☢ test - Í

(2002).” This is particularly true here, where the dead-docket delay was an intentional, strategic decision by the State. “No further investigation was performed or was necessary before Hayes's second indictment. The trial court, therefore, erred in finding that the reasons for the delay were ‘administrative’ and ‘benign,’ and that the conduct was negligent rather than intentional and should weigh only slightly against the State. The State made an intentional decision to dead- docket, rather than dismiss, the case and therefore this factor [reason for delay] should weigh heavily against the State.” Accord, Goddard (May 15, 2012), above (delay of over 16 years caused in part by State’s negligence couldn’t be called “relatively benign.”). 2. Presumed prejudice. No specific showing of prejudice required here, in light of other factors. “‘[C]onsideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable, and ... affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.’ Doggett [ v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 655(III)(A), 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)]. See also Ruffin [ v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 60(2)(b)(ii) (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)] (pre-trial delay caused by governmental negligence is not “automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him”) (punctuation omitted); [ State v. Stallworth, 293 Ga.App. 370(2) (667 S.E.2d 147) (2008)] (‘no one factor is regarded as either a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a violation of the right to speedy trial, but they are factors that must be considered in a test balancing the conduct of the State and the defense’) (punctuation omitted). Rather, whether a defendant needs to show particularized prejudice depends upon an evaluation of the first three factors in the balancing test, and whether those factors weigh against the government. The central holding of Doggett was that when there is a significant delay (the first factor), caused by the government (the second factor), then the resulting ‘presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified[, if] neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence [the third factor], nor persuasively rebutted [by the State],’ entitles the defendant to relief. Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at 658(III)(B).” “Under Doggett, a substantial delay gives rise to a presumption of actual prejudice, because ‘greater pretrial delays simultaneously increase the degree of prejudice presumed and decrease the expectation that the defendant can demonstrate tangible prejudice to his or her ability to present a defense.’ Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601(1)(d) (592 S.E.2d 848) (2004). Where that delay results from government conduct, it will compel relief for the defendant unless the State can rebut that presumption. See, e.g., [ State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 863(2)(d) (655 S.E.2d 575) (2008)] (pre-trial delay of five-and-one-half years gives rise to presumption of actual prejudice ); State v. Sutton, 273 Ga.App. 84, 87-88 (614 S.E.2d 206) (2005) (presumption of prejudice resulting from approximately seven year delay); Williams, supra, 277 Ga. at 600-601(1)(d) (an ‘extraordinarily long’ delay of five years in bringing an indictment to trial raises presumption of actual prejudice); Redding, supra, 274 Ga. at 833 (delay of 67 months). Such a rebuttal can be achieved by showing either: (i) that the defendant acquiesced in the delay by failing to timely assert his right to a speedy trial; or (ii) otherwise benefitted from the delay. See Harris [ v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 456-457 (667 S.E.2d 361) (2008)] (no presumption of actual prejudice despite pre-trial delay of 65 months, where defendant waited five years to assert the right, despite being represented by counsel during that time); Kramer v. State, 287 Ga.App. 796, 799(1) (652 S.E.2d 843) (2007) (six-year pre-trial delay did not give rise to presumption of actual prejudice where ‘[t]he record strongly indicates that [the defendant] sought or knowingly acquiesced in the delay and that he did not want a speedy trial’).” Accord, Grizzard (December 14, 2009), above (eight year delay raises presumption of actual prejudice, weighs heavily against State). State v. Reid, 298 Ga.App. 235, 679 S.E.2d 802 (June 5, 2009). Trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation where defendant’s DUI prosecution was delayed some four years. Timing of motion: Plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation was not required to be filed within 10 days of arraignment under OCGA § 17-7-110. “Rather, we have stated that “a defendant is not procedurally barred from raising a constitutional speedy trial claim at any time up to the point of trial. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Disharoon v. State, 288 Ga.App. 1, 4(1)(c) (652 S.E.2d 902) (2007); accord Nusser v. State, 275 Ga.App. 896, 898 (622 S.E.2d 105) (2005); see also State v. Allgood, 252 Ga.App. 638 (556 S.E.2d 857) (2001) (trial court granted motion to dismiss filed almost three years after defendant waived arraignment).” Form of motion: Plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation was not required to be filed in writing. “Reid's position is contrary to Ruffin v. State, [284 Ga. 52, 65(3) (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)] in which the Supreme Court of Georgia recently stated that a defendant ‘need not file a formal motion’ to invoke his or her right to a speedy trial. 284 Ga. at 62-63(b)(iii).” Balancing: No abuse of discretion in granting motion: DUI prosecution was delayed 45 months, most of it unexplained, partly because of abolition of City Court of Atlanta; defendant asserted speedy trial right with statutory demand within two months of arrest; little or no prejudice shown. Robinson v. State, 298 Ga.App. 164, 679 S.E.2d 383 (June 2, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar based on alleged constitutional speedy trial denial. 1. Reason for delay. “Here, there were multiple factors contributing to the [three-plus year] delay, including: (1) the State's delay in producing discovery, including DNA test results from the GBI lab; (2) Robinson's appeal, which resulted in an approximate six-month delay before he withdrew it; (3) multiple ex