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dismiss based on constitutional speedy trial. Three year delay was presumptively prejudicial, and delays investigating case weighed against State, but defendant’s failure to effectively assert right and lack of prejudice justify denial of motion. Assertion of right: “The record shows that Simmons waited almost 14 months after the original indictment to file a statutory request for speedy trial, and that demand was untimely. Moreover, he did not assert his constitutional right to speedy trial until he filed his motions to dismiss [approximately three years after prosecution began.] Given the initial delay in raising the statutory right, the untimeliness of that demand, and Simmons’ failure to even mention his constitutional right before moving to dismiss, the trial court properly balanced this factor heavily against Simmons.” Prejudice: “To demonstrate an impaired defense, Simmons must present more than vague or conclusory statements; he must offer specific evidence. Id. Merely asserting that memories have faded over time does not satisfy this requirement. See Parker v. State, 283 Ga.App. 714, 718(2)(d) (642 S.E.2d 111) (2007). And although Simmons argues that the State deprived him of his chosen counsel, he has not shown that the delay in bringing him to trial caused his financial difficulties. Moreover, he has offered no evidence that the change in counsel impaired his defense or that appointed counsel cannot adequately defend him. Simply put, Simmons has not demonstrated that the delay prejudiced him. See id. at 719; Frazier [ v. State, 277 Ga.App. 881, 883 (627 S.E.2d 894) (2006)].” Accord, Lambert v. State , 302 Ga.App. 573, 692 S.E.2d 15 (March 2, 2010) (mere assertion of faded memories not sufficient to establish prejudice). Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga.App. 698, 658 S.E.2d 144 (February 5, 2008). “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. To trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation or arrest and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a speedy trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.” “ There is no bright-line length of delay that is presumptively prejudicial. [ Wimberly v. State, 279 Ga. 65 (608 S.E.2d 625) (2005).] Rather, ‘[t]he length of delay that constitutes presumptive prejudice is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. The delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.’ [ Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, (651 S.E.2d 674) (2007).] The present case is more akin to a complex conspiracy charge than to an ordinary street crime. The indictment at issue, while not alleging conspiracy, does charge 11 people with the serious offense of trafficking in cocaine. Given the large number of defendants involved, numerous motions have been filed in the case. Moreover, as the [defendants] have acknowledged in the trial court and in their appellate briefs, there is a massive amount of evidence for discovery, including thousands of documents, thousands of telephone records and hundreds of hours of taped conversations. And as noted by the trial court, there was also a federal investigation of the drug operation going on at the same time as the state investigation.” Accord, Williams (November 7, 2011), above. State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 655 S.E.2d 575 (January 8, 2008). Trial court properly held that defendants’ constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. Shooting occurred in May, 1999; defendants were arrested shortly thereafter, but released with a pending charge of voluntary manslaughter against one defendant. “The State did not present the case to the grand jury until December of 2004, when a murder indictment was returned against both Appellees. Appellee Carlos White was rearrested in March of 2006, and Appellee Larry White was apprehended some months later.” Five-plus year delay was presumptively prejudicial; state’s “negligence” in delaying prosecution “‘is weighted as a “relatively benign” factor against the [S]tate. [Cits.]’ Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 784 (534 S.E.2d 796) (2000).” Prejudice : trial court could find that defense was actually prejudiced in that the housing project where the shooting occurred was razed during the delay, destroying the crime scene and scattering the witnesses. Accord, Heard v. State , 295 Ga. 559, 761 S.E.2d 314 (July 11, 2014) (“delay due to the State's negligence typically weighs only lightly, or benignly, against the State.”). State v. Moore, 289 Ga.App. 99, 656 S.E.2d 156 (December 10, 2007). 1. Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for discharge on his DUI charge based on constitutional speedy trial violation. Although State’s fifteen- month, unexplained delay in bringing the charge was “negligent,” there was no evidence of prejudice to defendant. “ The prejudice element of anxiety and concern ‘is always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing is not likely to be determinative in defendant's favor. ’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733(1)(d) (438 S.E.2d 626) (1994). Moreover, the 15-month delay from the time of arrest to the time of Moore’s motion for discharge and acquittal is insufficient to raise an inference of actual prejudice, so Moore must show actual anxiety and concern and specific evidence of how the delay impaired his ability to defend himself. See Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. 416, 418(2) (490 S.E.2d 91) (1997) (21-month delay did not raise inference of actual prejudice).” No such showing made here, despite evidence that defendant was without a driver’s license during the pendency of the case: “Moore did not … testify that he has suffered actual anxiety or concern, that his job and family activities have been