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delay in asserting speedy trial right for more than two years weighed against the defendant. Accord, Fleming v. State , 324 Ga.App. 481, 749 S.E.2d 54 (October 2, 2013); York (November 17, 2015), above . 4. “The general anxieties stemming from being incarcerated … are insufficient to sustain a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Bowling v. State, [285 Ga. 46(1)(d) (673 S.E.2d 194) (2009)].” Accord, Johnson v. State , 313 Ga.App. 895, 723 S.E.2d 100 (February 3, 2012); York (November 17, 2015), above . State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 705 S.E.2d 636 (February 7, 2011). Reversing 300 Ga.App. 128, 684 S.E.2d 299 (2009), and remanding to trial court for full constitutional speedy trial analysis. 1. Trial court erred in failing to analyze cause of entire eight-year delay, and Court of Appeals erred in doing its own analysis instead of remanding. Accord, Goddard v. State , 310 Ga.App. 2, 712 S.E.2d 528 (June 15, 2011) (reversing and remanding for findings of fact); Richardson v. State , 311 Ga.App. 369, 715 S.E.2d 774 (August 5, 2011) (remand for findings of fact by trial court); Singleton (September 19, 2012), above (remand appropriate where trial court analysis faulty); State v. Thompson , 334 Ga.App. 692, 780 S.E.2d 67 (November 18, 2015) (remand required where trial court failed to weigh Barker factors). 2. Contrary to State’s assertion, filing of motion to dismiss based on speedy trial violation was an assertion of the right. “It is true that the ‘timing, form, and vigor of the accused's demands to be tried immediately’ should be considered in determining the weight given to the assertion-of-the-right factor. See Ruffin [ v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 63, 663 S.E.2d 189 (2008)]. This Court, however, has repeatedly and consistently recognized that a defendant may assert his constitutional speedy trial right through a motion to dismiss asserting a violation of that right. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265, 266, 268-269, 695 S.E.2d 201 (2010); Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 48, 54, 694 S.E.2d 350 (2010); Bowling v. State, 285 Ga. 43, 43, 45-46, 673 S.E.2d 194 (2009). See also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 650, 653 (treating Doggett's motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his speedy trial right, without mention of any demand for trial, as an assertion of the right); Barker, 407 U.S. at 528 (rejecting the view that a defendant waives his right to a speedy trial entirely by failing to file a formal demand for trial or for the period before such a demand if one is eventually filed). To the extent that Lively [ v. State, 155 Ga.App. 402, 270 S.E.2d 812 (1980)], is inconsistent with our cases, it is disapproved.” Accord, Davis (March 28, 2011), above; Curry (September 13, 2012), above.. 3. “[T]he greater the delay between charging and trial, the greater the presumed impairment of witness recollections and other evidence needed for a fair and reliable trial. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 655, 657; Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 57, 663 S.E.2d 189.” Accord, Goddard v. State , 315 Ga.App. 868, 729 S.E.2d 397 (May 15, 2012). Higgenbottom v. State, 288 Ga. 429, 704 S.E.2d 786 (January 10, 2011). In defendant’s murder prosecution, reverses and remands trial court’s denial of motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial deprivation, for failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. “It is imperative … that in cases implicating a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial, the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker. Absent such findings, there is no exercise of discretion for this Court to review. See Phan v. State, 287 Ga. 697, 700 n. 1 (699 S.E.2d 9) (2010); Bryant v. State, 265 Ga.App. 234, 235 (593 S.E.2d 705) (2004). The trial court in this case made no findings as to the majority of the Barker factors, finding with regard to Higgenbottom's Sixth Amendment claim only that Higgenbottom failed to show that ‘the delay between the defendant's arrest and the filing of motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial was prejudicial.’ While a trial court's findings as to the presence or absence of prejudice are important, they cannot alone establish a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim without consideration of the other Barker criteria. Barker, supra at 533.” Accord, Moore v. State , 309 Ga.App. 519, 710 S.E.2d 692 (May 6, 2011) (remanding trial court’s summary denial of speedy trial motion for findings of fact); Smith v. State , 323 Ga.App. 668, 747 S.E.2d 859 (August 8, 2013); Culbreath v. State , 328 Ga.App. 153, 761 S.E.2d 557 (July 10, 2014); Graham v. State , 331 Ga.App. 36, 769 S.E.2d 753 (March 6, 2015); York v. State , 334 Ga.App. 581, 780 S.E.2d 352 (November 17, 2015). Teasley v. State, 307 Ga.App. 153, 704 S.E.2d 248 (November 30, 2010). Trial court erred in applying constitutional speedy trial balancing test to defendants’ prosecution for child cruelty. 1. Trial court “erred by assuming that the State could not be blamed for the State's failure to fund the public defender system,” citing Phan (June 28, 2010), below. 2. Failure to ever demand trial during 38-month delay weighed heavily against one defendant; factor weighed against co- defendant wife, but less heavily, when she in fact twice demanded trial, but defense counsel “admitted she failed to make further demands based on assurances of trial by the State.” 3. Prejudice: “‘[E]ven if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.’ Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. See also Ruffin [ v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 55 (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)] (‘Release on bond does not absolve the State of its constitutional obligation to bring those accused of committing crimes to trial in a speedy manner.’) Also, ‘consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable, and ... affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.’ Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655(III)(A). A finding of presumptive prejudice ‘cannot alone carry [the defendants'] Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria. Instead, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.’ (Citations and