☢ test - Í

impaired by the delay, Id. at 733-734, Jackson has failed to swing the balance of prejudice in his favor.” Similarly, co-defendant “Allison’s bare claims of anxiety due to prison over-crowding and separation from family, which are ‘always present to some extent,’ Boseman, 263 Ga. at 733, 438 S.E.2d 626, quoting LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 410, § 18.2 (1984), fall short of establishing prejudice sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” Hall v. State, 240 Ga.App. 356, 523 S.E.2d 409 (October 14, 1999). No constitutional speedy trial violation where defendant’s trial for robbery by sudden snatching was conducted 14 months after the crime, even though defendant was incarcerated in the interim. 1. Assertion of right. Defendant first filed a speedy trial demand nine months after defendant’s arrest, but “when the trial court offered to conduct a trial soon after this speedy trial demand was filed (in exchange for defendant's agreement to waive formal indictment), defendant refused to proceed to trial without having the case against him proceed by formal arraignment. Further, when defendant's case was called for trial, defense counsel (who had represented defendant for over a year before trial) asked for a continuance . Under these circumstances, the assertion of the right to a speedy trial must be weighted heavily against defendant. See Weidlund v. State, 191 Ga.App. 668, 669-670, 382 S.E.2d 709 (1989).” 2. Prejudice. “Although we cannot say in the case sub judice that defendant's 14-month stay in jail before trial was not oppressive, we will not weigh the first prejudice factor in defendant's favor because defendant has not shown that he was exposed to substandard conditions while he was in jail, nor has defendant shown that he had to endure some burden beyond those that necessarily attend imprisonment. See Boseman v. State, [263 Ga. 730, 733 (1)(d), 438 S.E.2d 626 (1994)]. Defendant therefore had to show actual anxiety and concern and specific evidence of how the delay impaired his ability to defend himself. See Johnson v. State, [268 Ga. 416, 418(2), 490 S.E.2d 91 (1997)]. We find no evidence in the case sub judice of defendant's anxiety or concern so as to balance this factor in his favor. And, while defendant's attorney speculated that possible exculpatory witnesses were not called as a result of the delay, he presented no evidence to that effect. As a consequence, this factor must also be weighted against defendant. See Perry v. Mitchell, 253 Ga. 593, 595, 322 S.E.2d 273 (1984).” Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). No constitutional speedy trial violation despite four year delay where delay caused by defendant’s repeated requests for continuance; defendant made no speedy trial demand; and defendant’s allegation of prejudice – death of the victim in the interim – actually worked to defendant’s benefit, as “the absence of testimony by the [victim] detailing Johnson's attack and the adverse consequences he had sustained because of the attack worked to Johnson's advantage,” citing Brown v. State, 264 Ga. 805, 450 S.E.2d 821 (1994). Jernigan v. State, 239 Ga.App. 65, 517 S.E.2d 370 (May 11, 1999). No constitutional speedy trial violation despite 17- month delay in trying defendant’s DUI charges. While time is presumptively prejudicial, delay was caused as much by defendant as by State. No actual prejudice shown absent fact that defendant’s witness moved to California, and trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that witness’s testimony was not material, based on evidence that witness was also intoxicated. “To carry her burden of showing prejudice due to the unavailability of this witness, Jernigan must show that the missing witness could supply material evidence for the defense. Torres v. State, 270 Ga. 79, 81(2), 508 S.E.2d 171 (1998). ‘A missing witness whose testimony cannot help a defendant constitutes a flimsy basis on which to claim prejudice.’ Id.” B. IMMEDIATE APPEAL Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 767 S.E.2d 24 (December 11, 2014). Following defendant’s armed robbery and related convictions, habeas court properly denied relief; contrary to defendant’s argument, trial court wasn’t deprived of jurisdiction to conduct his trial by filing of his pro se notice of appeal, inasmuch as he had counsel of record at the time it was filed. Notes in footnote that “[t]he denial of a motion for acquittal on statutory speedy trial grounds is immediately appealable. See Hubbard v. State, 254 Ga. 694, 695–696, 333 S.E.2d 827 (1985).” Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 262 (November 19, 2012). 1. Overruling Callaway v. State, 275 Ga. 332, 567 S.E.2d 13 (2002), and Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730 n. 1, 438 S.E.2d 626 (1994), Supreme Court instead follows United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978) and holds that appeal from the denial of a pretrial constitutional speedy trial claim must follow the interlocutory appeal procedures of OCGA § 5–6–34(b). “Unlike a double jeopardy violation, the harm of which is not eliminated by the defendant's acquittal after being twice put in jeopardy, ‘[t]he essence’ of a speedy trial claim ‘in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged. Normally, it is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed.’ Id. at 860. Most importantly, the Supreme Court [in MacDonald ] flatly rejected the argument that the right to a speedy trial is, like the right against double jeopardy or to reduced bail before trial, the sort of right ‘the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.’ Id.” Dismisses Sosniak’s appeal for failure to follow