☢ test - Í

(‘[defendant] suffered no prejudice because he was already legally incarcerated’).” Same result here, despite 74 month delay. Accord, Herndon (January 25, 2006), above; compare Johnson (February 3, 2012), above (pending charges may result in prejudice by preventing or delaying release from other incarceration). Wimberly v. State, 279 Ga. 65, 608 S.E.2d 625 (February 7, 2005). “[Defendant], citing Boseman v. State, [263 Ga. 730(1b) (438 S.E.2d 626) (1994)] asserts the 38-month delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial. However, our statement in Boseman that the 27-month delay in that case met the threshold presumption of prejudice was not a holding that all pre-trial delays of 27 months or more were ‘presumptively prejudicial.’ Such a ‘bright-line’ determination is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation in Barker v. Wingo, [407 U.S. 514, 530-31(IV), 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)], that ‘the length of delay that will provoke [the inquiry into the other factors] is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.... [T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. ’ In the case at bar, [defendant] is a co- indictee in a multiple-murder case in which the State is seeking capital punishment, thereby triggering the use of the pre- trial Unified Appeal Procedure and the need for separate trials for each co-indictee, the latter requirement itself triggering the State’s statutory right to decide to try [defendant]’s co-indictee first. The ‘peculiar circumstances’ of this case authorize a finding that [defendant]’s case is being prosecuted with the promptness customary for death-penalty cases involving multiple defendants. See Doggett v. United States, [505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)]. See also King v. State, 273 Ga. 258 (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000) (47-month delay between indictment and trial of death penalty case); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691 (532 S.E.2d 78) (2000) (51-month delay between indictment and trial of death penalty case); Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217 (526 S.E.2d 560) (2000) (41-month delay between indictment and trial of death penalty case). Compare State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511(1) (555 S.E.2d 710) (2001) (‘extraordinary delay’ of approximately seven years in non-capital murder trial is ‘more than sufficient’ to cross the presumptively prejudicial threshold); Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179 (549 S.E.2d 381) (2001) (51-month delay in non-capital murder trial constitutes ‘an extraordinary delay’ which is presumptively prejudicial).” Accord, Lawrence v. State , 289 Ga.App. 698, 658 S.E.2d 144 (February 5, 2008) (no presumptive prejudice in 14-month delay of complex trafficking conspiracy trial); Culbreath v. State , 328 Ga.App. 153, 761 S.E.2d 557 (July 10, 2014) (presumption of prejudice in 19-month delay of aggravated assault/armed robbery prosecution). Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 473, 604 S.E.2d 139 (October 12, 2004). Defendant’s wife was murdered in 1970. Defendant was arrested for the crime on June 4, 2003, and indicted on August 4, 2003. Twenty-two days after indictment, defendant filed a plea in bar, alleging that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights had been violated. Held, trial court properly denied the plea in bar. “Only the pretrial delay which occurs subsequent to arrest or indictment is examined for a violation of the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876(2) (426 S.E.2d 852) (1993). Moore’s right to a speedy trial attached on June 4, 2003, the date of his arrest. His trial was scheduled to commence within five months of his arrest and two months following his indictment At the time, no factors supported a finding of presumptive prejudicial delay to Moore in those few intervening months between arrest, indictment and trial on the serious charge of murder. ” State v. Carr, 278 Ga. 124, 598 S.E.2d 468 (June 28, 2004). Trial court’s dismissal of murder charge on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds upheld. Trial court could find that defense was impaired by death of two witnesses and senility of third during 50 month delay, although testimony of all three was available by transcript. “Although the State argues that the delay was caused by Carr’s desire that a new arson expert be consulted after the original convictions were reversed, the only evidence before this Court is that the State willingly undertook to secure such an expert, and that for most of the time between its commitment to do so and the filing of the motion to dismiss, the State made little or no effort to fulfill that commitment.” Hester v. State, 268 Ga.App. 94, 601 S.E.2d 456 (June 24, 2004). Trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss for violation of Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. 1. Sixty-three month delay was mostly caused by state, and by court’s failure to schedule the case or failure to notify defendant of scheduled matters, though her address never changed during the pendency of the case. “The trial court … concluded that Hester brought some of the delay on herself when she repeatedly complained about the State not having produced all the discovery documents and materials required by court order and by law. The State’s undisputed failure to produce materials and witness statements contained in police files to Hester caused this delay, not Hester’s assertion of her rights. Material in the possession of an investigating law enforcement agency is deemed to be in the possession of the State, whether or not it is in the prosecutor’s file. [Cit.] Thus, the trial court erred when it attributed the delay to Hester, since Hester can hardly be faulted for demanding that the State comply with its discovery obligations before trial began.” Accord, State v.