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of [a defendant's] arrest and prosecution,’ were not shown to be specifically caused by the delay in the defendant's prosecution. See Simmons v. State, 304 Ga.App. 39, 44(2)(d) (696 S.E.2d 75) (2010); Jackson v. State, 279 Ga. 449, 453– 454(3) (614 S.E.2d 781) (2005). Likewise, while the difficulties raised by Reimers in this case are certainly associated with the fact of Reimers's arrest and prosecution for child molestation, Reimers has not shown that the delay in this case is actually the cause of such difficulties. Indeed, even Reimers testified that it was simply ‘having an accusation charged against [him] ... that's causing [him] the anxiety.’” Accord, Moore v. State , 314 Ga.App. 219, 723 S.E.2d 508 (February 17, 2012) (no prejudice shown by defendant’s testimony “about the strain the [child molestation] charges have placed on his marriage and the fact that six months before the hearing, because of his bond conditions, he had to move from his house because his stepson had moved back in.”). State v. Thaxton, 311 Ga.App. 260, 715 S.E.2d 480 (July 14, 2011). In prosecution for animal cruelty and felony marijuana possession, trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Reason for delay. Trial court properly found that “the State had not adequately explained its failure to expeditiously pursue the common drug and animal cruelty charges,” even though it showed that most of the delay was caused by need to investigate the dogfighting charges in light of the new statute prohibiting that practice. Trial court thus properly weighed reason for delay against State, although it was “relatively benign.” Prejudice. Defendant wasn’t prejudiced by bond conditions requiring him to stay away from animals; “the trial court properly noted that Thaxton had agreed to those conditions by entering into the consent bond order,” but then erred “based upon its unexplained conclusion that the prejudice was ‘substantial enough.’” Balancing. Trial court erred by concluding that “really what it boils down to is, the length of the delay versus the reason for the delay.” “In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the Barker balancing test, ‘there is no exercise of discretion for this Court to review, and the trial court's order must be vacated and the case remanded for the entry of a proper order pursuant to Barker ,’” quoting Porter (February 7, 2011), below. Weems v. State, 310 Ga.App. 590, 714 S.E.2d 119 (July 6, 2011). In prosecution for child molestation and aggravated sexual battery, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial right. 1. Reason for delay. Forty-month delay due to “over-crowded docket and budget constraints” was properly weighed “lightly” against State. Accord, Hill v. State , 315 Ga.App. 833, 729 S.E.2d 1 (May 10, 2012). 2. Delay in assertion. Thirty-eight month delay in asserting right properly weighed “heavily” against defendant. 3. Prejudice – anxiety. “Weems presented no specific evidence as to how his inability to have unsupervised visits with his grandchildren, or any other children for that matter, caused him significant anxiety.” 4. Prejudice – bond restrictions. “Weems further argues that he suffered anxiety and concern because he was required to call his bonding company once a week and his agreement with that company prevented him from leaving Georgia. However, these restrictions were not the result of his court-issued bond order, but were instead restrictions placed upon him by his agreement with a private bail bonding company. See Disharoon [ v. State, 288 Ga.App. 1, 5–6(1)(d) (652 S.E.2d 902) (2007)] (holding that a defendant's bond conditions in a related but separate case in another county could not be weighed against the State because the trial court in which the defendant filed his plea in bar could not be held responsible for anxiety over which it had no control). Additionally, we have previously held that a criminal defendant's inability to leave the State due to a bond condition is not sufficient to demonstrate the level of anxiety and concern necessary to constitute a violation of a defendant's speedy trial rights because such restrictions are not unusual for a defendant pending trial. See Watkins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 686(d) (600 S.E.2d 747) (2004).” 5. Prejudice – anxiety. “ Weems also argues that members of his family had to put up three separate homes as collateral for his bond and have faced hardship because they have been unable to refinance or sell their homes during this case. But Weems failed to proffer any evidence that there has been any attempt to sell or refinance these homes, which was thwarted because of his bond.” 6. Prejudice – anxiety. No prejudice from police visits to defendant’s home, despite defendant’s claim of public embarrassment. “While Weems likely has suffered from public ridicule and embarrassment, he has not demonstrated that this is unusual for someone facing such charges. Furthermore, Weems was already a registered sex offender prior to State's filing of the charges in this case. And ‘[t]his court has recognized that arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty[.]’ Watkins [ v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 686(d) (600 S.E.2d 747) (2004)] (citations and punctuation omitted). While ‘such general burdens are always present to some extent, they fall short of establishing some unusual showing that would balance this factor significantly, if at all, in [Weems's] favor.’ (citations and punctuation omitted).” Stewart v. State, 310 Ga.App. 551, 713 S.E.2d 708 (July 6, 2011). No constitutional speedy trial violation in defendant’s prosecution for aggravated child molestation despite almost six-year delay. Length of delay. Trial court wasn’t required to weigh length of delay “heavily” against State. Reason for delay. Trial court properly found delay attributable to both parties, based on defense counsel’s extensive leaves of absence, ultimately weighing the reason against the State as “a