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interfered with, that he has been unable to travel to his attorney’s office or that he has been unable to prepare for trial.” 2. “ [F]iling a statutory speedy trial demand is not a prerequisite to seeking discharge and acquittal based on a denial of constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Snow v. State, 229 Ga.App. 532, 533 (494 S.E.2d 309) (1997); Butler v. State, 207 Ga.App. 824, 825-826 (429 S.E.2d 280) (1993); State v. King, 137 Ga.App. 26, 27 (222 S.E.2d 859) (1975).” Disharoon v State, 288 Ga.App. 1, 652 S.E.2d 902 (October 23, 2007). Delay of 58 months was presumptively prejudicial, but no evidence of intentional delay by State – defense requested three continuances, and on other calendars case simply wasn’t reached. Defendant never asserted statutory right to speedy trial. Defendant was released on bond after 21 days and so suffered “no oppressive pretrial incarceration.” Evidence indicated that defendant “generally kept a positive attitude and, because of his faith in a higher power and belief in his own innocence, did not allow the pending charges to debilitate him.” “Importantly, ‘the fact that [Disharoon] never filed a speedy trial demand suggests that he was not suffering anxiety or stress from the delay.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Mesaros v. State, 283 Ga.App. 337, 339 (641 S.E.2d 559) (2007).” Kramer v State, 287 Ga.App. 796, 652 S.E.2d 843 (October 10, 2007). 1. No constitutional speedy trial violation despite six-year delay where “the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the great majority of the delay resulted from numerous continuances from the trial calendar requested by and granted to Kramer because of his health problems, scheduled treatments for these problems, and his assertion that he was physically unable to stand trial.” 2. State’s interlocutory appeal of order granting motion to suppress “was a justifiable and appropriate delay which cannot be weighted against the State.” 3. Generalized claims “that the delay prejudiced his ability to find unnamed witnesses who would give unspecified testimony clearing him of all the charges” and “that he was prejudiced because, during the delay, he ran out of money for investigative services and professional witnesses for his defense” were not enough to establish prejudice, especially where “Kramer has not asserted to the trial court that he is indigent and without funds reasonably necessary for the preparation of his defense, nor does he point to any specific evidence that he is unable to obtain. These generalized claims fall short of offering the “specific evidence” necessary to weight the prejudice factor in the defendant's favor. Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 783 (534 S.E.2d 796) (2000).” “‘ Barker [ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101) (1972)] recognized that delaying a case or acquiescing in delay is not an uncommon defense tactic, and held that “barring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 536.’ [ State v. Giddens, 280 Ga.App. 586, 589 (634 S.E.2d 526) (2006)].” Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, 651 S.E.2d 674 (September 24, 2007). Thirteen month delay in defendant’s murder trial was not presumptively prejudicial. “‘“Presumptive prejudice” ... simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker inquiry.’ Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652, n.1 (112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520) (1992). ‘[T]he length of delay that [constitutes presumptive prejudice] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case ... [T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.’ Barker v. Wingo, [407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101) (1972)]. The ‘peculiar circumstances’ of the present case include that it was a murder prosecution in which defense counsel was removed by the trial court three days before trial was scheduled to commence. Inasmuch as several murder convictions appealed to this Court recently have featured pre-trial delays of twelve to sixteen months [cits.], the circumstances of this case warrant a finding that [defendant] did not carry his burden of establishing that the thirteen- month delay between his arrest and his trial was ‘presumptively prejudicial.’” Accord, Lawrence v. State , 289 Ga.App. 698, 658 S.E.2d 144 (February 5, 2008) (no presumptive prejudice in 14-month delay of complex trafficking conspiracy trial). Bell v. State, 287 Ga.App. 300, 651 S.E.2d 218 (August 20, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s constitutional speedy trial demand; despite 24 month delay, defendant’s failure to assert his speedy trial right until 13 months after his arrest weighed against him ; fourteen months of delay was caused by absence of arresting officer, who was on active duty with National Guard. Accord, Hill v. State , 315 Ga.App. 833, 729 S.E.2d 1 (May 10, 2012) (ten month delay in asserting right). Prejudice: Two years in jail not enough to show prejudice where “the conditions are normal for jail.” “Unquestionably, Bell’s two-year incarceration was burdensome. See Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 785 (534 S.E.2d 796) (2000). To support his claim, Bell testified that he endured ‘horrible’ living conditions in jail, including over- crowding, uncomfortable beds, lack of privacy and free time, exposure to fights between other inmates, and substandard meals. According to Bell, the conditions and the separation from his family caused him to be ‘depressed’ and ‘agitated.’ But when, as here, the conditions are normal for jail and do not reflect sub-standard care, Bell’s claims ‘fall short of establishing prejudice sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.’ Id. at 786; see Mullinax v. State, 273 Ga. 756, 759(2)