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interlocutory appeal procedures, but notes that trial court’s ruling on the subject was correct, anyway: Accord, Stevens v. State , 292 Ga. 218, 734 S.E.2d 743 (November 27, 2012); Moceri v. State , 319 Ga.App. 375, 735 S.E.2d 36 (November 29, 2012); Morris v. State , 319 Ga.App. 198, 734 S.E.2d 926 (December 5, 2012); Ford v. State , 319 Ga.App. 655, 738 S.E.2d 111 (February 4, 2013); Taylor v. State , 321 Ga.App. 736, 738 S.E.2d 347 (February 14, 2013). 2. Assertion of right. “Sosniak waited over five years until the trial court would no longer grant his requests for a continuance to assert his right to a speedy trial. The trial court did not err in finding this eve-of-trial request untimely, and it properly weighed this factor against Sosniak.” Hewell v. State, 277 Ga.App. 265, 626 S.E.2d 237 (January 19, 2006). 1. Trial court denied defendant’s motion for acquittal based upon speedy trial violation, then ordered defendant to proceed to trial despite counsel’s oral assertion of the right to an immediate appeal. Defendant then decided to plead guilty rather than go to trial. Held, “Hewell failed to preserve any issue with regard to his right to a direct appeal by failing to file a notice of direct appeal before pleading guilty to the charges against him. See [ Baker v. State , 263 Ga.App. 462, 466-467(2), 588 S.E.2d 288 (2003)]. Compare Reed v. State, 205 Ga.App. 209, 211(3) (422 S.E.2d 15) (1992) (defendant filed notice of appeal several minutes after the trial court’s denial of his plea in bar and before opening statements).” Note this is a direct appeal, not an interlocutory appeal. 2. “Since Hewell entered a guilty plea, he has waived his right to assert speedy trial issues on appeal. Griffin v. State, 278 Ga. 669 (604 S.E.2d 155) (2004). This rule of waiver applies even in cases in which the defendant attempts to reserve his right to appeal a speedy trial issue before pleading guilty. Davis v. State, 251 Ga.App. 436, 437 (554 S.E.2d 583) (2001).” Callaway v. State, 275 Ga. 332, 567 S.E.2d 13 (July 15, 2002). Overruled, see Sosniak (November 19, 2012), above. C. SPEEDY APPEAL/POST-CONVICTION RELIEF Chernowski v. State, 330 Ga.App. 702, 769 S.E.2d 126 (February 12, 2015). DUI conviction reversed; claim of due process violation in seven-year delay in processing appeal can’t be considered on appeal because not presented to trial court. Defendant also contends, apparently correctly, that the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals is incomplete because it “does not contain (1) her motion to suppress, (2) the trial court's order denying her motion to suppress, or (3) a transcript of the motion-to-suppress hearing.” “But here, we are precluded from considering this enumeration of error because, as demonstrated by the record that is before this Court, Chernowski failed to raise this issue below and may not raise it for the first time on appeal. See Bynum v. State, [315 Ga.App. 392, 395-96(3) (726 S.E.2d 428) (2012)] (‘Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court must be affirmed. Significantly, there is no ruling of the trial court to review for abuse of discretion, as [appellant] failed to raise this issue below. As a result, he may not raise this issue for the first time on appeal.’); Butler v. State, [277 Ga.App. 57, 63(5) (625 S.E.2d 458) (2005)] (same).” Defendant should have moved the trial court to complete the record. “Indeed, OCGA § 5–6–41 provides that when ‘any party contends that the transcript or record does not truly or fully disclose what transpired in the trial court and the parties are unable to agree thereon, the trial court shall set the matter down for a hearing with notice to both parties and resolve the difference so as to make the record conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after the record is transmitted to the appellate court, on a proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be corrected and, if necessary, that a supplemental record shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the trial court.’ OCGA § 5–6–41(f); see DeToma v. State, 296 Ga. 90, 94(2) n.3 (765 S.E.2d 596) (2014) (noting that appellant had not attempted to supplement the transcript on appeal using the procedures set forth in OCGA § 5–6–41(f)).” Accord, Thomas v. State , 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015) (speedy appeal issue not raised below). Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; delay in processing direct appeal didn’t “violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. While this Court has never addressed a claim exactly like the one that Hulett makes, we have previously rejected similar arguments alleging an excessive delay between sentencing and execution in two cases where death row inmates' appeals had resulted in resentencing trials. See Jones v. State, 273 Ga. 231, 233(2), 539 S.E.2d 154 (2000) (finding meritless a ‘“waiting for execution is intolerably cruel” argument’); Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 96, 105(35), 376 S.E.2d 851 (1989) (same).” U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to hear this argument. “Furthermore, federal courts of appeal, including the Eleventh Circuit, have held that prolonged incarceration under a sentence of death does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Thompson v. Secretary for Dept. of Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284(II) (11 th Cir., 2008) (noting ‘the total absence of Supreme Court precedent that a prolonged stay on death row violates the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment’ and ‘conclud[ing] that execution following a 31–year term of imprisonment is not in itself a constitutional violation’). But cf. Jones v. Chappell, No. CV 09–02158–CJC, 2014 WL