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cases” are given priority over “bond cases,” the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lambert v. State, 302 Ga.App. 573, 575–576(2) (692 S.E.2d 15) (2010).” Moore v. State, 314 Ga.App. 219, 723 S.E.2d 508 (February 17, 2012). In child molestation prosecution, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial right. 1. Reason for delay. State’s failure to re-indict for more than a month after demurrer to original indictment was granted was not “intentional delay.” “See Zeger v. State, 306 Ga.App. 474, 478(3) (702 S.E.2d 474) (2010) (solicitor-general's almost-six-month delay in returning accusation was not evidence of intent to hamper defense).” 2. Appellate review where trial court findings absent or erroneous. “‘If the trial court significantly misapplies the law or clearly errs in a material factual finding, the trial court's exercise of discretion can be affirmed only if the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court used the correct facts and legal analysis, it would have had no discretion to reach a different judgment.’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679(2)(d) (706 S.E.2d 561) (2011).” Trial court here made no findings as to two of the three types of prejudice – pretrial incarceration and anxiety/concern, but Court of Appeals affirms. “We conclude that had the court considered these two interests, it would have had no discretion to reach a judgment different than it did: that Moore did not show that the delay prejudiced his defense.” 3. Law of the case. On second appeal challenging speedy trial violation, Court is bound by its prior ruling regarding prejudice up to the time of the first appeal. “‘Although the “law of the case” rule has been statutorily abolished, any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be. This law of the case rule is not confined to civil cases, but applies also to rulings made by appellate courts in criminal cases.’ (Citation omitted.) Bass v. State, 287 Ga.App. 600 (653 S.E.2d 749) (2007). Our prior ruling that Moore has not shown impairment to his defense due to loss of the files is binding. Moore has alleged no impairment to his defense that has occurred subsequent to our prior holding that the loss of the files did not impair his defense.” Smereczynsky v. State, 314 Ga.App. 73, 722 S.E.2d 892 (February 9, 2012). In defendants’ prosecution for financial transaction card theft, denial of plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation remanded for appropriate findings of fact. 1. Length of delay. No error where trial court didn’t evaluate the length of delay in its Barker-Doggett analysis, separate from its threshold inquiry. “[T]his Court has held in similar cases that ‘inasmuch as the trial court has effectively weighed this factor in appellant’s favor, it did not abuse its discretion.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Harrison v. State , 311 Ga.App. 787, 790(3)(a), 717 S.E.2d 303 (2011).” 2. Prejudice – Anxiety/Concern. “Donita Smereczynsky has provided evidence that this trial was a contributing factor in the anxiety and stress she suffered. Other stressors in her life during this time period also included cases in two other counties and bankruptcy court, as well as an ill child. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighting this factor only slightly in favor of Donita Smereczynsky because her mental health issues were not related solely to this case.” 3. Prejudice – Impairment of defense. “‘Although the passage of time is not alone sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, greater pretrial delays simultaneously increase the degree of prejudice presumed and decrease the expectation that the defendant can demonstrate tangible prejudice to his or her ability to present a defense.’ (Citations omitted.) Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601(1)(d) (592 S.E.2d 848) (2004). In the present case, the extraordinary six-year delay raised the presumption of actual prejudice and appellants' ‘failure to make a particularized showing of ... [their] decreased ability to present a defense at trial must not be weighed heavily against [them]. Id. To the extent that the trial court found to the contrary, it was in error.” Thus, “the trial court here erred by requiring appellants to prove that they suffered actual prejudice.” Accord, Harris (March 2, 2012), above. Johnson v. State, 313 Ga.App. 895, 723 S.E.2d 100 (February 3, 2012). In prosecution for burglary and related offenses, trial court erred in its constitutional speedy trial analysis. 1. Trial court erred by conflating threshold inquiry into length of delay and second-step analysis of “whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long.” “Indeed, the trial court's finding in this regard was limited to a statement that the delay was approximately 33 months and that delays approaching one year are presumptively prejudicial. Accordingly, the trial court on remand must assess whether the delay in Johnson's case … was uncommonly long and/or excessive, keeping in mind that ‘[a] delay is considered uncommonly long under the test to the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’ [ State v. Thaxton, 311 Ga.App. 260, 264(2)(a) (715 S.E.2d 480) (2011) (punctuation omitted)]; The court must then consider the weight of this factor. See, e.g., id. (holding that ‘[t]o the extent that the majority of the delay occasioned ... was attributed to the pre-indictment delay, such delay was significant in the analysis of this factor,’ which was presumably weighed against the State); Grizzard v. State, 301 Ga.App. 613, 615(2)(a) (688 S.E.2d 402) (2009) (trial court properly weighed delay of eight years in bringing a defendant to trial against the State when State conceded that delay was uncommonly long).” 2. Trial court erred by failing to consider all reasons for delay and