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punctuation omitted.) Harris [ v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 456-457 (667 S.E.2d 361) (2008)]. But, ‘the extent to which a defendant must prove prejudice from a delay in prosecution is directly related to the government's reasonableness in its pursuit of that defendant.’ Hayes [ v. State, 298 Ga.App. 338, 349(2)(c) (680 S.E.2d 182) (2009)] (case of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and cruelty to children characterized as ‘relatively uncomplicated’). Finally, as explained by the Supreme Court, ‘the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.’ Id. And the delay that can be tolerated rises with the seriousness and complexity of the case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531(IV).” 4. Prejudice shown sufficient to warrant dismissal where defendant wife’s anxiety “included losing custody of a small child and having the State threaten to take a different child away from her at the time of that child's birth. Here, Elizabeth testified that the delay caused her significant anxiety about the well-being of her child who was removed from the home for three years, about whether the State was going to take her subsequent newborn child, about her strained family relations, and about having to live under a cloud of suspicion for so long.” However, “[w]ithout testimony from Jerry, we cannot say that he suffered in the same way as Elizabeth. We therefore conclude that the prejudice to Jerry was not as significant.” 5. Trial court improperly ruled that “ given that the victim was a small child, it had a duty to balance the victim's rights against the rights of the defendants. But we find no authority for weighing the specific victim's rights against the defendant's based on the circumstances of the case in order to conclude that a lengthy delay in prosecution attributable to the State is acceptable if the victim is a small child. Thus, we find the trial court erred by applying this factor.” 6. “ The court also relied on the fact that, at the hearing on the motion to discharge, the State had offered to try the case the following week. But there is nothing in the record to show that the offer was serious, that it was communicated to the Teasleys prior to the motion hearing, or that the trial had in fact been calendered or scheduled.” State v. Gleaton, 288 Ga. 373, 703 S.E.2d 642 (November 8, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendants’ plea in bar to prosecution of their murder charges; 1. defendants suffered actual prejudice during three-year delay between arrest and indictment because “condemnation of the apartment complex, which was the crime scene, made it impossible for the defense to investigate the case in any meaningful manner, and that this ‘actual’ prejudice was due entirely to the State's failure to have returned an indictment until nearly four years after the arrests of Gleaton and Clark.” Melton, writing for Benham and Nahmias, dissents: “the defendants were arrested shortly after September 8, 2005, and there was nothing preventing the defense from interviewing witnesses and beginning the preparation of their defense at this time. Nor is there any evidence of record as to exactly when the apartment complex was “condemned,” leaving the majority only to speculate as to when any ‘meaningful’ investigation would have been cut off, and to speculate as to how the State's delay would have had anything to do with the timing of the defense initiating its own investigation.” 2. Trial court properly chose not to weigh defendants’ failure to file pre-indictment trial demand against them , distinguishing “ Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898 (252 S.E.2d 397) (1979). It is certainly true that in Haisman, this Court weighed the defendant's pre-indictment silence against her. But, unlike the present case, Haisman involved a total delay of 22 months, the reason for the pre-indictment delay period was the State's legitimate need for further investigation of the crimes at issue, and there was no indication that Haisman was out on bond following her arrest.” Trial court properly “recognized that ‘as a practical matter a [d]efendant on bond is highly unlikely to come forward and demand an indictment be returned against him or that the case be brought before a court for any reason.’” Accord, Hartsfield (November 20, 2012), above. Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 700 S.E.2d 579 (October 4, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for murder and related crimes, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Specifically, no prejudice shown: “Sweatman notes only that she was 21 years old when she was arrested and that she ‘has spent her twenties worrying about this case and these charges.’” Brown v. State, 287 Ga. 892, 700 S.E.2d 407 (October 4, 2010). No constitutional speedy trial denial in defendants’ prosecution for murder, aggravated assault and related offenses; trial court properly found that first 38 months of delay “was due to the complexities of the case and the inability to produce [aggravated assault victim] Coachman for examination at the motions hearings and at trial because of the severity of his injuries and the need to accommodate his disability. … Additional delays were occasioned by discovery issues, the need to provide counsel for Coachman [who was implicated in “criminal drug activity”], and illness on the part of defense counsel.” Meder v. State, 305 Ga.App. 702, 700 S.E.2d 706 (August 27, 2010). In defendant’s DUI prosecution, trial court properly denied motion for acquittal based on constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Unexplained delay (here, 17 months) “ is attributable to the State. Because this delay was unexplained, it is presumed that this failure to bring the case to trial was caused by the negligence of the State. See Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733 (438 S.E.2d 626) (1994) (‘Where no reason appears for a delay, we must treat the delay as caused by the negligence of the State in bringing the case to trial’).” Accord, Teasley (November 30, 2010); Bucknor (February 4, 2013); Ward v. State , 325 Ga.App. 890, 756 S.E.2d 21