☢ test - Í

3567365, at * 1, * 14 (C.D.Cal., July 16, 2014) (holding that California's ‘dysfunctional’ death penalty system, in which only 13 of over 900 individuals sentenced to death since 1978 have been executed, violates the Eighth Amendment because it is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘serves no penological purpose’ and therefore vacating the death sentence of an inmate on death row for 19 years).” Trial court here properly assigned fault for the delay to defendant based on counsel’s admission that they had asked for no hearing on their motion for new trial for almost nine years based on “direction ‘from [his] client’ and that ‘it was directed as trial tactic.’” This Court has never addressed how to resolve constitutional speedy appeal claims in cases in which a death sentence was imposed. But see Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 48(1), 694 S.E.2d 350 (2010) (evaluating a defendant's constitutional speedy trial claim in a death penalty case under the Barker test). Singleton v. State, 326 Ga.App. 609, 757 S.E.2d 211 (March 27, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no due process violation in 10-year delay of appeal. “[A]n appellate delay's effect on counsel's memories is not the kind of specific evidence required to show that the delay prejudiced a defendant's appeal. See Loadholt v. State, 286 Ga. 402, 406(4), 687 S.E.2d 824 (2010).” Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 588, 740 S.E.2d 129 (March 18, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no due process violation from delayed appeal, as no prejudice shown despite nine-year delay. “Although Smith states that appellate counsel had to ‘reconstruct the case,’ appellate counsel will always have to familiarize himself with the case when he is not the same attorney who represented the defendant at trial.” Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (March 4, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions, and death penalty, affirmed. No due process violation despite four-year delay in filing trial transcript, due in part to death of original court reporter. “Brockman … contends that his appeal has been delayed as a result of the delayed filing of the trial transcript. However, he filed his amendment to his motion for new trial detailing errors beyond the general grounds eleven years after receiving the complete transcript, and he has failed to show how the delay in the filing of the trial transcript has harmed him. Compare Wade v. State, 231 Ga. 131, 133(I) (200 S.E.2d 271) (1973) (holding that a defendant was denied his right to appeal and was thus entitled to a new trial where the State was unable to file a transcript because notes from which the transcript was to be prepared had been destroyed). While, as Brockman contends, the late filing of the transcript was not in compliance with the Unified Appeal Procedure, see UAP IV(A)(1) (generally requiring that a complete transcript of a death penalty case be filed within 45 days from the jury's sentencing phase verdict), Brockman has failed to show how he was prejudiced. See Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 305(4) (486 S.E.2d 861) (1997) (finding no reversible error where the defendant was not harmed as a result of the trial court's non-compliance with the UAP).” Hargrove v. State, 291 Ga. 879, 734 S.E.2d 34 (November 5, 2012). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no prejudice shown in appellate delay. “Appellant argues that his counsels' limited recollections as to why certain decisions were made at trial establishes prejudice. However, this argument is unpersuasive where, as here, the transcript is not so inadequate or incomplete as to prevent a thorough judicial review of the proceedings on appeal. See Chatman v. Mancill, [280 Ga. 253, 262, 626 S.E.2d 102 (2006)].” Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691, 715 S.E.2d 104 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no due process violation in lengthy appellate delay, caused mostly by defendant’s repeated failure to file timely notice of appeal. Convicted in 1995, defendant finally filed timely notice of appeal in 2010. “Payne argues that the more than 15–year delay between his conviction and this appeal violated his right to due process. ‘This Court has recognized that substantial delays experienced during the criminal appellate process implicate due process rights.’ Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 256, 626 S.E.2d 102 (2006). Whether an appellate delay violates due process depends on a balancing of the ‘length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice’ — which, unlike in the speedy trial context, is not presumed but must be shown. Id. at 256, 260–261, 626 S.E.2d 102. While the length of the delay in this appeal was excessive and unfortunate, the delay did not violate Payne's due process rights, as the other three Chatman factors all weigh against him. The reasons for the delay: Although the State bears blame for some of the delay, it is largely attributable to Payne. Not only did he fail to vigorously assert his appellate right for more than five years, as discussed below, but he acknowledges that the delays were primarily his counsel's fault. To the extent Payne's various counsel provided constitutionally effective representation, delays resulting from their decisions and his interaction with them are attributable to him. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 94, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1287, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009); Weis v. State, 287 Ga. 46, 51–53, 694 S.E.2d 350 (2010). See also District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2330, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (‘[I]t