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to show what efforts, if any, he made to locate the witness. Moreover, other than to say that this witness would ‘directly contradict’ the victim's account, he made no proffer of what the victim's testimony would be. Thus, Higgins fell short of his burden to demonstrate how the missing witness could supply material evidence for the defense.” State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 706 S.E.2d 561 (February 28, 2011). Reversing 301 Ga.App. 251 (687 S.E.2d 239) (2009), In child molestation prosecution, Court of Appeals erred by affirming trial court’s dismissal based on constitutional speedy trial violation, erroneously applying balancing test. 1. Assertion of right. Trial court erroneously failed to weigh heavily against defendant his failure to assert his right to speedy trial in the three years between his arrest and indictment, instead weighing it in his favor. The right to a speedy trial may be asserted at any time after arrest, and “once his constitutional right accrues, the defendant has the responsibility to assert it, and delay in doing so normally will be weighed against him. See [ Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008)]; Barker [ v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 529 (92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101) (1972)] (discussing the defendant's ‘responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim’). Pickett's inability to assert his statutory right to a speedy trial does not alter this analysis. We have recognized that a trial court has the discretion to mitigate the weight given this factor when a defendant fails to assert his right during the period between arrest and indictment if he was out on bond and without counsel. See State v. Gleaton, 288 Ga. 373, 703 S.E.2d 642 (Nov. 8, 2010). Here, Pickett was on bond and apparently without counsel for almost three years between his arrest and indictment. But the trial court made no mention of those facts, instead indicating, erroneously, that the right to a speedy trial is sufficiently asserted at any time after arrest. Moreover, Pickett waited more than two years and seven months after his indictment to first assert his right, and that is a lengthy delay in itself. See Brown v. State, 287 Ga. 892, 895-896 (700 S.E.2d 407) (2010) (holding that the assertion-of-the-right factor weighed heavily against codefendants who waited two and three years, respectively, to assert their rights).” Accord, Fallen v. State , 289 Ga. 247, 710 S.E.2d 559 (May 31, 2011) (approximately three-year delay in asserting right to speedy trial properly weighed heavily against defendant); State v. Thaxton , 311 Ga.App. 260, 715 S.E.2d 480 (July 14, 2011) (pre-indictment delay in demanding trial should have weighed heavily against defendant); Higgenbottom v. State , 291 Ga. 198, 719 S.E.2d 482 (November 29, 2011) (“an accused may assert the right to a speedy trial prior to indictment”); York v. State , 334 Ga.App. 581, 780 S.E.2d 352 (November 17, 2015) (“The trial court did not err in concluding that York’s failure to assert his speedy trial claim for more than two years weighed heavily against him.”). Compare Hartsfield (November 20, 2012), above; Jenkins (February 24, 2014), above. 2. Prejudice. “The trial court's order also found actual prejudice based on the undue anxiety that Pickett had suffered as a result of his pending child molestation charges ‘making it impossible to get a professional job’ and from not having any contact with his children for more than five and a half years because of his bond condition. The Court of Appeals did not specifically address these findings. We believe the finding as to the no-contact condition was supported by the record and within the trial court's discretion. See Sweatman, 287 Ga. at 875 (holding that anxiety has to be more than that typically associated with serious pending charges). However, the finding that Pickett had suffered undue anxiety because the child molestation charges had made it ‘impossible [for him] to get a professional job’ implies that Pickett had held a ‘professional’ job at some point, had the ability to obtain one, or had lost one as a result of his arrest. There was no evidence or proffer at the hearing on the motion to dismiss concerning this point. The trial court therefore erred in this finding.” Howard v. State, 307 Ga.App. 822, 706 S.E.2d 163 (February 11, 2011). RICO conviction affirmed; no constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Delay caused by re-assignment of case to new judge and new prosecutor charged to State. 2. Defendant’s pro se speedy trial demand, filed while represented by counsel, was ineffective to assert his constitutional right. Wallace v. State, 288 Ga.App. 480, 481 (654 S.E.2d 442) (2007); see also Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43, 45, n. 3(1)(c) (673 S.E.2d 194) (2009). Accord, Johnson v. State , 313 Ga.App. 895, 723 S.E.2d 100 (February 3, 2012). Brewington v. State, 288 Ga. 520, 705 S.E.2d 660 (February 7, 2011). In defendants’ murder prosecution, trial court properly denied motions to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 1. For two defendants who cases were tried and resulted in a hung jury before speedy trial issue was raised, “the relevant time frame for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds is from the date of the mistrial, … through to the date the motion was denied,” less than four months, meaning “there is no presumption of prejudice.” Accord, Wilson v. State , 311 Ga.App. 780, 717 S.E.2d 300 (September 22, 2011); McCree v. State , 313 Ga.App. 101, 720 S.E.2d 208 (November 9, 2011); State v. Alexander , 295 Ga. 154, 758 S.E.2d 289 (May 5, 2014); construed, Whatley (March 10, 2014), above; State v. Grayson , 332 Ga.App. 862, 775 S.E.2d 222 (July 8, 2015) . 2. As to defendant not yet tried, delay resulting from defense counsel’s actions – failing to prepare for trial because of fee dispute with local indigent defense committee – “lies squarely with the defense. See Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 261, 262-263 (564 S.E.2d 441) (2002) (the actions of defense counsel may be weighed against the defendant in regard for the reason for delay).” 3. Defendant’s