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took place.” Constitutional speedy trial analysis thus begins at time of indictment, where that precedes arrest. Accord, Williams v. State , 277 Ga. 598, 592 S.E.2d 848 (February 16, 2004). Carraway v. State, 263 Ga.App. 151, 587 S.E.2d 152 (August 26, 2003). Six months’ delay between return of remittitur and trial date not presumptively prejudicial; that delay was equally the responsibility of defendant and (with defendant’s consent) State; speedy trial right not asserted until two days before trial date; and defendant not in custody and not apparently harmed by delay. Trial court properly found that constitutional guarantee of speedy trial was not violated. Smith v. State, 260 Ga.App. 403, 579 S.E.2d 829 (March 19, 2003). Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial; the delay was caused when “[h]e avoided arrest on the outstanding bench warrant for almost 14 years.” Distinguished, Higgins (March 8, 2011), above. Coney v. State, 259 Ga.App. 525, 578 S.E.2d 193 (February 11, 2003). “ Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530(IV), 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), identified the four factors a court should consider in deciding a motion to dismiss on grounds of a federal speedy-trial violation: ‘Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’” When considering the reasons for the delay, “[u]nless clear reasons are shown for a delay, we treat the delay as caused by the State’s negligence. Nowhere in the record, however, is there any evidence that the State intentionally dragged its feet to impair Coney’s defense. ‘Therefore, although the delay attributable to the State is a negative factor, it is relatively benign.’” Bolden v. State, 257 Ga.App. 474, 571 S.E.2d 393 (August 23, 2002). Analysis of defendant’s claim to deprivation of constitutional right to speedy trial in case returned from appeal must consider time between return of last remittitur to time of trial, not time from first trial to second trial. “[T]he delay in the present case of two and one-half months between the issuance of the remittitur and the second trial date cannot be said to be ‘presumptively prejudicial’ within the meaning of Doggett v. United States [505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)]. After all, ‘the accused cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness.’” Brannen v. State , 274 Ga. 454, 553 S.E.2d 813 (October 5, 2001). As to constitutional speedy trial right, “[I]t is the defendant’s responsibility to assert the right to trial, and the failure to exercise that right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight against the defendant. Although it appears that defense counsel objected to the February 1997 continuance, and followed with a letter to the court in which he reiterated his objection to the continuance, stated that he was ready for trial, and suggested that the witnesses should be held in contempt for failing to appear, such actions cannot be construed as an assertion of the right to a speedy trial under our analysis.” Accord, Miller v. State , 313 Ga.App. 552, 722 S.E.2d 152 (January 12, 2012); Smereczynsky v. State , 314 Ga.App. 73, 722 S.E.2d 892 (February 9, 2012). Nelloms v. State, 274 Ga. 179, 549 S.E.2d 381 (July 16, 2001). Denial of defendant’s motion for discharge and acquittal, on the basis that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated, affirmed. Balancing the Barker v. Wingo factors, the trial court properly found that although the 51 months between defendant’s arrest and the date he filed his motion to dismiss constituted an extraordinary delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is nothing in the evidence showing a deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense. In fact, defendant shares responsibility for the delay by filing a motion for psychiatric examination, at least one motion for continuance, and ex parte motions for investigative funds, among other motions. Jackson v. State, 272 Ga. 782, 534 S.E.2d 796 (September 11, 2000). Interlocutory appeal in murder prosecution; trial court properly denied pleas in bar based on constitutional speedy trial violation. 1. Length of delay. While two year delay between arrest/indictment and trial was “presumptively prejudicial,” six month delay as to one defendant was not. 2. Demand for trial. ” “‘“ The Demand Statute [in OCGA § 17-7-171] is to be regarded as an aid and implementation of the State constitutional right.” [Cit.] At the same time the demand statute provides no assistance in relation to the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial.’ Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 418, 434 S.E.2d 469 (1993), relying on Reid v. State, 116 Ga.App. 640, 645, 158 S.E.2d 461 (1967).” 3. Prejudice. Defendant Jackson’s “nearly two-year period of pre-trial incarceration was unquestionably burdensome. However, we have held that pre-trial incarceration of 27 months does not automatically establish prejudice in the defendant’s favor for purposes of the Barker analysis absent ‘proof of sub-standard conditions or other oppressive factors beyond those that necessarily attend imprisonment.’ Boseman [ v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 733, 438 S.E.2d 626 (1994)]. Having failed to offer the specific evidence required to support his general claims of anxiety, poor conditions in the Fulton County jail, and that his defense may be