☢ test - Í

(545 S.E.2d 891) (2001); Boseman [ v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733 (438 S.E.2d 626) (1994)]. And, as Bell concedes, he has failed to show that his defense was specifically impaired.” Vyas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 467, 646 S.E.2d 692 (May 21, 2007). No abuse of discretion in trial court’s denial of former jeopardy based on violation of constitutional speedy trial right. Defense was partially responsible for 26 month delay due to counsel conflicts and leaves of absence; defendant raised issue early in process, but never made a written demand for trial. No prejudice shown from delay (as opposed to the bringing of the charges themselves): “Vyas only argues that prejudice has resulted from the effect on his private life. He asserts that the delay in resolution of the criminal matter led to denial of his application for citizenship. But the relevant documents state that he can reapply. He argues that his emotional health, family life and professional life have also been affected by the passage of time without resolution of the criminal charges. But he also testified that he was still practicing medicine, that it was the arrest that caused a significant reduction in clients and referrals, and that it was his arrest and subsequent media coverage that caused irreversible psychological damage to his family life. Furthermore, ‘anxiety and concern of the accused, [ ] is always present to some extent, and thus absent some unusual showing [it] is not likely to be determinative in defendant's favor.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733(1)(d), 438 S.E.2d 626 (1994).” Oni v. State, 285 Ga.App. 342, 646 S.E.2d 312 (May 10, 2007). No constitutional speedy trial violation; despite presumptively-prejudicial 18-month delay, evidence that State “attempted to have the case placed on a trial calendar following the remittitur and did not intentionally delay the trial … is relatively neutral or benign,” but still weighed against state. Defendant shows no prejudice, however, such as establishing what the testimony of missing witnesses would have been, and thus “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to find a constitutional speedy trial violation.” Jones v. State, 283 Ga.App. 838, 642 S.E.2d 865 (March 1, 2007). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal on speedy trial grounds. Three-year delay was presumptively prejudicial; reason for delay is unclear, but not the fault of defendant and hence weighs against State. Trial court abused discretion in holding against defendant her failure to assert speedy trial demand: “That Jones was repeatedly assigned new attorneys serves as a mitigating circumstance that prevents Jones’s failure to assert her right to a speedy trial from weighing heavily against her.” Prejudice to the defense was shown by loss of witness, expected to testify that defendant was merely present at scene of drug deal, not a participant. “Thus, the informant’s testimony would have ‘lent credence to [Jones’] claim that although [she] was present, [she] was there for an entirely innocent purpose and was not involved in the illegal activity discovered by the police.’ Hardeman [ v. State, 280 Ga.App. 168, 171(4) (633 S.E.2d 595) (2006)]. It follows that ‘the delay deprived [Jones] of the potential benefit of this witness. The harm to [Jones’] case, under these circumstances, is not simply the inaccessibility of [this] possible witness[ ], but rather the deprivation of the opportunity to investigate and develop [her] defense when such was meaningful.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Lett v. State, 164 Ga.App. 584, 586(4) (298 S.E.2d 541) (1982). Prejudice has therefore been shown from the delay in this case. Id.” Parker v. State, 283 Ga.App. 714, 642 S.E.2d 111 (January 18, 2007). No error in denying defendant’s plea in bar based on constitutional speedy trial right, despite 52 month delay. Both sides sought continuances; defendant hadn’t previously asserted right to speedy trial; no prejudice shown. As to prejudice: Anxiety : “[W]hile while the minimization of a defendant’s anxiety and concern is a factor to be considered in determining prejudice, the broader concern is actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Watkins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 687(d) (600 S.E.2d 747) (2004).” Faded memories: “the fact that witnesses’ memories may have dimmed is not, standing alone, sufficient to demonstrate that Parker’s defense was impaired. See McKinney v. State, 250 Ga.App. 22, 24 (549 S.E.2d 164) (2001). Additionally, we have reviewed the entire trial record and fail to discern any instances where Parker was unable to get material information before the jury as a result of the witnesses’ faded memories, given defense counsel’s thorough cross-examination of the witnesses and use of their prior statements made to law enforcement shortly after the alleged molestation.” If loss of memory caused defendant to have to introduce the witness’s prior statement and thus lose the right to closing argument, “the improper loss of the defendant’s right to open and conclude closing argument is presumptively prejudicial.” Here, however, while counsel introduced the prior statements, he didn’t have to; “‘if a defendant reads only the portions of the prior written statement of a witness that are relevant to impeaching the witness, the defendant has not introduced evidence and does not lose the right to open and close,’” quoting Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 874, 878(3) (536 S.E.2d 514) (2000). Thus, no prejudice was caused by the delay in the trial. Accord, Simmons (March 14, 2008), above. Christian v. State, 281 Ga. 474, 640 S.E.2d 21 (January 8, 2007). No violation of defendant’s constitutional speedy trial