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court's assessment should include an analysis of alternative sources of funding and alternative representation if necessary under the circumstances of this particular case,” citing Weis (March 25, 2010), below, and “ Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. State, 285 Ga. 169 (675 S.E.2d 25) (2009) (trial court properly ordered GPDSC to fund capital case). The trial court may also want to consider alternatives to travel to Vietnam, such as phone or internet interviews of witnesses. By doing so, the trial court may safeguard both the public interest as well as Phan's rights. Weis, supra; cf. State v. Lattimore, [ (June 7, 2010), below ]” “If the trial court determines that no alternatives are available and that a systemic breakdown of the entire public defender system has actually occurred, this determination must then be factored into a constitutional speedy trial analysis for the review of such a claim. This requires a consideration of the four- part balancing test outlined in Barker v. Wingo .” Thompson, writing for Hunstein and Benham, dissents, based on trial court’s existing findings of ‘systemic failure,’ would make Barker calculation weighing that failure against State. State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 696 S.E.2d 613 (June 7, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar to prosecution of his murder charge, on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 1. Reason for delay: “staffing issues” and transfer between judges equal “negligence on the part of the State.” 2. Defendant’s failure to assert right properly not weighed against defendant where State represented to defendant that it intended to re-indict, but failed to do so for 16 months. 3. Trial court could find prejudice despite no incarceration, no special anxiety, and no impairment of defense: “ Here the delay was lengthy, almost five years, and Lattimore was not appointed counsel until two years after his arrest, preventing timely investigation of the incident. As the trial court noted, ‘[e]xcessive delay has a tendency to compromise the reliability of trials in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.’ [ Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56(2)(b)(i) (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)] (Citation and punctuation omitted.). Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the Barker v. Wingo factors, and thus find no err in the grant of Lattimore's motion to dismiss the indictment. [ State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 831-832 (561 S.E.2d 79) (2002)].” Carley, Melton and Nahmias dissent. Melton: “Lattimore's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial is not excused by the fact that he was not re-indicted until February 2008, as ‘invocation of the speedy trial right need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge[.] [T]he accused can begin demanding that the right to a speedy trial be honored as soon as he or she is arrested.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 63(2)(b)(iii) (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008).” Accord, Richardson (October 23, 2012), above (physical precedent only on this point). Brooks v. State, 304 Ga.App. 281, 696 S.E.2d 110 (June 1, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for battery, rape and related offenses, trial court properly denied defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim. 1. Reason for delay factor is neutral; State’s negligence (prosecution’s file lost, case transferred among judges), balanced by trial counsel’s strategic decision not to move the case forward “because ‘it was a sleeping dog.’” 2. No presumption of actual prejudice despite 7- year delay, “because he failed to timely assert his right to a speedy trial and the defense contributed to the delay by intentionally not taking steps to move the ‘sleeping dog’ case forward.” 3. No prejudice due to missing witness where defendant failed to “ show that [he] could supply material evidence for the defense,” quoting Ingram v. State, 280 Ga.App. 467, 471(1)(d) (634 S.E.2d 430) (2006). Jakupovic v. State, 287 Ga. 205, 695 S.E.2d 247 (May 17, 2010). No constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Delay after grant of new trial. “Where, as here, there is no contention that there was any inordinate delay in ruling on the defendant's motion for new trial, the length of the delay in retrying the defendant is measured from the date that the trial court ruled upon the defendant's motion.” Accord, Brewington (February 7, 2011) (delay after mistrial measured from grant of mistrial, citing Jakupovic). 2. No prejudice where two State’s witnesses no longer available, but their testimony preserved in prior trial transcript. “Jakupovic contends that without having the witnesses at the second trial, the jury will be unable to assess their credibility. However, these witnesses testified against Jakupovic in his first trial, and, as this Court has previously held, ‘[a] missing witness whose testimony cannot help a defendant constitutes a flimsy basis on which to claim prejudice.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Torres v. State, 207 Ga. 79, 81(2) (508 S.E.2d 171) (1998).” Accord, Brooks (June 1, 2010), above. Simmons v. State, 304 Ga.App. 39, 696 S.E.2d 75 (May 11, 2010). In his prosecution for armed robbery and related offenses, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for discharge based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Death of potential character witness of limited prejudice. “[W]e find it less than credible that Simmons could summon only one witness willing and capable to testify to his good character. Further, even if Simmons's alleged character witness had testified as he contends, then the State would have been free to introduce, pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-20(b), Simmons's criminal record documenting his prior commission of violent felonies. [fn] This would limit the value of good character testimony from Simmons's mother.”