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abuse the child. See Jones v. State, 283 Ga.App. 838, 842(4) (642 S.E.2d 865) (2007) (finding that accused's defense was prejudiced by loss of witness who would have supported accused's claim that she was not involved in illegal activity despite presence at scene); Hardeman v. State, 280 Ga.App. 168, 171(4) (633 S.E.2d 595) (2006) (same). In this matter, where the credibility of witnesses would have played a pivotal role, ‘[i]t is inconceivable that this evidence would have not been material.’ Hardeman, supra, 280 Ga.App. at 171(4). ‘It follows that the delay deprived [Ditman] of the potential benefit of this witness.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Jones, supra, 283 Ga.App. at 842(4). ‘Prejudice has therefore been shown from the delay in this case.’ Id. See Hardeman, supra, 280 Ga.App. at 171(4).” State v. Moses, 301 Ga.App. 315, 692 S.E.2d 1 (November 17, 2009). No abuse of discretion where trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Length of delay. Delay of four years caused mostly by State’s negligence. Assertion of right. Defendant’s delay in asserting right weighs slightly against the defendant, but “this case is distinguishable from those cases in which the accused waits until trial is imminent before seeking to dismiss an indictment on Sixth Amendment grounds” because “Moses had appeared and announced ready for trial and … the case was dismissed because the State was not ready to try it. Perhaps more importantly, Moses' case had not yet been placed [back] on a trial calendar [after re-indictment] at the time he asserted his right.” In other words, this motion carries more weight because not filed on the eve of trial. Presumption of prejudice. Prejudice is presumed from delay in excess of eight months, but trial court erred in presuming “actual prejudice” because delay was less than five years, citing Moore v. State , 294 Ga.App. 570, 574(1)(d) (669 S.E.2d 498) (2008). While actual prejudice can be presumed with a delay less than five years, based on “the complexity of the case and the evidence existing on the date the State initiated the prosecution,” quoting Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 338, 348 (680 S.E.2d 182) (2009), this case doesn’t lend itself to such a presumption: “the underlying crime was a “street” armed robbery, the crime was reported to police immediately and statements taken from the victim and apparently a witness. The suspects were also immediately identified both by name and from a photographic line-up and arrests were quickly made. It appears, therefore, that the investigation was mostly completed by the time indictments were returned several weeks after the crime was committed.” Actual prejudice. Trial court could find actual prejudice, however, in that defendant’s “defense will be hampered in that any possible alibi witnesses [fn] will be deemed less credible by a jury because they will assume memory issues due to the four years of delay. Although a generalized statement that the memories of witnesses have faded over time is not deemed sufficient, memory lapses that substantially relate to a material issue are deemed prejudicial. Robinson v. State, [298 Ga.App. 164, 168 (1)(b) (679 S.E.2d 383) (2009)]. ‘[A]lso the presumption of prejudice addressed in Barker strengthens with the passage of time, and, as the delay increases, less specific harm need be demonstrated to conclude that the delay is prejudicial.’ State v. Redding, [274 Ga. 831, 834 (561 S.E.2d 79) (2002).]” Arbegast v. State, 301 Ga.App. 462, 688 S.E.2d 1 (September 28, 2009). In defendant’s child molestation prosecution, trial court properly denied plea in bar based on alleged constitutional speedy trial violation. Five year, two month delay was mostly attributable to state, but not intentional; but State rebutted presumption of prejudice by showing that defendant “waited more than five years to assert his right to a speedy trial.” Defendant showed no actual prejudice; trial court could disbelieve defendant’s assertion that his mother was now too sick to travel to testify in his defense. “Here, Arbegast's only support for his claim that his mother was unavailable is trial counsel's statement at the hearing that counsel asked the mother's husband whether a doctor had concluded that she was unable to travel, and the husband replied, “Well, I don't want her travel, I don't think she can.” Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting this argument.” Falagian v. State, 300 Ga.App. 187, 684 S.E.2d 340 (September 23, 2009). No constitutional speedy trial violation despite 54-month delay between defendant’s arrest for theft by conversion and filing of his motion to dismiss; “Falagian's late assertion of his constitutional right to a speedy trial weighs heavily against him as does his failure to show prejudice in light of such delay.” Note, defendant had no means of asserting any right to speedy trial during the 44 months when he was unindicted. Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 338, 680 S.E.2d 182 (June 15, 2009). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation: defendant was jailed for ten months on aggravated assault and related charges, then released when the charges were dead-docketed due to prosecutor’s strategic decision to re-file charges when a co-defendant could be found. Defendant and co-defendants were re-indicted 42 months later. Four months after re- indictment, defendant filed her constitutional speedy trial challenge. 1. “‘Placing a case upon the dead docket certainly constitutes neither a dismissal nor a termination of the prosecution in the accused's favor.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Beam [ v. State, 265 Ga. 853, 855, (3) (463 S.E.2d 347) (1995)]. Consequently, ‘the fact that a case is placed on the dead docket does not affect the constitutional right to a speedy trial.’ State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 833 (561 S.E.2d 79)