against the State’). … Overall, the government and the defense share the responsibility for the delays in this case. The prosecution was less than proactive in moving the case forward during the initial years after indictment; the defense also appears to have been in no hurry. This initial, largely unexplained delay pushed the case squarely into the vortex of the State budget crisis, which was beyond the control of either the prosecution or the defense. Though the State is ultimately responsible for delays occasioned by budget problems, see id. at 50(1)(b), the defense bears responsibility to the extent it allowed its fight for travel funds for two attorneys rather than one to become its primary focus in the litigation. Given the various, intertwined reasons for the delay, it is impossible to precisely apportion the parties' relative shares of responsibility. Therefore, we find that the second factor of the Barker analysis remains neutral.” Accord, Jenkins (February 24, 2014), above (confusion over defendant’s indigent representation following grant of habeas relief properly attributed to State). 2. Assertion of right . Defendant’s failure to assert his speedy trial right for more than four years “weighs heavily against the defense.” “At no point during the years-long period before the funding issues became salient did the defense assert any objection to the slow pace of the case, and the defense actively sought further delay once the funding issues did emerge.” 3. Prejudice/presumed prejudice. “We have acknowledged that ‘the greater the delay between charging and trial, the greater the presumed impairment of witness recollections and other evidence needed for a fair and reliable trial.’ State v. Porter, [288 Ga. 531(2)(c)(4) (705 S.E.2d 636) (2011)]. However, where the defendant has made no attempt at all to demonstrate (or even argue) that he has suffered any particular prejudice to his mental or physical condition or to his defense strategy, any prejudice that might be presumed by virtue only of the passage of time will carry very little weight in the Barker analysis. See Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455 (667 S.E.2d 361) (2008) (where no showing of oppressive pre-trial incarceration or undue anxiety and no claim of actual prejudice to defense, presumed prejudice attending more than five-year delay insufficient to overcome defendant's failure to assert speedy trial right in a timely fashion). Accord Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43, 47(2) (673 S.E.2d 194) (2009). We therefore agree with the trial court that this factor does not measurably favor the defense.” Kemp v. State, 314 Ga.App. 327, 724 S.E.2d 41 (February 23, 2012). In prosecution for aggravated assault and related charges, trial court erred in speedy trial analysis: 1. Length of delay. Trial court erroneously calculated delay: relevant period began at arrest, not later indictment; and continued to denial of motion to dismiss, not earlier call of the trial calendar. 2. Cause of delay. Trial court erred by weighing delay against defendant “because he failed to contact the court to schedule a hearing to resolve his motions or to put the case on the trial calendar. However, the record shows that the trial court notified the parties that it would not schedule another motions hearing and, instead, would resolve all motions at trial. Moreover, ‘the primary burden is on the prosecutor and the court — not the defendant — to bring the case to trial [.]’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hester v. State, 268 Ga.App. 94, 97(2) (601 S.E.2d 456) (2004); see also Ward v. State, 311 Ga.App. 425, 429(3) (715 S.E.2d 818) (2011) (holding that the government is responsible for bringing a defendant promptly to trial, and this ‘includes all state actors, even trial and appellate court judges’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Additionally, both the record and the trial court's order reflected that part of the reason for the 2– year period of inactivity was that the trial court gave priority to cases involving incarcerated individuals. ‘[W]here “jail