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late, repetitive discovery requests; “[w]e also note note that Howard moved to sever his trial from that of his co- defendants. When a defendant moves to sever, he ought to know that, if his motion is granted, the multiplication of proceedings may cause some additional delay. In this case, the trial court never ruled upon the motion to sever because it was rendered moot by the entry of guilty pleas by all of the co-defendants.”). Hassel v. State, 284 Ga. 861, 672 S.E.2d 627 (January 26, 2009). No violation of constitutional speedy trial right, although defendant remained incarcerated for 13 months awaiting trial. “In analyzing the prejudice factor after the initial hearing, the trial court observed that anxiety and concern are always present in pretrial incarceration situations, but that Hassel had made no showing as to the extent of his anxiety and concern. See Disharoon v. State, 288 Ga.App. 1, 5(1)(d) (652 S.E.2d 902) (2007) ( absent some unusual showing of anxiety or concern, it is not likely that this interest will be determinative in favor of the accused ).” Green v. State, 295 Ga.App. 468, 672 S.E.2d 414 (December 12, 2008). Trial court could find no violation of constitutional speedy trial, despite presumptively-prejudicial three year delay between arrest and hearing on motion to dismiss. No intentional delay by State to hamper defense; no assertion of right by defendant; no oppressive incarceration or other prejudice to defendant shown. Prejudice: “While Green alleges that the delay caused him extreme anxiety because he is now established in Virginia and has custody of his children, there is no evidence in the record specifically demonstrating Green's anxiety and concern due to the delay in trying his case. This is especially true given the fact that Green chose not to alleviate his anxiety and concern by filing a speedy trial demand during the three-year period he was on bond. And while Green contends the delay in trying him prejudiced his defense by diminishing the ability of the witnesses to recall the events surrounding the offense, the record does not show any actual prejudice to Green's defense.” West v. State, 295 Ga.App. 15, 670 S.E.2d 833 (November 26, 2008). No violation of constitutional due process. Presumptive prejudice from 34 month delay from arrest to trial, but no constitutional violation where no showing of actual prejudice , no purposeful delay by State, and no earlier assertion of right by defendant, citing Harris (September 22, 2008), below. Moore v. State, 294 Ga.App. 570, 669 S.E.2d 498 (November 14, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial claim. Despite State’s loss of “its primary investigative file from police (which could have contained contradictory witness interviews and exculpatory evidence) and also lost the medical records reflecting the results of the physician's examination of the young child's vaginal area and hymen, which could be significant evidence in either substantiating or discounting the now-grown victim's testimony,” trial court could find no prejudice to defendant based on absence of showing of exculpatory evidence. “ Moore proved that during the delay, the State lost two key files that may have contained exculpatory evidence. However, he did not show that either of these files in fact did contain such evidence. The trial court concluded that as it had no way of knowing whether that evidence was exculpatory, it was logical to believe that the absence of the evidence ‘hurts the party having the burden of proof and the defense will be allowed to show the jury that the State is unable to produce the evidence that has been lost.’” Accord, Bowling v. State , 285 Ga. 43, 673 S.E.2d 194 (February 9, 2009) (Evidence destruction didn’t constitute prejudice where defendant “provided no cogent testimony regarding how he may have been harmed by this destruction.”). Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 667 S.E.2d 361 (September 22, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial claim; despite over five year delay between arrest and trial, defendant’s failure to raise issue and lack of prejudice to defendant supports trial court’s ruling. “In evaluating Harris's delay in asserting his right, we assume without deciding that the approximately one year time frame during which Harris's case was on the dead docket due to the State's inability to locate a key witness should not be counted against Harris.” Accord, Hayes v. State , 298 Ga.App. 338, 680 S.E.2d 182 (June 15, 2009); Phan v. State , 290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2d 876 (February 27, 2012); numerous other cases, above. State v. Stallworth, 293 Ga.App. 368, 667 S.E.2d 147 (August 22, 2008). Trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial grounds. Although twenty-eight month delay between arrest and motion was presumptively prejudicial, reason for delay was neutral; defendant delayed in asserting his right; and no actual prejudice was shown. Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 663 S.E.2d 189 (June 30, 2008). 1. No constitutional speedy trial violation despite presumptively-prejudicial two-plus year delay in bringing defendant’s murder case to trial; defendant was incarcerated for most of that time, a negative factor even though allegedly “attributable to his own actions in missing a court date and in