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Godfrey , 309 Ga.App. 234, 709 S.E.2d 572 (March 15, 2011). 2. “Hester first asserted her right to a speedy trial … more than five years after her arrest, and thus normally this factor would be weighed heavily against Hester. [Cit.] Nevertheless, because of mitigating factors, the trial court erred in weighing this factor heavily against Hester. Hester was not appointed counsel until her first court appearance in October 2001, which was long after her statutory right to demand a speedy trial had expired…. We recognize that regardless of the procedures mandated for a statutory demand for speedy trial, a defendant has the right to assert a constitutional speedy trial demand any time after arrest. [Cits.] Thus, the trial court was correct in weighing Hester’s delay in doing so against her, but not in weighing such heavily. This delay in Hester’s asserting her right to a speedy trial was mitigated by the State’s failure to bring an indictment for three years and then by the delay in appointing counsel for Hester until the time for demanding a statutory speedy trial had run. Since the filing of a speedy trial demand is not a prerequisite for a plea in bar for failure to have a speedy trial on constitutional grounds [cit.] and since Hester’s counsel filed a demand within months after being appointed, the trial court erred in failing to mitigate this factor in the balancing process. It could not be weighed heavily against Hester.” Accord, State v. White , 282 Ga. 859, 655 S.E.2d 575 (January 8, 2008). 3. “[E]ven though the extraordinary five-year delay did not require her to do so, Hester nevertheless made a specific showing of actual prejudice. The undisputed evidence here showed that an exculpatory witness – who would have described a completely different person as having driven Hester’s car at the time of the accident – had died during the delay. In such circumstances, the United States Supreme Court has stated that ‘the prejudice is obvious.’ Barker [ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532(IV), 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)]. [Cit.] The trial court discounted this showing, explaining that the witness’s statement had been preserved in writing and could be introduced as hearsay evidence. But this ignores the dry impact of such written testimony as compared to the powerful impact of a live witness testifying from the stand with the jury able to determine the witness’s demeanor and credibility.” See also Carr (June 28, 2004), above ; Hardeman (June 27, 2006), above. Watkins v. State, 267 Ga.App. 684, 600 S.E.2d 747 (June 4, 2004). In analyzing constitutional speedy trial claim, regarding whether defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, “we consider the fact that ‘[d]elay often works to a defendant’s advantage.’ [Cit.]” Also, fact that child-victims are now older and more articulate does not show harm to defendant; ‘a child is automatically competent to testify as the victim of acts of molestation.’ [Cit.] Thus, Watkins has shown no prejudice based on his assertion that the child victims were more vulnerable to a competency challenge when they were younger.” State v. Byrd, 266 Ga.App. 121, 596 S.E.2d 426 (March 4, 2004). Trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss based on constitutional right to speedy trial where delay in trial was caused by defendant’s attempts to seek psychiatric examination and records. “[T]he State’s acquiescence in Byrd’s desired resolution of mental health services placement and the subsequent delay of trial related to the defense’s attempts to attain such resolution will not permit Byrd to legitimately claim that the State violated her right to a speedy trial.” Defendant’s sixteen hospitalizations and three different attorneys also contributed to delays. Indeed, Byrd has not cited any action by the prosecution that created a delay in the trial of her case; nor, to this day, has she ever asserted that she was ready for trial and wanted same. [Cit.]” Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 592 S.E.2d 848 (February 16, 2004). Sixty-one month delay was “presumptively prejudicial,” but delay was occasioned by defendant’s medical condition and defense counsel’s unpreparedness, not by State. “Although the passage of time is not alone sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, greater pretrial delays simultaneously increase the degree of prejudice presumed and decrease the expectation that the defendant can demonstrate tangible prejudice to his or her ability to present a defense. Doggett [ v. U.S. , 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)]; Boseman [ v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 438 S.E.2d 626 (1994)]. Thus, in light of the extraordinarily long delay in bringing Williams’s 1998 indictment to trial, Williams's failure to make a particularized showing of the oppressiveness of his lengthy pretrial incarceration and of his decreased ability to present a defense at trial must not be weighed heavily against him. To the extent that the trial court found to the contrary, it was in error.” Accord, Smereczynsky (February 9, 2012), and Harris (March 2, 2012),both above. Excellent point-by-point analysis of constitutional speedy trial claim. Smith v. State, 266 Ga.App. 529, 597 S.E.2d 414 (February 9, 2004). Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis begins at time of arrest (or indictment, if earlier – see Salahuddin , below). Trial court thus erred in failing to consider defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial motion on grounds that he had not yet been indicted. Salahuddin v. State, 277 Ga. 561, 592 S.E.2d 410 (February 2, 2004). “Speedy trial rights attach at the time of arrest or formal indictment, whichever is earlier. [Cit.] At the time of [defendant’s] indictment for the four murders at issue here, he was already in prison due to separate convictions; hence, no formal ‘arrest,’ as that term is understood in our law, [cit.]