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parte motions filed by Robinson; (4) the withdrawal of Robinson's trial attorney; (5) Robinson's request to place the case back on the plea and arraignment calendar following his withdrawal of the appeal; and (6) the deposition of one of the victims. At the hearing, the trial court concluded that the reason for the delay was primarily attributable to Robinson and noted that the Fulton County Superior Court had a shortage of judges. Given the evidence presented, the trial court did not err in weighing this factor in favor of the State. See Mullinax v. State, 273 Ga. 756, 759(2) (545 S.E.2d 891) (2001) (the reason-for-the-delay factor was properly weighed against the defendant where the primary basis for the delay was a backlog at the state crime lab, which was compounded by the defendant's filing of an interlocutory appeal) .” 2. Timeliness of Defendant's Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial. Here, Robinson filed a statutory demand for speedy trial within four weeks of his arrest ..., but he withdrew it less than two months later. He also filed statutory speedy trial demands in the other two cases less than a month after his arrest and the issuance of the indictments; he withdrew these demands less than four months later. He then took no further steps to assert his right to a speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss more than two years later. Thus, although his initial assertions of his statutory rights to a speedy trial militate in his favor, his ultimate withdrawal of those demands and subsequent delay in asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial should be weighed against him. See Williams v. State, 279 Ga. 106, 109(1)(c) (610 S.E.2d 32) (2005).” Prejudice: “Robinson argues that his over three-year pre-trial incarceration at the Fulton County Jail – which he alleges ‘has been the subject of federal oversight and public criticism for substandard jail conditions’ – was oppressive and has caused him anxiety and concern. Robinson's pre-trial incarceration was substantial. But he does not ‘assert or show any specific anxiety or concern’ attendant to his incarceration. Thomas v. State, 274 Ga. 492, 495 (555 S.E.2d 693) (2001). Thus, ‘we conclude that [Robinson] failed to establish the type of oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety and concern beyond that which necessarily attends confinement in a penal institution.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 456 (667 S.E.2d 361) (2008).” General allegations of missing witnesses and faded memories also do not suffice to show prejudice. Wofford v. State, 299 Ga.App. 129, 682 S.E.2d 125 (May 5, 2009). Trial court properly found no violation of defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right, based on lack of prejudice to defendant in 32-month delay: “‘ a generalized statement that the memories of witnesses have faded over the passage of time is not sufficient. For memory lapse to be prejudicial, [defendant] must establish that the lapses substantially relate to a material issue.”(Citations omitted.) Smith [ v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 20(2) (663 S.E.2d 142) (2008)].” Missing witness also not sufficient for prejudice. “‘To prove prejudice due to the unavailability of these witnesses, [the defendant] must show that the unavailable witnesses could supply material evidence for the defense.’ (Footnote and citation omitted.) Ingram v. State, 280 Ga.App. 467, 470- 471(1)(d) (634 S.E.2d 430) (2006). Wofford has failed to make this showing.” Accord, Lynch v. State , 300 Ga.App. 723, 686 S.E.2d 268 (October 7, 2009) (defendant failed to show that alleged missing witnesses were material to any defense); Howard v. State , 307 Ga.App. 822, 706 S.E.2d 163 (February 11, 2011) (no showing that witnesses could have been located at an earlier time, or that they were material); Sechler v. State , 316 Ga.App. 675, 730 S.E.2d 142 (July 6, 2012) (general assertion that “witnesses may not be available” and their “recollection will not be as sharp” as a result of delay insufficient to show prejudice. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (March 9, 2009). “[T]he Vermont Supreme Court erred in ranking assigned counsel essentially as state actors in the criminal justice system. Assigned counsel, just as retained counsel, act on behalf of their clients, and delays sought by counsel are ordinarily attributable to the defendants they represent. … The State may be charged with [delays which] resulted from the trial court's failure to appoint replacement counsel with dispatch. Similarly, the State may bear responsibility if there is ‘a breakdown in the public defender system.’” No such breakdown was shown here; most of the delays in the three-year pendency of defendant’s domestic assault charges were caused by defendant’s obstruction of his succession of six attorneys, including threatening the life of one of them. “Because ‘the attorney is the [defendant's] agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation,’ delay caused by the defendant's counsel is also charged against the defendant. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The same principle applies whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned , for ‘[o]nce a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender program.’ Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘Except for the source of payment,’ the relationship between a defendant and the public defender representing him is ‘identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client.’ Ibid. Unlike a prosecutor or the court, assigned counsel ordinarily is not considered a state actor.” “Just as a State's ‘deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the [State],’ Barker [ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)], so too should a defendant's deliberate attempt to disrupt proceedings be weighted heavily against the defendant.” Accord, Howard v. State , 307 Ga.App. 822, 706 S.E.2d 163 (February 11, 2011) (replacement counsel’s new,