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possessing illegal drugs;” Court declines to hold these factors against defendant: “Ruffin claims he never received notice of the missed court date, and that as soon as he found out about it, he contacted the court and received erroneous information from a court agent who misled him into believing that the matter had been resolved and that he need do nothing further. The trial court made no factual finding regarding these allegations, and the correctness of the trial court’s decision to declare Ruffin’s bond forfeited and subsequent refusals to reinstate the bond are not properly before us in any event. Second, Ruffin denies the drug possession charge, and nothing in the record indicates that he has ever been tried for his alleged crime, despite the fact that it is going on three years now since he was arrested for it. Suffice it to say that the State cannot rely on its delay in prosecuting one matter to defeat a constitutional speedy trial claim in another. [Cit.]” 2. Delay caused by multiple substitutions of appointed counsel for co-defendant weighs against State. Note, “State” is not synonymous with “prosecution.” “ The relevant inquiry for purposes of the second factor is not whether prosecutor or the accused bears more responsibility for the delay, but ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay,’” quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520) (1992). “[T]he federal Constitution requires the states to provide conflict-free appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants.” Accord, Stewart (July 6, 2011), above (delay caused by judge weighed against State). 3. Defendant “plainly … asserted his speedy trial right … when he appeared in court on the first specially set trial date with his witnesses and exhibits and requested severance of his case from his co-defendant’s so that he could proceed to trial immediately.” Written demand for trial was not filed until three months later. Overall delay here weighs against defendant. With no apparent prejudice to defendant’s ability to defend himself, trial court did not abuse discretion in finding no violation; but Supreme Court cautions that “[t]he government's interest in the convenience and efficiency of trying Ruffin and his co-defendant together falls far short of justifying such prolonged pretrial incarceration in the face of an accused's insistent demands that the government either try him now or release him.” Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83, 663 S.E.2d 169 (June 30, 2008). No violation of defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right despite “presumptively prejudicial” four year delay in beginning murder trial. Reasons for delay included quashing of one indictment, nolle pros of two more, and pretrial filings on both sides, but no intentional delay – “a relatively benign, although negative, factor.” Defendant’s delay in asserting the right “weighed heavily” against him. Finally, no prejudicial effect; defendant was free on bail for most of the delay, and although two witnesses died in the interim, their prior statements “appear to be more favorable to the State than the defendant. … Thus, we are hard pressed to find any prejudice to Layman,” especially given that the State agreed to stipulate to admissibility of their statements given to both the police and defense investigators. Accord, Lambert (February 2, 2010), above. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 663 S.E.2d 142 (June 30, 2008). No constitutional speedy trial violation where most of the six-year delay between arrest and trial “was attributable to the fact that he was mistakenly released from jail shortly after his arrest in 1998 and was not re-arrested until January 2002. It appears that defense counsel shares responsibility for the delay in trying this case, as trial counsel was given a continuance when she became counsel of record at some point between February and August 2003, the case appeared on trial calendars in May and August 2003 but was not tried, and trial counsel engaged in extensive discovery which resulted in informal continuances and filed several pre-trial motions that required hearings prior to the case being tried in March 2004.” Brandeburg v. State, 292 Ga.App. 191, 663 S.E.2d 844 (June 25, 2008). No constitutional speedy trial violation: “Given that there was an on-going official investigation between the time of the alleged theft and Brandeburg’s initial arrest, Brandeburg was released on bond shortly after he was arrested, he did not file a statutory demand for speedy trial, he has not shown any evidence that the State deliberately delayed the trial in order to hamper the defense, he has not shown that the delay impaired his defense, and he first brought his motion to dismiss on this ground in March 2007 [one year after arrest], we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that there has been no violation of Brandeburg’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Henderson v. State, 290 Ga.App. 427, 662 S.E.2d 652 (March 21, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress on constitutional speedy trial grounds. While 68-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, but no effective statutory demand filed, and constitutional right first raised “over five years after [defendant’s] arrest. No showing of actual prejudice . “[Defendant] claims that the length of the delay itself ‘constitutes “actual prejudice” requiring no specific showing of impairment.’ … This presumptive prejudice, however, ‘cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.),” quoting Kramer v. State, 287 Ga.App. 796, 800-801 (652 S.E.2d 843) (2007). Simmons v. State, 290 Ga.App. 315, 659 S.E.2d 721 (March 14, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to