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right despite 61-month delay between arrest and trial, much of which State attributed to waiting for medical records of victim from the hospital. Reason for delay: “While the records may have been informative and helpful, the State did not show that, without them, obtaining an indictment was impossible or even difficult. … ‘However, there is nothing evidencing “‘that most serious abuse — ‘A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense....’ [Cit.]” [Cit.]’ Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179, 180 (549 S.E.2d 381) (2001).” And defendant, who caused part of the delay by seeking continuances, never asserted her speedy trial rights in the interim. With no showing of prejudice, trial court properly denied plea in bar. Prejudice : Defendant was only incarcerated for three months, not the full time; testimony of one missing witness was presented by hearsay under the necessity exception; defendant did not show how other alleged missing evidence was material or relevant to her defense. Manley v. State, 281 Ga. 466, 640 S.E.2d 9 (January 8, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar; 18- year delay between victim’s death and defendant’s indictment did not deprive defendant of due pocess. “In order for Manley to prevail on his claim that his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated by the delay between the time of the crime and the time of his arrest, Manley must prove (1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to his defense, and (2) that the delay was the result of deliberate prosecutorial action to give the State a tactical advantage. Jackson v. State, 279 Ga. 449(2) (614 S.E.2d 781) (2005).” “‘ The offense in this case is murder, for which there is no applicable statute of limitation. Hence, any prejudice which results merely from the passage of time cannot create the requisite prejudice . The possibilities that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost are inherent in any extended delay, and, these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that [the defendant] cannot receive a fair trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted) Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 880(3) (426 S.E.2d 852) (1993). Thus, Manley has failed to show that the delay between the time of the crime and the time of his arrest prejudiced his defense. Nor is Manley able to show that the delay here was the result of deliberate action by the State to gain a tactical advantage. Delay caused by an ongoing investigation does not result in a violation of due process, Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200(4) (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003), and Manley has produced no evidence that the State acted deliberately to gain a tactical advantage in this regard.” Lackey v. State, 283 Ga.App. 139, 640 S.E.2d 717 (December 29, 2006). No constitutional speedy trial violation despite three year delay: “Balancing the [ Barker ] factors, we note first that Lackey waited over 36 months before asserting his right to a speedy trial. This failure to assert the right to a speedy trial makes it difficult for him to prove any Constitutional violation. Barker [ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)]. That, together with the fact that Lackey has suffered no impairment to his defense and therefore can show no actual prejudice, lead to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lackey’s plea in bar.” Smith v. State, 282 Ga.App. 339, 638 S.E.2d 791 (November 8, 2006). No constitutional speedy trial violation, considering these factors: “the inordinate delay caused by Smith’s twice persuading the court to appoint him new counsel and thrice having the assigned trial judge recused (see Jackson [ v. State, 279 Ga. 449, 452-453(3), 614 S.E.2d 781 (2005)] (defense recusal motions and motions to change counsel count against defendant)), and (b) Smith’s defense counsel's expressly eschewing the pro se speedy trial demand and declining the court’s offer for an earlier trial;” “he did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 14 months after his indictment;” and his only alleged prejudice was the loss of availability of certain phone records which became unavailable after six months, long before he asserted any right to a speedy trial. “Moreover, regardless of when the trial took place, Smith could have subpoenaed and obtained these records soon after his arrest and indictment. The delay in scheduling the trial did not encumber his ability to obtain these records.” State v. Giddens, 280 Ga.App. 586, 634 S.E.2d 526 (July 24, 2006). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for acquittal; defendant showed no prejudice despite five-year delay. “ Barker [ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)] recognized that delaying a case or acquiescing in delay is not an uncommon defense tactic, and held that ‘barring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates, as does this one, that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 535-536.’” Hardeman v. State, 280 Ga.App. 168, 633 S.E.2d 595 (June 27, 2006). Defendant’s cocaine trafficking conviction reversed; defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right was violated. Trial court abused its discretion in two respects; first, in failing to weigh the delay against the State, where based simply on the Fulton Superior Court’s heavy calendar and practice of giving priority to incarcerated defendants; and second, in finding no prejudice to defendant based on death of witness 21 months after defendant’s arrest. Defendant presented evidence that witness would have testified that defendant’s presence at the scene was entirely innocent. Held, inability to present this witness prejudiced