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Higgenbottom v. State, 291 Ga. 198, 719 S.E.2d 482 (November 29, 2011). In defendant’s prosecution for murder, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Prejudice: defendant couldn’t claim prejudice from death of witness who died before prosecution ever commenced. “[T]he accused's constitutional rights to a speedy trial attach at the time of arrest or when formal charges are brought, whichever is first in time. Wimberly v. State, [279 Ga. 65, 608 S.E.2d 625 (2005)]. Thus, any impact on Higgenbottom's case by the death of Dr. James existed prior to the attachment of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Herndon v. State, 277 Ga.App. 374, 379(4)(c) 626 S.E.2d 579) (2006); compare Hester v. State, 268 Ga.App. 94, 601 S.E.2d 456 (2004).” Prosecution here was delayed by five years, as infant victim’s death was originally ruled an accident. Accord, Jackson v. State , 322 Ga.App. 196, 744 S.E.2d 380 (June 12, 2013). Williams v. State, 290 Ga. 24, 717 S.E.2d 640 (November 7, 2011). Trial court properly denied motion for discharge and acquittal on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 1. As defendant was already incarcerated on other charges, trial court properly “measured the length of the delay from the time of Williams's indictment on the present charges to his filing of the motion for discharge and acquittal.” Four year delay between indictment and acquittal was presumptively prejudicial. 2. Trial court properly weighed the reasons for delay “benignly against the State” based on numerous complicating factors: no intentional delay by State; “that the case did not appear to be a ‘garden-variety’ street crime, but could potentially involve other serious felony crimes and other perpetrators” ; at least one continuance request from defense; removal of public defender for conflict of interest and request for more preparation time from new counsel; and the “extraordinarily heavy court dockets” in the trial court. “Certainly, there is more tolerance with regard to delay in a case involving serious complex charges. Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, 563(4) (651 S.E.2d 674) (2007). And, when any portion of a delay in trial is caused by or at the behest of defense counsel, it should not be weighed against the State. Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 52(1)(b) (694 S.E.2d 350) (2010). Pretermitting questions of the possible complexity of the trial of this case or any delay as the result of a request or action by Williams's counsel, the evidence is, as Williams concedes, that the State did not deliberately attempt to delay trial in order to hamper Williams's defense or to gain a tactical advantage. Therefore, at most, the delay may be attributed to negligence on the part of the State, which is generally considered to be relatively benign. Fallen v. State, [289 Ga. 247, 248(2) (710 S.E.2d 559) (2011)]. Further, as to the superior court's citing of the extraordinarily heavy workload of the court as a factor, a delay attributed to workload is weighed only lightly against the State. Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 875(4) (700 S.E.2d 579) (2010).” Accord, Moore v. State , 314 Ga.App. 219, 723 S.E.2d 508 (February 17, 2012) (negligent, as opposed to intentional, delay weighed against State, but “relatively benign.”). 3. Four-year delay in asserting right properly weighed against defendant. “Insofar as Williams suggests that he could not have asserted his right sooner because discovery was not complete, the argument is unavailing. Williams v. State, 300 Ga.App. 797, 798(c) (686 S.E.2d 407) (2009).” 4. No prejudice shown from missing witness. “In order to prove prejudice as the result of the unavailability of a witness, a defendant has to show that the witness could supply material evidence for his or her defense. Howard v. State, 307 Ga.App. 822, 829(2)(d) (706 S.E.2d 163) (2011). Williams's own description of the anticipated testimony by the claimed witnesses, on its face, portrays it as inadmissible hearsay for the purpose of substantive evidence. See Jones v. State, 284 Ga. 320, 324(2) (667 S.E.2d 49) (2008). But, pretermitting questions of the admissibility or materiality of the anticipated testimony, either as substantive evidence or for the purpose of impeachment, Williams makes no challenge to the superior court's significant finding of the defense's failure to show diligence in attempting to locate the subject witnesses, i.e., that they are indeed unavailable to him. Simply, Williams has failed to show that the superior court should be faulted for benignly weighing this final factor against him.” Hill v. State, 312 Ga.App. 12, 717 S.E.2d 523 (October 12, 2011). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment for methamphetamine distribution, based on alleged constitutional speedy trial violation; no presumptive violation based on seven month delay between indictment and trial. Harrison v. State, 311 Ga.App. 787, 717 S.E.2d 303 (September 27, 2011). In defendant’s prosecution for rape and aggravated child molestation, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial rights. Defendant was originally arrested in Florida, then extradited to Mississippi in November, 2006, based on allegations of molestation of same victim both in Mississippi and Georgia. Georgia police took a warrant and placed a “hold” on defendant in December, 2006. Mississippi held defendant for the next two years, then nolle prossed their charges, whereupon defendant was extradited to Georgia in November, 2008. 1. Length of delay. Trial court properly determined that the relevant time began upon defendant’s extradition, not his prior detention by Mississippi, despite the “hold” placed by Georgia two years earlier. “Harrison did not become subject to the full force of Georgia law until the warrants were executed in 2008.” 2. Reason for delay. “ ‘Our cases reflect that negligence is entitled to minimal weight against the State only where it results either from the prosecution's inadvertent neglect of the case or from solely administrative factors