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negative factor, [but] relatively benign.” “The delay was also somewhat ‘attributable to the number of older cases ahead of [Stewart] on the trial court's docket.’ Nairon [ v. State, 215 Ga.App. 76, 76–77(1)(b) (449 S.E.2d 634) (1994)]. Nevertheless, a large part of the delay was attributable to the government, not only as a result of the State's multiple reindictments, but also because of the State's negligence and the trial judge's [fn] failure to call this case in for trial during any one of the available trial weeks on which defense counsel had no leaves of absence and had announced ready for trial. ‘Nowhere in the record, however, is there any evidence that the delay was the result of bad faith.’ Frazier [ v. State, 277 Ga.App. 881, 882(b) (627 S.E.2d 894) (2006)].” Accord, Hill v. State , 315 Ga.App. 833, 729 S.E.2d 1 (May 10, 2012) (delayed caused by defense counsel’s leaves of absence weighed against defendant). Assertion of right. Defendant’s delay in assertion of right for almost six years should have been weighed “heavily” against him. Prejudice. Delay may have “actually benefitted Stewart's defense” inasmuch as victim made subsequent statements varying from her initial outcry. And defendant’s failure to keep documentation as to his whereabouts at the time of the alleged molestation “is not a result of pretrial delay, but rather Stewart’s own negligence.” State v. Shirley, 311 Ga.App. 141, 714 S.E.2d 636 (June 30, 2011). In defendant’s cocaine trafficking prosecution, record supported trial court’s grant of motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Reason for delay. Of the four year delay, two years was caused by State’s failure to identify its confidential informant as ordered by the court. Trial court found that the State “had ‘strategically delayed the prosecution of the case in order to gain a tactical advantage over the defense and to harass the Defendant.’ … The trial court noted that the state's investigation had been completed for years, that the case had been pending for years, and that the state had ignored Judge Campbell's order for almost two years. Meanwhile, ‘[e]ach time the [s]tate appeared at the calendar call [it] announced ready knowing that it had not complied with Judge Campbell's order or with its basic discovery obligations pursuant to OCGA § 17–16–8.’ Accordingly, the trial court found that the state intended the defense be prepared in a ‘last-minute scramble’ and that such ‘gamesmanship’ should be weighed heavily against the state.” Assertion of right. Trial court properly declined to fault defendant for not asserting his speedy trial rights for 41 months. “Here, the trial court noted that Shirley had to file a motion and obtain an order requiring the state to reveal the CI, and that in the two-year period after the issuance of the order defense counsel appeared at numerous trial calendars and informed the state that he was ready to try the case subject to receipt of the CI's identity. We have accepted, as an appropriate mitigating circumstance in weighing this factor, a trial court's finding that a defendant ‘cannot be faulted for demanding that the [s]tate comply with discovery obligations before trial began.’ (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Ivory, 304 Ga.App. 859, 862–863(2)(c) (698 S.E.2d 340) (2010). Similarly, in this case the trial court was not required to fault Shirley for deciding to appear at calendar calls and announce ready, subject to the state's compliance with its obligation to reveal the CI, as opposed to formally demanding an immediate trial. See also State v. Moses, 301 Ga.App. 315, 319–320(2)(c) (692 S.E.2d 1) (2009) (factors warranting mitigation included defendant's appearance and announcement of ready for trial when state was not prepared to try the case).” Accord, State v. Brown , 315 Ga.App. 544, 726 S.E.2d 500 (March 20, 2012) (State’s failure to provide discovery mitigated defendant’s delay in demanding speedy trial); Richardson (October 23, 2012), above (trial court erred by categorically stating that State’s failure to respond to discovery didn’t excuse defendant’s assertion of right to speedy trial) ; Hartsfield (November 20, 2012), above. Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 710 S.E.2d 559 (May 31, 2011). Trial court properly denied motion to dismiss defendant’s murder charges based on constitutional speedy trial violation; no prejudice shown from death of witness where testimony preserved. “The record shows … that Archie Byron, Fallen's father, was interviewed prior to his death and that a videotape of this interview would be available for trial. The State entered a statement on the record that it would stipulate to the admissibility of the videotape. In addition, the record further shows that Archie's statements are largely cumulative of similar deposition testimony given by Fallen's grandmother, Joyce Byron, who remains available to testify as to this evidence at trial. Under these circumstances, Fallen has not shown that he was prejudiced.” Accord, Miller v. State , 313 Ga.App. 552, 722 S.E.2d 152 (January 12, 2012). Davis v. State, 308 Ga.App. 843, 709 S.E.2d 343 (March 28, 2011). In child molestation prosecution, “the trial court clearly erred in reaching several material factual findings” in assessing defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim. Reason for delay. Although case was in bench warrant status for some months due to defendant’s failure to appear for court, “[t]he evidence presented at the speedy trial hearing did not support the court's findings that the delay in prosecuting Davis's case was caused either by his ‘bench-warrant status’ (the duration of which was not established) or his use of another name. None of the prosecutors testified that the ‘bench-warrant status’ or Davis's involvement in another Fulton County case under the name ‘Antoniel Davis’ hindered their ability to prosecute the case. The trial court also did not elaborate on how these facts contributed to the delay.” Assertion of right. “Davis did not file this motion until nearly three years after his arrest. In Brown v. State, 287 Ga. 892, 700 S.E.2d 407 (2010), the Supreme Court of Georgia held