☢ test - Í

Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265, 695 S.E.2d 201 (May 3, 2010). In defendants’ murder prosecution, trial court properly found no constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Reason for delay: conflict of defense counsel. After withdrawal of the Circuit Defender’s Office due to conflict, trial court promptly (28 days) appointed conflict counsel. “Here, contrary to any effort by the State to cause delay, or any failure of the trial court to act with dispatch, the State's attorney made his best effort to bring about the prompt appointment of new counsel, and the trial court acted promptly to ensure that replacement counsel was appointed. Indeed, once it became clear that the Circuit Defender's Office would not continue with Robinson and [co-defendant] Woods' cases, Robinson and Woods were provided with new counsel in less than a month.” 2. Reason for delay: defense request for ruling on conflict from State Bar. “On the defense side, … when confronted with the State's motion showing a potential conflict of interest for the Circuit Defender's Office, instead of seeking an immediate ruling on the motion or a brief continuance to allow for the filing of briefs, the defendants requested that the trial court allow them to wait an indefinite amount of time in order to obtain an informal advisory opinion from the State Bar of Georgia on the conflict of interest issue. This created a four-month delay that must be attributed to the defendants .” 3. Reason for delay: joinder with unrepresented defendant. Additional delay caused by lack of counsel for a third co-defendant “does not weigh for or against either side, however, because the State and the defense bear equal responsibility for the delay. Indeed, the State initially decided to try all of the co- defendants together; however, Robinson and Woods acquiesced in that decision rather than moving to sever Robinson and Woods' cases from Williams' case in order to move their cases closer to trial independent of Williams' situation. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 279 Ga. 449(3) (614 S.E.2d 781) (2005). It is not the fault of Robinson and Woods, nor the fault of the State, that Williams' initial counsel was disqualified from representing him.” Ogletree v. State, 303 Ga.App. 581, 693 S.E.2d 909 (April 7, 2010). In defendant’s prosecution for rape, child molestation and related offenses, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Assertion of right. Defendant’s failure to assert right to speedy trial for four years and four months, until eve of trial, weighed heavily against him. Accord, Jakupovic v. State , 287 Ga. 205, 695 S.E.2d 247 (May 17, 2010); Wilson v. State , 311 Ga.App. 780, 717 S.E.2d 300 (September 22, 2011) (three year, nine month delay in asserting right properly weighed heavily against defendant). 2. Prejudice. “‘[A] generalized statement that the memories of witnesses have faded over the passage of time is not sufficient. For memory lapse to be prejudicial, [the defendant] must establish that the lapses substantially relate to a material issue [at trial],’” quoting Robinson v. State, 298 Ga.App. 164, 168(1)(b)(iv), 679 S.E.2d 383 (2009). Accord, Stewart v. State , 310 Ga.App. 551, 713 S.E.2d 708 (July 6, 2011). Ferguson v. State, 303 Ga.App. 341, 693 S.E.2d 578 (April 1, 2010). In defendant’s child molestation, no error in denying motion for dismissal based on speedy trial violation. Despite 27-month delay triggering analysis, defendant’s failure to assert right until eve of trial and his failure to show prejudice weigh “strongly” against him. 1. State responsible for delay, but death of investigator and maternity leave of prosecutor are “relatively benign.” 2. Contrary to defendant’s argument, “moving to sever the trial of a co-defendant does not invoke either a constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial.” 3. No prejudice where witness had already moved out of state before defendant was arrested, and he made no efforts to contact her subsequently. Also, defendant’s “‘speculation that they “might have been alibi witnesses” falls short of “specific evidence” to weight this factor in his favor,’” quoting Watkins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 687(d), 600 S.E.2d 747 (2004). Accord, Higgins (March 8, 2011), above. Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 694 S.E.2d 350 (March 25, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar to his capital murder prosecution based on speedy trial denial. Defendant contends that State violated his speedy trial right by failing to fund his defense by appointed capital defense specialists, to be paid by the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council (“the Council”); majority finds, however, that much of the delay was caused by defendant’s failure to cooperate with the public defender appointed to replace the Council’s private attorneys. 1. Delay was not caused by “a systematic ‘breakdown in the public defender system’ which could be charged to the State,” Vermont v. Brillon , 556 U.S. 81, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (March 9, 2009). “[T]he ‘public defender system’ had not broken down from the lack of funding at that point, as there were attorneys available within the public defender system to continue the case. Indeed, there can be no ‘systemic breakdown in the public defender system’ ( Vermont v. Brillon, supra) when there are still attorneys within that system who are available to represent the criminal defendant.” See also Phan (February 27, 2012), above. 2. “ Even though Weis preferred to have [Council’s private attorneys] Citronberg and West as his attorneys, and we have held that ‘“it is an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's request to appoint the counsel of his preference”’ where that choice ‘“is supported by objective considerations favoring the appointment of the preferred counsel,”’ we have also explained that those cases involved ‘“no countervailing considerations of comparable weight.”’ Grant v. State, 278 Ga. 817, 817, 607 S.E.2d 586 (2005) (quoting Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469, 469, 384 S.E.2d 181 (1989)). Seeking to move the case forward in an effort to prevent a violation of the constitutional speedy trial