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(March 4, 2014); Cawley v. State , 330 Ga.App. 22, 766 S.E.2d 581 (November 21, 2014). 2. Demand for jury trial in pleading waiving arraignment “‘does not invoke either a constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial.’ State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 513 (555 S.E.2d 710) (2001).” 3. No prejudice shown where defendant asserts that “one of her witnesses has now refused to testify for her. Meder states that this witness had been with her on the evening in question, was a passenger in her car when Meder was arrested for DUI, and would have testified that Meder was not impaired at the time of the accident. The witness and Meder have since quarreled, however, and, according to Meder, the witness told her that she would not testify on Meder's behalf. As the trial court pointed out, the witness is not unavailable and Meder may still subpoena her to testify. The trial court also stated that there was no reason to believe that a witness would perjure herself because of a disagreement .” Franklin v. State, 305 Ga.App. 354, 699 S.E.2d 575 (July 8, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his prosecution for armed robbery and aggravated assault, based on alleged constitutional speedy trial violation. After defendant’s conviction for murder in 1979, case was dead-docketed. Franklin was sentenced to death, but his murder conviction was overturned in 1984, and 1985, defendant was instead sentenced to life. In 2006, defendant’s armed robbery charges were placed back on the active docket, blocking defendant’s pending grant of parole. 1. Reason for delay: trial court erred in failing to weigh 17-year dead docket delay against State, citing Hayes ( June 15, 2009), and Harris (September 22, 2008), both below, and State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 832-833 (561 S.E.2d 79) (2002). 2. Nevertheless, “the trial court did not err by concluding that the presumptive prejudice from the lengthy delay was outweighed by the State's proof that Franklin suffered no actual prejudice,” given that “he admitted under oath that he has no defense to the crime, that he does not have a defense and has never intended to mount a defense, and that no witnesses have been lost as a result of the delay.” 3. “We find no merit in Franklin's contention that possible impairment of his parole prospects for an unrelated crime should be considered when evaluating whether the delay in this case impaired his defense, caused oppressive pretrial detention, or caused anxiety and concern about the pending charges against him.” State v. Ivory, 304 Ga.App. 859, 698 S.E.2d 340 (July 7, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for discharge based on constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Reason for delay. Defendant couldn’t be faulted for demanding full response to discovery before proceeding to trial. Accord, Shirley (June 30, 2011), above. 2. Prejudice. “[T]he trial court did find that Ivory's ability to prepare his defense and receive a fair trial had been impaired by the delay in this case. This finding was based on the fact that the missing Grady records were critical to Ivory's defense since he claimed that they would demonstrate he was heavily intoxicated and under the influence of medication at the time he made his statement to police,[fn] and because the records were needed to show whether the type of wounds he received were consistent or inconsistent with the type of ammunition which was fired from the gun of the patron at the club. The trial court also found that the missing 911 call records were important to corroborate certain aspects of the defense, and that evidence remained unaccounted for, such as some of the photographs of the scene and forensic evidence concerning shell casings found at the scene. Based on the foregoing, the trial court weighed this factor heavily against the State.” Distinguishing Moore v. State, 294 Ga. App 570, 575(1)(d) (669 S.E.2d 498) (2008): “in this case, the trial court found that it was not only the failure to provide the medical records that impaired Ivory's defense, but the fact that the State apparently waited in excess of two years to notify Ivory that the medical records could not be located and did so then only in response to a second motion to compel and an order of the trial court. Further, the trial court found that the State still had not accounted for some of the requested items. And of critical distinction here, in Moore and cases cited therein, we were ‘affirming a trial court's finding that the loss of key evidence did not necessarily impair an accused's defense under this factor,’ id. at 575(1)(d).” Phan v. State, 287 Ga. 697, 699 S.E.2d 9 (June 28, 2010). In defendant’s capital murder prosecution, defendant’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial violation and violation of the right to counsel remanded to trial court for further consideration. “As the basis for these motions, Phan maintains that, pursuant to Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 (III)(C), 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (March 9, 2009), there has been a ‘systemic breakdown in the public defender system’ caused by a lack of funding.” Record shows that two private attorneys were retained by the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council to represent defendant after his 2005 indictment; one has never been paid, the other not paid since August 2008. “In 2006, defense counsel petitioned the GPDSC for funds to travel to Vietnam to investigate Phan's case for both facts and mitigation evidence. Phan is a native of Vietnam, and all of his family remains there. The GPDSC has not provided funds for this trip. Based on this lack of funding, Phan filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, and he also claimed that his right to a speedy trial had been violated.” “ To adequately address Phan's contentions, the trial court must first thoroughly assess whether there has been an actual breakdown in the entire public defender system prohibiting Phan from receiving counsel within the framework of the facts of this specific case. The trial