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over which the prosecution has no control, such as overcrowded court dockets or understaffed law enforcement agencies.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ditman v. State, 301 Ga.App. 187, 193(2)(b) (687 S.E.2d 155) (2009). In this case, the turnover in the district attorney's office would constitute a solely administrative factor. The trial court recognized that the defendant's involvement in plea negotiations also contributed to the delay, but weighed this factor more heavily against the state than the defendant. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.” 3. Assertion of right: motions to reduce bond don’t count as assertion of right to speedy trial. “A motion for bond reduction is designed to secure a defendant's perhaps temporary release, not accelerate his trial date. See State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 513(3) (555 S.E.2d 710) (2001) (even request for jury trial found insufficient to invoke speedy trial rights).” Rafi v. State, 289 Ga. 716, 715 S.E.2d 113 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; 1. no constitutional speedy trial violation despite nine year delay between murder and trial where “the delay was primarily due to bond forfeiture and not due to intentional delay by the State.” 2. “Appellant also was not prejudiced by lost evidence. Although the toy gun the victim allegedly brandished at appellant and the counterfeit $100 dollar bill were destroyed, there was both photographic and testimonial evidence about these items presented at trial, including a defense witness who testified that the victim brandished what appeared, from afar, to be a real gun immediately prior to the shooting. Consequently, the absence of these items did not prejudice appellant. Under these factual circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.” Ward v. State, 311 Ga.App. 425, 715 S.E.2d 818 (August 16, 2011). In prosecution for armed robbery and related offenses, trial court properly denied motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial rights, based on insufficient showing of prejudice. 1. Anxiety. “When asked how the lack of a speedy trial had affected him, Ward testified that at times he was ‘angry a little bit,’ did not sleep some nights, and experienced strain from being locked up and ‘not really knowing what is what.’ In this case, Ward has made no unusual showing of anxiety and concern.” 2. Impairment of defense – missing witnesses. “We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the delay did not substantially prejudice Ward. According to Ward, the witness who died would only testify regarding something one of the victims told him. As to the second missing witness, Ward testified that he had no current telephone number but did not describe any attempts by him or his counsel to locate her. Finally, as to the co-defendant the State did not produce for the anticipated trial, as the trial court noted, Ward had the power to subpoena the co-defendant himself, and had remained incarcerated locally with the opportunity to communicate with his counsel. Thus the State's failure to produce the co- defendant did not prejudice Ward because he could have subpoenaed the co-defendant himself instead of relying on the State to produce him simply because he was included in the State's witness list.” State v. Reimers, 310 Ga.App. 887, 714 S.E.2d 417 (July 14, 2011). In prosecution for child molestation, trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Assertion of right. Trial court erred in weighing defendant’s assertion of right heavily in his favor, instead of heavily, or at least slightly, against him, where he did nothing during 16 months between arrest and indictment, but diligently sought trial beginning more than four months after indictment. “ The trial court first found that Reimers could not be faulted for his failure to assert his demand on either constitutional or statutory grounds prior to receiving complete discovery from the State. The trial court went on to discuss the months following Reimers's statutory speedy trial demand, finding that during such time, Reimers took ‘extraordinary measure[s]’ and ‘remarkable steps to ensure that his assertion of that right was made known and effectuated.’ The trial court specifically pointed to Reimers's appearance at a calendar call when he was not on the calendar, where Reimers agreed to waive any notice requirements and asked to be placed on trial, as well as Reimers's appearance at the subsequent calendar call, where he announced ready for trial. Although Reimers's two-year delay in asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial normally would be weighted heavily against him, we recognize that mitigating circumstances can authorize a trial court to find otherwise, i.e., by weighting this factor slightly against the defendant. See State v. Ivory, 304 Ga.App. 859, 862–863(2)(c) (698 S.E.2d 340) (2010); see also State v. Moses, 301 Ga.App. 315, 320(2)(c) (692 S.E.2d 1) (2009). Notably, we found no abuse of discretion in Ivory where the trial court mitigated the weight given this factor due to the defendant's demands that the State comply with discovery obligations before asserting his right to a speedy trial. Ivory, supra, 304 Ga.App. at 862–863(2)(c). Here, on the other hand, the trial court cited the above-referenced mitigating circumstances as its basis for weighing the assertion of right factor heavily in favor of Reimers. Thus, the trial court misapplied the law to the extent that it failed to weigh against Reimers, or even slightly against him, his delay in asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Prejudice. Trial court erred in finding undue anxiety and concern, or prejudice to defendant’s defense. “[T]his Court has previously found that difficulties similar to Reimers's, such as the loss of employment, the break-up of a marriage, and financial difficulties, while ‘certainly associated with the fact